From nobody Fri Dec 19 20:13:23 2025 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 333F3185F08; Sun, 24 Mar 2024 23:53:01 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1711324382; cv=none; b=FVKtIyos9r3WK59oGb56rhaSVW0Dl45bxmmarQo35SfA1k0PUF6oZp0ROgxTM9t9ah5MjWSNF80U8FqQ8uw8f/FoG4TPFwjr2lZHKcGWcwwAt8tKaxgXwq4n+drONPDlNY9cz1NeKUvxksdaI/v0Z3VXwAk570QJgUuIEJpZq1E= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1711324382; c=relaxed/simple; bh=i4JmSMxH5OlnL+XOfQJWj9C2cgHjqyhvb5Orgg/tQzE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=qCyOtXj7oT5UM7VG3qatKB3cAJyRzRyQO4xvwvH/cZ7l/4kSLyZXduETma87ZLut8nYsfq57Lq3fP6KEwIOi3wwVP8Q82OI1we5unSVN8jmndzYTBtwfYQvze7FuPVAvWUODKqyURzco5iaulLsvH5Y3vzfOX73dtzxha0wIrac= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=W9noazb3; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="W9noazb3" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 52DACC43390; Sun, 24 Mar 2024 23:53:00 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1711324381; bh=i4JmSMxH5OlnL+XOfQJWj9C2cgHjqyhvb5Orgg/tQzE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=W9noazb3JZ/Qqaqni3htUUUX7lyPCz/T4wq6a24DxuTVkgI+qhl31gxMroJmzAcuP jlSZHKyVX75QgeoiqXpVswVUgjdJ02FVZvYQlj5T+FTeRKUXCIJ5caivCycgZu7ixD bj7jCUmOMWJFq3KWuvpqSfLPA8GyUKdCy4e1NrR1H05mdxQLuZGkaNPpiWH2InBfhz /wQ5B3TKbCPzPNeTZM3PBFNeXt/1hoiT3sR53EEYS5YW6YfK/HRspP0wu/kRIpoeew hQI8t++qqntb2ML3h2REoAvZ6P2PhGlR5omOFVrjNmh4syIrAcXBsRH7XYp43tjvWm r5Hh78EsT6qPw== From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thinh Tran , Jiri Pirko , Jakub Kicinski , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.19 146/148] net/bnx2x: Prevent access to a freed page in page_pool Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2024 19:50:10 -0400 Message-ID: <20240324235012.1356413-147-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20240324235012.1356413-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20240324235012.1356413-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" From: Thinh Tran [ Upstream commit d27e2da94a42655861ca4baea30c8cd65546f25d ] Fix race condition leading to system crash during EEH error handling During EEH error recovery, the bnx2x driver's transmit timeout logic could cause a race condition when handling reset tasks. The bnx2x_tx_timeout() schedules reset tasks via bnx2x_sp_rtnl_task(), which ultimately leads to bnx2x_nic_unload(). In bnx2x_nic_unload() SGEs are freed using bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(). However, this could overlap with the EEH driver's attempt to reset the device using bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), which also tries to free SGEs. This race condition can result in system crashes due to accessing freed memory locations in bnx2x_free_rx_sge() 799 static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_sge(struct bnx2x *bp, 800 struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp, u16 index) 801 { 802 struct sw_rx_page *sw_buf =3D &fp->rx_page_ring[index]; 803 struct page *page =3D sw_buf->page; .... where sw_buf was set to NULL after the call to dma_unmap_page() by the preceding thread. EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset' PCI 0011:01:00.0#10000: EEH: Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset() bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14228(eth1)]IO slot reset initializing... bnx2x 0011:01:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14244(eth1)]IO slot reset --> driver unload Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000025065fc Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ..... Call Trace: [c000000003c67a20] [c00800000250658c] bnx2x_io_slot_reset+0x204/0x610 [= bnx2x] (unreliable) [c000000003c67af0] [c0000000000518a8] eeh_report_reset+0xb8/0xf0 [c000000003c67b60] [c000000000052130] eeh_pe_report+0x180/0x550 [c000000003c67c70] [c00000000005318c] eeh_handle_normal_event+0x84c/0xa= 60 [c000000003c67d50] [c000000000053a84] eeh_event_handler+0xf4/0x170 [c000000003c67da0] [c000000000194c58] kthread+0x1c8/0x1d0 [c000000003c67e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 To solve this issue, we need to verify page pool allocations before freeing. Fixes: 4cace675d687 ("bnx2x: Alloc 4k fragment for each rx ring buffer elem= ent") Signed-off-by: Thinh Tran Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240315205535.1321-1-thinhtr@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h b/drivers/net/= ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h index df5e8c2e8eafe..844195849ae76 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h @@ -1008,9 +1008,6 @@ static inline void bnx2x_set_fw_mac_addr(__le16 *fw_h= i, __le16 *fw_mid, static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_mem_pool(struct bnx2x *bp, struct bnx2x_alloc_pool *pool) { - if (!pool->page) - return; - put_page(pool->page); =20 pool->page =3D NULL; @@ -1021,6 +1018,9 @@ static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(struct bnx= 2x *bp, { int i; =20 + if (!fp->page_pool.page) + return; + if (fp->mode =3D=3D TPA_MODE_DISABLED) return; =20 --=20 2.43.0