From nobody Tue Sep 16 09:17:56 2025 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B635AC4708E for ; Wed, 4 Jan 2023 14:39:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239456AbjADOjS (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Jan 2023 09:39:18 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58668 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239301AbjADOjM (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Jan 2023 09:39:12 -0500 Received: from mail-ej1-x632.google.com (mail-ej1-x632.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::632]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3F4E26167 for ; Wed, 4 Jan 2023 06:39:10 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ej1-x632.google.com with SMTP id tz12so83091307ejc.9 for ; Wed, 04 Jan 2023 06:39:10 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=cc:to:in-reply-to:references:message-id:content-transfer-encoding :mime-version:subject:date:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=CYYQgh/lv3T9poZ9Kbn1xfKKla/OcUPaY2NVZr8/1wI=; b=TPhzP6VDMUU3QtDkGKBz2ODkHY5IHPZJLk2AHghZRhDppkwIzHLh+ClSZSi7dOkdEO djNbFLbX/qbVhko5HtmYgh+KwUPHIj6YbIq8IfqKDrqPxZwEVo1ZnOcnm84WOikjUIXN 84Nn49z3bmZGZyGjFWM0g31CC5lEjul+7e7vQ= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:in-reply-to:references:message-id:content-transfer-encoding :mime-version:subject:date:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=CYYQgh/lv3T9poZ9Kbn1xfKKla/OcUPaY2NVZr8/1wI=; b=4/5lzIax1ZRT/pm98zsO57kdRzz3uKB+Kw0fsLGOHHZa6PrPJgXAHLbyCDyiJNErm8 jkcrpB3f+BBJj8psFa6uRFB1yO08D3NhucCofMEBXG7+Qz6zonOB9aoWSk/j7mcseVLm 65r0rApw+ad4u5YprQLl+haiky1M5CVdaB/K1h0XsQIozLh+IZysYFie6c/iiTIPoKUb d5Cz2D6aEZUOafKgVDo+2jK3SGKEXCkJeh3t9SLnpiwfkrKYDTn092tCzBOwcVvFoMBo cLme7dItgzeJr0/ZdaUW9cJnNmwoLPPcD7rQD1I0WplsTawxy9G3Qbv2zc7H2myl5iQe vRyQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AFqh2kq0DjqVSqT5nshLilaCboBojsa3q+kXd/VlhmkonPlTGybpuV/M aTlJtfSAUOhafVNgx+m3AWo2HQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMrXdXtBlcdrPW/OtLMuhlJIa8ITHBl4FnGqRj+b7buGekdJ2R0dm4D0Mgxm/adGoMtGVV+TmZF0UA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:5dd2:b0:7c1:7010:f413 with SMTP id p18-20020a1709065dd200b007c17010f413mr44805532ejv.19.1672843148794; Wed, 04 Jan 2023 06:39:08 -0800 (PST) Received: from alco.roam.corp.google.com ([2620:0:1059:10:a438:c7da:62e0:36f4]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c8-20020a170906924800b0078de26f66b9sm15386659ejx.114.2023.01.04.06.39.07 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 04 Jan 2023 06:39:08 -0800 (PST) From: Ricardo Ribalda Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2023 15:38:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH v6 1/3] Documentation: sysctl: Correct kexec_load_disabled MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-1-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org> References: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-0-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org> In-Reply-To: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-0-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org> To: Philipp Rudo , Eric Biederman , "Guilherme G. Piccoli" , Jonathan Corbet Cc: Ricardo Ribalda , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Sergey Senozhatsky , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , Baoquan He , Petr Tesarik , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Bagas Sanjaya , Steven Rostedt , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ross Zwisler X-Mailer: b4 0.11.0-dev-696ae X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=1318; i=ribalda@chromium.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=2pZFS+1BHtUlFuNmvm1mTYxkgU9yharonO0OzNd1vYM=; b=owEBbQKS/ZANAwAKAdE30T7POsSIAcsmYgBjtY+EP67lwRrCO5L5k4Dp6xvXVoYkuhFXhgRbt/kG 8bQ+rx2JAjMEAAEKAB0WIQREDzjr+/4oCDLSsx7RN9E+zzrEiAUCY7WPhAAKCRDRN9E+zzrEiEwYD/ 4usIWKfOuuGi8xYMQsTa952RC/Gqq3NLfoSqb13IPaxmQxqWWUjQ9uDtxl6QD90QnBoAjD/tSFebtK EapNZosQxrdc+t7axxND9uY17FhOJIKscuu90wrCExbOXav9p2pBlZVk1U8k/WwDAJrH5qMpt7pUvw pGRdxVE80sFSCeFSJCcuNrY0XeAYjO2cxzIuLxLSx7O9za8wFCZF4BMRohyc7tsSyl2EVdZYcemr0R 4z2XLsWYVQRXjtccMgFRkfCGOOmNW/hXVuV11qDDGyf5CSjfO9R7+6laH01SA3fF0Uk/E8Q+3LCu59 6F5RMHfOoXh38K58UOC8w/U2l5RjiRF2XC4yfmrobAdgnYqmutRHi+Lug8kNkWndLNlewOVKt3Cd63 wlBc/bMdd6ccRlzZ1pU8IMBsdVp1LCIUWq+IttQU61DODNb9Eatwj6wxBX8Qnhg0PvGrK8Cvsaamfp bYOMgQZU49QK2hsbc/aWhMe4mAt26NsDxp87ifiQjgWtpCkBYvj6Su8gg8VEAehX3Nl/1FxQA05HsT xSHhehNI5G5pHHslJ5HupPSSbvcOEZO5knYX2C0pCmWn3Gji43SAmKZSHJ3DE3zeUe5bJZlTJLZHBw XTSGECyozGv6ERamTopSA8x3YabJeqxtU79aXb9q9mYqfk5MxwYuXUKki4aw== X-Developer-Key: i=ribalda@chromium.org; a=openpgp; fpr=9EC3BB66E2FC129A6F90B39556A0D81F9F782DA9 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org kexec_load_disabled affects both ``kexec_load`` and ``kexec_file_load`` syscalls. Make it explicit. Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda Acked-by: Baoquan He --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/ad= min-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst index 98d1b198b2b4..97394bd9d065 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst @@ -450,9 +450,10 @@ this allows system administrators to override the kexec_load_disabled =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D =20 -A toggle indicating if the ``kexec_load`` syscall has been disabled. -This value defaults to 0 (false: ``kexec_load`` enabled), but can be -set to 1 (true: ``kexec_load`` disabled). +A toggle indicating if the syscalls ``kexec_load`` and +``kexec_file_load`` have been disabled. +This value defaults to 0 (false: ``kexec_*load`` enabled), but can be +set to 1 (true: ``kexec_*load`` disabled). Once true, kexec can no longer be used, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. This allows a kexec image to be loaded before disabling the syscall, --=20 2.39.0.314.g84b9a713c41-goog-b4-0.11.0-dev-696ae From nobody Tue Sep 16 09:17:56 2025 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E194DC4332F for ; Wed, 4 Jan 2023 14:39:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239558AbjADOjW (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Jan 2023 09:39:22 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58672 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239349AbjADOjM (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Jan 2023 09:39:12 -0500 Received: from mail-ej1-x62d.google.com (mail-ej1-x62d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::62d]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C6363E7E for ; Wed, 4 Jan 2023 06:39:11 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ej1-x62d.google.com with SMTP id fy8so19059473ejc.13 for ; Wed, 04 Jan 2023 06:39:11 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=cc:to:in-reply-to:references:message-id:content-transfer-encoding :mime-version:subject:date:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=UgxvQK67tmMrLA74uOg//Gx6503PSr9SD0hLGo86OJA=; b=OsU1DngzOr4hhp/EoveJQE3TgkyHrAPpIqNakGYzicuHh+CEyyLyykYhfaAoqGFAP0 LYbScr1P7QayvqjcETjQvA86XknilwM/8QYVJvo5EC3i5qtaTrRhxUBFdaiU4bPIhAxz Hbe9lGwRtmdSmOtj1sxtys51p9R+230EoGueY= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:in-reply-to:references:message-id:content-transfer-encoding :mime-version:subject:date:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=UgxvQK67tmMrLA74uOg//Gx6503PSr9SD0hLGo86OJA=; b=jRmNYNxT5Hbs7cZwDh05KLlZRMDnt1l49NxyE8Y9MmOSNNCYU18Htj8kPq8QMZTY+j Botk4YdgjWP+w57A+h7urR0JZ11OGca3iAfKQcaBJGt5Mn4WZ4z/e6gBKC+hMnoJD5qZ mTFOCUweKCP9hYF4/BwtVC08pJsxf0K/eQL99J4AjBwpwIbV9IO5Lct4USxSpP/PTt5B E0BO01kY4csPQJVkMPHnFmNmQrkITd3glcGwBeG9UsBS9KZccKtF6CPUgvEkCi9woNcF qg7tQXPJ7GyBHNKFwzAfiVXBqyP1T/BH0raymE+gpWHzDSVrgsMSYdA2ZDNWcg9IFjc+ YlVw== X-Gm-Message-State: AFqh2krzQEqDKLBoMeT1girfJ//Chu7i9mgyCNbz2nn1QdXusTGqo+fL 1WvHlHrEl1y5YIRjpw2liV09qw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMrXdXvnkGuCKVUdw8um3IaAa5qydCD325lajLfPnGFPmg5PN8jHu5yo2Sbj1UcOE9OWka3RWtYWTw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:a643:b0:83c:7308:b2ed with SMTP id vu3-20020a170907a64300b0083c7308b2edmr41277617ejc.17.1672843150377; Wed, 04 Jan 2023 06:39:10 -0800 (PST) Received: from alco.roam.corp.google.com ([2620:0:1059:10:a438:c7da:62e0:36f4]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c8-20020a170906924800b0078de26f66b9sm15386659ejx.114.2023.01.04.06.39.08 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 04 Jan 2023 06:39:09 -0800 (PST) From: Ricardo Ribalda Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2023 15:38:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH v6 2/3] kexec: Factor out kexec_load_permitted MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-2-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org> References: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-0-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org> In-Reply-To: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-0-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org> To: Philipp Rudo , Eric Biederman , "Guilherme G. Piccoli" , Jonathan Corbet Cc: Ricardo Ribalda , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Sergey Senozhatsky , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , Baoquan He , Petr Tesarik , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Bagas Sanjaya , Steven Rostedt , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ross Zwisler X-Mailer: b4 0.11.0-dev-696ae X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=2784; i=ribalda@chromium.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=k6P1smlJYbqtcVyvGezj5oVw/cqtzE+zRS/qzT0ctCc=; b=owEBbQKS/ZANAwAKAdE30T7POsSIAcsmYgBjtY+F5BhkliZFvYK5Ym2wT15gzQ6IywHdyBQuZv9D Oz2Fl7SJAjMEAAEKAB0WIQREDzjr+/4oCDLSsx7RN9E+zzrEiAUCY7WPhQAKCRDRN9E+zzrEiCV9D/ 43PHdTJ87hSQ5gRjDLnN9QhBf/0sdKtpQSIVJtwjRwJj0fKVXNwKAbxnZGaKGFbK0+D6XWur5dsPhx zICLrbRMjNO5zu2acdEIcX0Ixyc1goxQxCWSvLbPGI13Gu0zXck2k1aGNHQxbrHsLsoMWv1eJmz7ur 0A1lsCo+Tm3tAmEnvQh2aD6k3XqJloCXOAzXoiwo3JjNn7aUKZmMnNEOVMiMhnEORyLIkQanA6I6pL XJ8jguQA6h/Bp8Xn5ykknlVGxjJvu4Nn6rvEnUKm+kp7L1k8iiUK7HcFRf4VPocxKiILNgowAGfnlR mTGEFPqHMTv+Ht+GLfRhqEOd31vGL8VkT0ermM6YAqLuhXIONQn4Jaewcdw90K31Teiw5Y1mdal9tj J1IkZa48R7TpCMYFTXf7SibBowvNWa9Vrz8vbrM7SE3cjIUTs0JvqP6Vav0a2TmgMgKdcOPkNgDP6F EotJDSYyCD9L+VjV54ebwcd6Tw94km8BKQtiR8AdwBHagfrBuQIYUJtBL5nWYP7hP8HiQt4P4Ubj7c kk5rmipLfXeDwJNM5L+L3kUi38k3o9hch06PSlNgWkhmhBSPAlLZxWZ8qTXYLWRpyfFX35Qzx6p1xD bjTLM5g5f84UHd42O5GYOj3SQoPP2t4muxbQhIIms/wq5G20v9tluc/GAVQQ== X-Developer-Key: i=ribalda@chromium.org; a=openpgp; fpr=9EC3BB66E2FC129A6F90B39556A0D81F9F782DA9 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Both syscalls (kexec and kexec_file) do the same check, lets factor it out. Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda Acked-by: Baoquan He --- include/linux/kexec.h | 3 ++- kernel/kexec.c | 2 +- kernel/kexec_core.c | 11 ++++++++++- kernel/kexec_file.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h index 41a686996aaa..182e0c11b87b 100644 --- a/include/linux/kexec.h +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h @@ -406,7 +406,8 @@ extern int kimage_crash_copy_vmcoreinfo(struct kimage *= image); =20 extern struct kimage *kexec_image; extern struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; -extern int kexec_load_disabled; + +bool kexec_load_permitted(void); =20 #ifndef kexec_flush_icache_page #define kexec_flush_icache_page(page) diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c index cb8e6e6f983c..ce1bca874a8d 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec.c +++ b/kernel/kexec.c @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_seg= ments, int result; =20 /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) + if (!kexec_load_permitted()) return -EPERM; =20 /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c index ca2743f9c634..a1efc70f4158 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c @@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image, =20 struct kimage *kexec_image; struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; -int kexec_load_disabled; +static int kexec_load_disabled; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL static struct ctl_table kexec_core_sysctls[] =3D { { @@ -952,6 +952,15 @@ static int __init kexec_core_sysctl_init(void) late_initcall(kexec_core_sysctl_init); #endif =20 +bool kexec_load_permitted(void) +{ + /* + * Only the superuser can use the kexec syscall and if it has not + * been disabled. + */ + return capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) && !kexec_load_disabled; +} + /* * No panic_cpu check version of crash_kexec(). This function is called * only when panic_cpu holds the current CPU number; this is the only CPU diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index 45637511e0de..29efa43ea951 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, i= nitrd_fd, struct kimage **dest_image, *image; =20 /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) + if (!kexec_load_permitted()) return -EPERM; =20 /* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */ --=20 2.39.0.314.g84b9a713c41-goog-b4-0.11.0-dev-696ae From nobody Tue Sep 16 09:17:56 2025 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 922F0C53210 for ; Wed, 4 Jan 2023 14:39:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229648AbjADOj1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Jan 2023 09:39:27 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58720 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S239489AbjADOjO (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Jan 2023 09:39:14 -0500 Received: from mail-ej1-x62e.google.com (mail-ej1-x62e.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::62e]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4B9FDA45E for ; Wed, 4 Jan 2023 06:39:13 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ej1-x62e.google.com with SMTP id u9so83231676ejo.0 for ; Wed, 04 Jan 2023 06:39:13 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=cc:to:in-reply-to:references:message-id:content-transfer-encoding :mime-version:subject:date:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=7ktTgqCg5vZndbEsq2NE84RTVG7aeSaApbDApUiy3yI=; b=bAo5rEoMeLXb+zWJpWccSUbC/52Xl5JUcRb7B7ldPjmJu8yrGJebcgfu2mvn6DoQOH DJpreAUPSRM8Os5s1oTyh3CCfi6WZSJnNqxdwx043PELATrAMnUMkGjBMipqFxsD6I2u shiCmP+MHLcOSwobb1InBZKdfL043vctCbYng= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:in-reply-to:references:message-id:content-transfer-encoding :mime-version:subject:date:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=7ktTgqCg5vZndbEsq2NE84RTVG7aeSaApbDApUiy3yI=; b=MLffjluwUk3Ck+G/f+H6hoitObbbpItp1i3IoWbjSCpyFsORH4TIKPddfywTNSwyhc uRzGMl+9LACJ2ict6bTx/liURAoq5/XmvVW6/fPQOlmxBGrgATuLFgmc1NNYkol1WYct 7BaLkrWeQ//yY/8fnUnF1ZXGVTRGzMUxo9LWMsLxLk/O5rs0uoPrA+/nQviJBkZfZcoC gM+RTzBnDnnCXBNHmF3/dzt/KnKjnq0OzBAcFhXLC5w+m9zGSay2Yt7ryNXjqnsPyr9P d0eITIdTIMReIrBS4y9D2l8ri5ZPGo9VSCJogAKzeCgwVxPtIbOwHEXNbr2aqzWOzqJ7 7AdA== X-Gm-Message-State: AFqh2kqjv2mHaXujweNG8iUX1Pi4h12wlGpoGEPmAVPlv5aKZU+YwqyR joQ4/iTluyY0DmZzWg74uknIJg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMrXdXuNx+d3v0Nfvuk68oEYdAFWRimFrEchPyE6TlxN7ROhq+mc7cuwNsyL8lc4Y9VgL1LLJfST/g== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:b150:b0:7c1:2931:2263 with SMTP id bt16-20020a170906b15000b007c129312263mr43585109ejb.71.1672843151848; Wed, 04 Jan 2023 06:39:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from alco.roam.corp.google.com ([2620:0:1059:10:a438:c7da:62e0:36f4]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c8-20020a170906924800b0078de26f66b9sm15386659ejx.114.2023.01.04.06.39.10 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 04 Jan 2023 06:39:11 -0800 (PST) From: Ricardo Ribalda Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2023 15:38:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH v6 3/3] kexec: Introduce sysctl parameters kexec_load_limit_* MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-3-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org> References: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-0-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org> In-Reply-To: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v6-0-6a8531a09b9a@chromium.org> To: Philipp Rudo , Eric Biederman , "Guilherme G. Piccoli" , Jonathan Corbet Cc: Ricardo Ribalda , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Sergey Senozhatsky , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , Baoquan He , Petr Tesarik , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Bagas Sanjaya , Steven Rostedt , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ross Zwisler X-Mailer: b4 0.11.0-dev-696ae X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=7913; i=ribalda@chromium.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=pwr4lQSQU6e2iagP33ihhaoD9RG5CubbrBaEaThEAKM=; b=owEBbQKS/ZANAwAKAdE30T7POsSIAcsmYgBjtY+HjBoWaxGoO7sxgdVTlJcthgWB365UeesT8qSd hvqseBiJAjMEAAEKAB0WIQREDzjr+/4oCDLSsx7RN9E+zzrEiAUCY7WPhwAKCRDRN9E+zzrEiAunD/ 91AfbnoUWa9e8aD0UKHg+GAqqRrXozPx01fMTG3wC2iUZxj/n2uMz/Y8QbTHYctYbTfVMTpx/jHg2K cbSS6gGr5ybyMAggEcwWMSPfYWS/rVzPFf6T8G0NpDwWEnbQ4QjHDaULMlPg5AXL5uReOCp0qh/CjQ k2MK/1noz9a6dzcMqHd25iw6UGm2HWY4VXSD7on2U1hzxCAixuddN5gPd8lwBxwpueWdRaq3EIX+BI 0ECi9pmjTjN7BwiLeVDOPm8xI9hmn3SKhv/onx0MyBdYds4qYDZOgCxUWI/2/d+qa2V14UkKigfeQR g3c3YrWsOeWJTcCKad5PaGmNHk110c3wU8EZ5hCWcUXAMWyJbWXDh7GAOF6m8AVPtSsT2b++X9JQJw UUCys+nCBZmTEDOHNkS7ghuK3Q3YsjemCdfKa1LjHE1YSC18fK737LAKLRi3qv+vfFAQUX9HWBxWy7 u2hkB6tkUVgrTIwmEC9BzneUHH6HUJIffKaBjcCpSklvHyU0VFnXEkMbJFIy8JkDT31zzdfVe0jilF yyWg2218E4cEthc8vrS0HQuGe/Rl5rCO/l2Z7k4ZB//JKMuQX9c7W4RoBIMSEp0xHdOJwxtHOSflS/ xpS7m2cyXFO00X1x4m7hB6Mqmfn60Bhin0EGNy91xeKIdJLNMd5B15HPhzpA== X-Developer-Key: i=ribalda@chromium.org; a=openpgp; fpr=9EC3BB66E2FC129A6F90B39556A0D81F9F782DA9 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org kexec allows replacing the current kernel with a different one. This is usually a source of concerns for sysadmins that want to harden a system. Linux already provides a way to disable loading new kexec kernel via kexec_load_disabled, but that control is very coard, it is all or nothing and does not make distinction between a panic kexec and a normal kexec. This patch introduces new sysctl parameters, with finner tunning to specify how many times a kexec kernel can be loaded. The sysadmin can set different limits for kexec panic and kexec reboot kernels. The value can be modified at runtime via sysctl, but only with a stricter value. With these new parameters on place, a system with loadpin and verity enabled, using the following kernel parameters: sysctl.kexec_load_limit_reboot=3D0 sysct.kexec_load_limit_panic=3D1 can have a good warranty that if initrd tries to load a panic kernel, a malitious user will have small chances to replace that kernel with a different one, even if they can trigger timeouts on the disk where the panic kernel lives. Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda Acked-by: Baoquan He --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 18 ++++++ include/linux/kexec.h | 2 +- kernel/kexec.c | 4 +- kernel/kexec_core.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++= +++- kernel/kexec_file.c | 11 ++-- 5 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/ad= min-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst index 97394bd9d065..d5fb4b6ef405 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst @@ -461,6 +461,24 @@ allowing a system to set up (and later use) an image w= ithout it being altered. Generally used together with the `modules_disabled`_ sysctl. =20 +kexec_load_limit_panic +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D + +This parameter specifies a limit to the number of times the syscalls +``kexec_load`` and ``kexec_file_load`` can be called with a crash +image. It can only be set with a more restrictive value than the +current one. + +=3D=3D =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D +-1 Unlimited calls to kexec. This is the default setting. +N Number of calls left. +=3D=3D =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D + +kexec_load_limit_reboot +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D + +Similar functionality as ``kexec_load_limit_panic``, but for a normal +image. =20 kptr_restrict =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h index 182e0c11b87b..791e65829f86 100644 --- a/include/linux/kexec.h +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ extern int kimage_crash_copy_vmcoreinfo(struct kimage *= image); extern struct kimage *kexec_image; extern struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; =20 -bool kexec_load_permitted(void); +bool kexec_load_permitted(int kexec_image_type); =20 #ifndef kexec_flush_icache_page #define kexec_flush_icache_page(page) diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c index ce1bca874a8d..92d301f98776 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec.c +++ b/kernel/kexec.c @@ -190,10 +190,12 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigne= d long nr_segments, static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, unsigned long flags) { + int image_type =3D (flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) ? + KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH : KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT; int result; =20 /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ - if (!kexec_load_permitted()) + if (!kexec_load_permitted(image_type)) return -EPERM; =20 /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c index a1efc70f4158..951541d78ca8 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c @@ -926,10 +926,64 @@ int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image, return result; } =20 +struct kexec_load_limit { + /* Mutex protects the limit count. */ + struct mutex mutex; + int limit; +}; + +static struct kexec_load_limit load_limit_reboot =3D { + .mutex =3D __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(load_limit_reboot.mutex), + .limit =3D -1, +}; + +static struct kexec_load_limit load_limit_panic =3D { + .mutex =3D __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(load_limit_panic.mutex), + .limit =3D -1, +}; + struct kimage *kexec_image; struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; static int kexec_load_disabled; + #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static int kexec_limit_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct kexec_load_limit *limit =3D table->data; + int val; + struct ctl_table tmp =3D { + .data =3D &val, + .maxlen =3D sizeof(val), + .mode =3D table->mode, + }; + int ret; + + if (write) { + ret =3D proc_dointvec(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (val < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + mutex_lock(&limit->mutex); + if (limit->limit !=3D -1 && val >=3D limit->limit) + ret =3D -EINVAL; + else + limit->limit =3D val; + mutex_unlock(&limit->mutex); + + return ret; + } + + mutex_lock(&limit->mutex); + val =3D limit->limit; + mutex_unlock(&limit->mutex); + + return proc_dointvec(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} + static struct ctl_table kexec_core_sysctls[] =3D { { .procname =3D "kexec_load_disabled", @@ -941,6 +995,18 @@ static struct ctl_table kexec_core_sysctls[] =3D { .extra1 =3D SYSCTL_ONE, .extra2 =3D SYSCTL_ONE, }, + { + .procname =3D "kexec_load_limit_panic", + .data =3D &load_limit_panic, + .mode =3D 0644, + .proc_handler =3D kexec_limit_handler, + }, + { + .procname =3D "kexec_load_limit_reboot", + .data =3D &load_limit_reboot, + .mode =3D 0644, + .proc_handler =3D kexec_limit_handler, + }, { } }; =20 @@ -952,13 +1018,30 @@ static int __init kexec_core_sysctl_init(void) late_initcall(kexec_core_sysctl_init); #endif =20 -bool kexec_load_permitted(void) +bool kexec_load_permitted(int kexec_image_type) { + struct kexec_load_limit *limit; + /* * Only the superuser can use the kexec syscall and if it has not * been disabled. */ - return capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) && !kexec_load_disabled; + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) + return false; + + /* Check limit counter and decrease it.*/ + limit =3D (kexec_image_type =3D=3D KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) ? + &load_limit_panic : &load_limit_reboot; + mutex_lock(&limit->mutex); + if (!limit->limit) { + mutex_unlock(&limit->mutex); + return false; + } + if (limit->limit !=3D -1) + limit->limit--; + mutex_unlock(&limit->mutex); + + return true; } =20 /* diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index 29efa43ea951..70e1e99038ee 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -326,11 +326,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int,= initrd_fd, unsigned long, cmdline_len, const char __user *, cmdline_ptr, unsigned long, flags) { - int ret =3D 0, i; + int image_type =3D (flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH) ? + KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH : KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT; struct kimage **dest_image, *image; + int ret =3D 0, i; =20 /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ - if (!kexec_load_permitted()) + if (!kexec_load_permitted(image_type)) return -EPERM; =20 /* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */ @@ -342,11 +344,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int,= initrd_fd, if (!kexec_trylock()) return -EBUSY; =20 - dest_image =3D &kexec_image; - if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH) { + if (image_type =3D=3D KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) { dest_image =3D &kexec_crash_image; if (kexec_crash_image) arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(); + } else { + dest_image =3D &kexec_image; } =20 if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD) --=20 2.39.0.314.g84b9a713c41-goog-b4-0.11.0-dev-696ae