From nobody Fri Dec 19 17:35:46 2025 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BBEEEC07E9D for ; Mon, 26 Sep 2022 11:13:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237628AbiIZLNE (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 Sep 2022 07:13:04 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52740 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237442AbiIZLLx (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 Sep 2022 07:11:53 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AE6425051A; Mon, 26 Sep 2022 03:35:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 90A5EB802C7; Mon, 26 Sep 2022 10:35:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C4623C433D6; Mon, 26 Sep 2022 10:35:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1664188540; bh=Qts+mTwxPMEZO9kijhoy/64pFEzmYfB6q0q5Kwgo2VU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Lq4aNg5pOTY4/gOKg5VsiCvgzXo21toqPOLeWH8741kY11JHnQGE+uzn/Iep1rTYE Z2UVXgxcxv7n/68XeALxIIOy1rRSN87QJcWH2heC4HILn1I+qtAoAHWz0G0EcgtcbR kYmuKc6y1VxQstXS+YpSazqO+A5E/iQ5XLrJDZDs= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel , Ilias Apalodimas , Peter Jones Subject: [PATCH 5.15 041/148] efi: libstub: check Shim mode using MokSBStateRT Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2022 12:11:15 +0200 Message-Id: <20220926100757.566743144@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.3 In-Reply-To: <20220926100756.074519146@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220926100756.074519146@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" From: Ard Biesheuvel commit 5f56a74cc0a6d9b9f8ba89cea29cd7c4774cb2b1 upstream. We currently check the MokSBState variable to decide whether we should treat UEFI secure boot as being disabled, even if the firmware thinks otherwise. This is used by shim to indicate that it is not checking signatures on boot images. In the kernel, we use this to relax lockdown policies. However, in cases where shim is not even being used, we don't want this variable to interfere with lockdown, given that the variable may be non-volatile and therefore persist across a reboot. This means setting it once will persistently disable lockdown checks on a given system. So switch to the mirrored version of this variable, called MokSBStateRT, which is supposed to be volatile, and this is something we can check. Cc: # v4.19+ Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas Reviewed-by: Peter Jones Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ =20 /* SHIM variables */ static const efi_guid_t shim_guid =3D EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; -static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] =3D L"MokSBState"; +static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] =3D L"MokSBStateRT"; =20 static efi_status_t get_var(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor, u32 *a= ttr, unsigned long *data_size, void *data) @@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureb =20 /* * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the - * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well - * honor that. + * variable doesn't have the non-volatile attribute set, we might as + * well honor that. */ size =3D sizeof(moksbstate); status =3D get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid, @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureb /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ if (status !=3D EFI_SUCCESS) goto secure_boot_enabled; - if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate =3D=3D 1) + if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) && moksbstate =3D=3D 1) return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; =20 secure_boot_enabled: