From nobody Mon Apr 13 13:30:25 2026 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 91ED9C19F2A for ; Wed, 10 Aug 2022 15:21:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233166AbiHJPU5 (ORCPT ); Wed, 10 Aug 2022 11:20:57 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:37134 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232988AbiHJPUo (ORCPT ); Wed, 10 Aug 2022 11:20:44 -0400 Received: from mail-yb1-xb49.google.com (mail-yb1-xb49.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::b49]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0E9AB2409A for ; Wed, 10 Aug 2022 08:20:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yb1-xb49.google.com with SMTP id 190-20020a2503c7000000b0067d8d7f2db3so760866ybd.19 for ; Wed, 10 Aug 2022 08:20:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=cc:to:from:subject:references:mime-version:message-id:in-reply-to :date:from:to:cc; bh=gpjaSxcl3Da89SJa9UoDRS3ZGGXqWVjkkBkYPyI+780=; b=XJoI09594WaiQ53jiHyTNQfPp9yp8DnWtffWrcDrOQnqNS/FpuLusgXXnuuqHUMzfi R82gi5Z6cHm9AlElWeE3cDiol/0mo2jTSghCKfxRsPtvaW+GygWsquUM6k1QrsfQ89R8 lgN4lDGpGdDdZjlbc7Dxi25fNoEHOBF5Xmo2HUalXctwpric/ajLprnX3slghqWcHSOD xgt3Hthe5iY8VySqFRnaH511Usno2FbB730cytQELyjUUN7Ja5orcooBFeehIfJrJigm TpfzjPR0/1vUPuXKV+hGts9g/ZynWz7mpl/lx/CImvWN/MifeRzBnUBBSA5J5bNEB7+y mR5w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:from:subject:references:mime-version:message-id:in-reply-to :date:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=gpjaSxcl3Da89SJa9UoDRS3ZGGXqWVjkkBkYPyI+780=; b=LH0PIuqvING+ryVFn51sD0EoYsqI8l9ZyuPSCNPU4YlyffHzoJwLMfguMesZwME4lE tg5X2hidyBUXNhczuM4qDpAzNjlb58NgW2NKJlaXsZT9xwMAqRrF6OLF7vE1c6UEGScl MgONvKOaErVlLYsl5KGhWOFnkJ3XBEbymgsX1emONi5OXhiYKha8R8YSuRQci0oAhB5E PW+JP+H1n7SnmiT0k8Nrf2OuNx5LxzlH8qz7p4WEtKa54lWbgOx5VZ5bYVIyj9gQZfqf /5cQIVhOgtarEWbud2orcWMSJcQvDVJzCcY3ekTQt6SIBzEAdjEYk5LuhunckrApQxQE 3ugw== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo0w3W4d7t77kZxzYN59lKzlLrWrXzJS1zkTGotViSXvFc5132ab J7a8pKXFtZYCg/CRHn07Wt/KuL0aMtw= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR5fUTj03bLY58ZNaat8U+xhcpjGEo7XLVmz9Eo7sO6V0+JjCLuRNpxPlGVvP6TPvR7+8HIRCrnX8mk= X-Received: from pgonda1.kir.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:29:203:b185:1827:5b23:bbe2]) (user=pgonda job=sendgmr) by 2002:a5b:745:0:b0:670:8cf9:3a92 with SMTP id s5-20020a5b0745000000b006708cf93a92mr23346562ybq.503.1660144842375; Wed, 10 Aug 2022 08:20:42 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2022 08:20:25 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20220810152033.946942-1-pgonda@google.com> Message-Id: <20220810152033.946942-4-pgonda@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20220810152033.946942-1-pgonda@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.1.559.g78731f0fdb-goog Subject: [V3 03/11] KVM: selftests: add hooks for managing encrypted guest memory From: Peter Gonda To: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, marcorr@google.com, seanjc@google.com, michael.roth@amd.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, joro@8bytes.org, mizhang@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, andrew.jones@linux.dev, vannapurve@google.com, Peter Gonda Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" From: Michael Roth VM implementations that make use of encrypted memory need a way to configure things like the encryption/shared bit position for page table handling, the default encryption policy for internal allocations made by the core library, and a way to fetch the list/bitmap of encrypted pages to do the actual memory encryption. Add an interface to configure these parameters. Also introduce a sparsebit map to track allocations/mappings that should be treated as encrypted, and provide a way for VM implementations to retrieve it to handle operations related memory encryption. Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang Signed-off-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda --- .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 17 ++++++ tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/te= sting/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h index 24fde97f6121..3928351e497e 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ typedef uint64_t vm_vaddr_t; /* Virtual Machine (Guest) v= irtual address */ struct userspace_mem_region { struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; struct sparsebit *unused_phy_pages; + struct sparsebit *encrypted_phy_pages; int fd; off_t offset; void *host_mem; @@ -64,6 +65,14 @@ struct userspace_mem_regions { DECLARE_HASHTABLE(slot_hash, 9); }; =20 +/* Memory encryption policy/configuration. */ +struct vm_memcrypt { + bool enabled; + int8_t enc_by_default; + bool has_enc_bit; + int8_t enc_bit; +}; + struct kvm_vm { int mode; unsigned long type; @@ -87,6 +96,7 @@ struct kvm_vm { vm_vaddr_t idt; vm_vaddr_t handlers; uint32_t dirty_ring_size; + struct vm_memcrypt memcrypt; =20 /* Cache of information for binary stats interface */ int stats_fd; @@ -834,4 +844,11 @@ static inline int __vm_disable_nx_huge_pages(struct kv= m_vm *vm) return __vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_VM_DISABLE_NX_HUGE_PAGES, 0); } =20 +void vm_set_memory_encryption(struct kvm_vm *vm, bool enc_by_default, bool= has_enc_bit, + uint8_t enc_bit); + +const struct sparsebit *vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int = slot, + vm_paddr_t *gpa_start, + uint64_t *size); + #endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_UTIL_BASE_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/sel= ftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c index cb3a5f8a53b7..c6b87b411186 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c @@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ static void __vm_mem_region_delete(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, ®ion->region); =20 sparsebit_free(®ion->unused_phy_pages); + sparsebit_free(®ion->encrypted_phy_pages); ret =3D munmap(region->mmap_start, region->mmap_size); TEST_ASSERT(!ret, __KVM_SYSCALL_ERROR("munmap()", ret)); =20 @@ -882,6 +883,7 @@ void vm_userspace_mem_region_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, } =20 region->unused_phy_pages =3D sparsebit_alloc(); + region->encrypted_phy_pages =3D sparsebit_alloc(); sparsebit_set_num(region->unused_phy_pages, guest_paddr >> vm->page_shift, npages); region->region.slot =3D slot; @@ -1097,6 +1099,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu *__vm_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uin= t32_t vcpu_id) * num - number of pages * paddr_min - Physical address minimum * memslot - Memory region to allocate page from + * encrypt - Whether to treat the pages as encrypted * * Output Args: None * @@ -1108,8 +1111,9 @@ struct kvm_vcpu *__vm_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uin= t32_t vcpu_id) * and their base address is returned. A TEST_ASSERT failure occurs if * not enough pages are available at or above paddr_min. */ -vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, - vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot) +static vm_paddr_t +_vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, vm_paddr_t paddr_min, + uint32_t memslot, bool encrypt) { struct userspace_mem_region *region; sparsebit_idx_t pg, base; @@ -1141,12 +1145,22 @@ vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, si= ze_t num, abort(); } =20 - for (pg =3D base; pg < base + num; ++pg) + for (pg =3D base; pg < base + num; ++pg) { sparsebit_clear(region->unused_phy_pages, pg); + if (encrypt) + sparsebit_set(region->encrypted_phy_pages, pg); + } =20 return base * vm->page_size; } =20 +vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, + vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot) +{ + return _vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, num, paddr_min, memslot, + vm->memcrypt.enc_by_default); +} + vm_paddr_t vm_phy_page_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot) { @@ -1730,6 +1744,10 @@ void vm_dump(FILE *stream, struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_= t indent) region->host_mem); fprintf(stream, "%*sunused_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, ""); sparsebit_dump(stream, region->unused_phy_pages, 0); + if (vm->memcrypt.enabled) { + fprintf(stream, "%*sencrypted_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, ""); + sparsebit_dump(stream, region->encrypted_phy_pages, 0); + } } fprintf(stream, "%*sMapped Virtual Pages:\n", indent, ""); sparsebit_dump(stream, vm->vpages_mapped, indent + 2); @@ -1978,3 +1996,31 @@ void __vm_get_stat(struct kvm_vm *vm, const char *st= at_name, uint64_t *data, break; } } + +void vm_set_memory_encryption(struct kvm_vm *vm, bool enc_by_default, bool= has_enc_bit, + uint8_t enc_bit) +{ + vm->memcrypt.enabled =3D true; + vm->memcrypt.enc_by_default =3D enc_by_default; + vm->memcrypt.has_enc_bit =3D has_enc_bit; + vm->memcrypt.enc_bit =3D enc_bit; +} + +const struct sparsebit * +vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int slot, vm_paddr_t *gpa_st= art, + uint64_t *size) +{ + struct userspace_mem_region *region; + + if (!vm->memcrypt.enabled) + return NULL; + + region =3D memslot2region(vm, slot); + if (!region) + return NULL; + + *size =3D region->region.memory_size; + *gpa_start =3D region->region.guest_phys_addr; + + return region->encrypted_phy_pages; +} --=20 2.37.1.559.g78731f0fdb-goog