From nobody Sun Apr 19 10:42:19 2026 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 97C93C433EF for ; Sun, 3 Jul 2022 00:44:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230402AbiGCAo4 (ORCPT ); Sat, 2 Jul 2022 20:44:56 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:40870 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229688AbiGCAoy (ORCPT ); Sat, 2 Jul 2022 20:44:54 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D6794B485 for ; Sat, 2 Jul 2022 17:44:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 732D36114D for ; Sun, 3 Jul 2022 00:44:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id F1557C34114; Sun, 3 Jul 2022 00:44:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com header.i=@zx2c4.com header.b="d/CoGOnv" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; s=20210105; t=1656809089; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=ENQIGAVnNx6+iTI3JY/1bFuwq4cdjpuAncZb8gR1y14=; b=d/CoGOnv+crI1sI+WaT+pi4jLAWDDFB0C6a4M5LTI6iWfEYyDPiK9yAp2lXYjERHExOkcD R2jhFpoItHidll9uAzqpdgpb2uV+aRroLZyiLSuYurI7OViPexnNFL5KDCPa1oVbENml9V oNbYA3lDVE0zgZ+Oc5pVxR9buZAv55A= Received: by mail.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id 50cbca71 (TLSv1.3:AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256:NO); Sun, 3 Jul 2022 00:44:49 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: hpa@zytor.com, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , X86 ML , LKML Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH v6] x86/setup: Use rng seeds from setup_data Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2022 02:44:31 +0200 Message-Id: <20220703004431.268931-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Currently the only way x86 can get an early boot RNG seed is via EFI, which is generally always used now for physical machines, but is very rarely used in VMs, especially VMs that are optimized for starting "instantaneously", such as Firecracker's MicroVM. For tiny fast booting VMs, EFI is not something you generally need or want. Rather, here we want the ability for the image loader or firmware to pass a single random seed, exactly as device tree platforms do with the "rng-seed" property. Additionally, this is something that bootloaders can append, with their own seed file management, which is something every other major OS ecosystem has that we do not (yet). This patch adds SETUP_RNG_SEED, similar to the other seven setup_data entries that are parsed at boot. It also takes care to zero out the seed immediately after using, in order to retain forward secrecy. This all takes about 7 trivial lines of code. Then, on kexec_file_load(), a new fresh seed is generated and passed to the next kernel, just as is done on device tree architectures when using kexec. And, importantly, I've tested that QEMU is able to properly pass SETUP_RNG_SEED as well, making this work for every step of the way. This code too is pretty straight forward. Together these measures ensure that VMs and nested kexec()'d kernels always receive a proper boot time RNG seed at the earliest possible stage from their parents: - Host [already has strongly initialized RNG] - QEMU [passes fresh seed in SETUP_RNG_SEED field] - Linux [uses parent's seed and gathers entropy of its own] - kexec [passes this in SETUP_RNG_SEED field] - Linux [uses parent's seed and gathers entropy of its own] - kexec [passes this in SETUP_RNG_SEED field] - Linux [uses parent's seed and gathers entropy of its own] - kexec [passes this in SETUP_RNG_SEED field] - ... I've verified in several scenarios that this works quite well from a host kernel to QEMU and down inwards, mixing and matching loaders, with every layer providing a seed to the next. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- Changes v5->v6: - Rework commit message for hpa to be less confusing and not improperly mention e820. Changes v4->v5: - Populate field when loading bzimages for kexec, just like device tree platforms do. Changes v3->v4: - Zero out data after using, for forward secrecy. Changes v2->v3: - Actually memmap the right area with the random bytes in it. This worked before because of page sizes, but the code wasn't right. Now it's right. Changes v1->v2: - Fix small typo of data_len -> data->len. arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 8 ++++++ 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/= asm/bootparam.h index bea5cdcdf532..a60676b8d1d4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #define SETUP_APPLE_PROPERTIES 5 #define SETUP_JAILHOUSE 6 #define SETUP_CC_BLOB 7 +#define SETUP_RNG_SEED 8 =20 #define SETUP_INDIRECT (1<<31) =20 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzim= age64.c index 170d0fd68b1f..13b2c55ebbf0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include =20 #include #include @@ -110,6 +111,27 @@ static int setup_e820_entries(struct boot_params *para= ms) return 0; } =20 +enum { RNG_SEED_LENGTH =3D 32 }; + +static void +add_rng_seed_setup_data(struct boot_params *params, + unsigned long params_load_addr, + unsigned int rng_seed_setup_data_offset) +{ + struct setup_data *sd =3D (void *)params + rng_seed_setup_data_offset; + unsigned long setup_data_phys; + + if (!rng_is_initialized()) + return; + + sd->type =3D SETUP_RNG_SEED; + sd->len =3D RNG_SEED_LENGTH; + get_random_bytes(sd->data, RNG_SEED_LENGTH); + setup_data_phys =3D params_load_addr + rng_seed_setup_data_offset; + sd->next =3D params->hdr.setup_data; + params->hdr.setup_data =3D setup_data_phys; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_EFI static int setup_efi_info_memmap(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, @@ -190,7 +212,8 @@ static int setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz, - unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset) + unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset, + unsigned int rng_seed_setup_data_offset) { unsigned int nr_e820_entries; unsigned long long mem_k, start, end; @@ -242,6 +265,8 @@ setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot= _params *params, } } =20 + add_rng_seed_setup_data(params, params_load_addr, + rng_seed_setup_data_offset); #ifdef CONFIG_EFI /* Setup EFI state */ setup_efi_state(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz, @@ -337,6 +362,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char = *kernel, void *stack; unsigned int setup_hdr_offset =3D offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr); unsigned int efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz, efi_setup_data_offset; + unsigned int rng_seed_setup_data_offset; struct kexec_buf kbuf =3D { .image =3D image, .buf_max =3D ULONG_MAX, .top_down =3D true }; struct kexec_buf pbuf =3D { .image =3D image, .buf_min =3D MIN_PURGATORY_= ADDR, @@ -401,13 +427,16 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, cha= r *kernel, params_cmdline_sz =3D ALIGN(params_cmdline_sz, 16); kbuf.bufsz =3D params_cmdline_sz + ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16) + sizeof(struct setup_data) + - sizeof(struct efi_setup_data); + sizeof(struct efi_setup_data) + + sizeof(struct setup_data) + + RNG_SEED_LENGTH; =20 params =3D kzalloc(kbuf.bufsz, GFP_KERNEL); if (!params) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); efi_map_offset =3D params_cmdline_sz; efi_setup_data_offset =3D efi_map_offset + ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16); + rng_seed_setup_data_offset =3D efi_setup_data_offset + sizeof(struct efi_= setup_data); =20 /* Copy setup header onto bootparams. Documentation/x86/boot.rst */ setup_header_size =3D 0x0202 + kernel[0x0201] - setup_hdr_offset; @@ -490,7 +519,8 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char = *kernel, =20 ret =3D setup_boot_parameters(image, params, bootparam_load_addr, efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz, - efi_setup_data_offset); + efi_setup_data_offset, + rng_seed_setup_data_offset); if (ret) goto out_free_params; =20 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index bd6c6fd373ae..6c807a4ae141 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include =20 #include =20 @@ -355,6 +356,13 @@ static void __init parse_setup_data(void) case SETUP_EFI: parse_efi_setup(pa_data, data_len); break; + case SETUP_RNG_SEED: + data =3D early_memremap(pa_data, data_len); + add_bootloader_randomness(data->data, data->len); + memzero_explicit(data->data, data->len); + memzero_explicit(&data->len, sizeof(data->len)); + early_memunmap(data, data_len); + break; default: break; } --=20 2.35.1