From nobody Tue Jun 30 04:37:30 2026 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68453C433F5 for ; Tue, 25 Jan 2022 14:39:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1579099AbiAYOhh (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jan 2022 09:37:37 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:38654 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1389067AbiAYOd2 (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jan 2022 09:33:28 -0500 Received: from mail-ed1-x536.google.com (mail-ed1-x536.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::536]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 35396C06173B; Tue, 25 Jan 2022 06:33:27 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ed1-x536.google.com with SMTP id c24so61217072edy.4; Tue, 25 Jan 2022 06:33:27 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=googlemail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=bLGRSDBqt3CI9o30EqMaKBgi/Og7jvCpHq0R8ShXmFM=; b=Mn4PK6g/oizWyfQ/FlsNpx8KUGy4lvZNH4Q44yveFyG6XwfO4vkxu5X4ytfU6J68Jp t/Ep8y+dU+4NrFLJMNh5dhoE3ITMKtr8o4VcdBESKAXHbnpqb0CjYOyMH+JgwlHcFxUg SdYu2BojdjheT8JGAjkEWzq6FCuwKY1y7yWHJguJTGz1GcYRHYZkH++kWEoZ0Pvrl0EM TNidQED+LEGzAweI2o8TceH5KTyp97FCGQZyfp44hk6hrSdAJIzr1V/CxQJtFyfq8bnP oy9Avv4wKRXUE6cJtJrAk60hQGmhsPB+EiNE1/cwxu7YTSuMAE9EwA6e/ZhT9IOo9xYz OTkg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=bLGRSDBqt3CI9o30EqMaKBgi/Og7jvCpHq0R8ShXmFM=; b=mCeSOG42rHLmdlqIFonaAw/LVJGsOJVJUGUbEoi371kQt8tCnpbqWBr0OpDAKA4Km5 dTA3UUB+E5L4U7TwbRa6PCrHk18+wk4wGViYQGu4UWuNGjPKu/iV4bRXwETkP9ipzuzp UZs9rshkgoL7hex1gUJxxXwEBoqCYE0wrxUW38zKMXlNfg5hgNechwPMdkNzyeBPJAoG Kjz3tuXf1b6cMmddrvbOLy23gDWDQAaE0UMtpGyPyMYBCt97phaflruOQPyT9wX+lCVr N2ToCYS+QDfij6hQjuqNC8S3+jcNiwH2DPvSjd1SFtT7u/DtaBjttx0L8ViiF6E3Xext yAaA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531Y2srWANeW/QtBz/6X4vAk9SGw5PYNolzTI9C8TD6fL/mvCi2a z5hf6nSINNTSbn2yLE4ZIo9oGMAYj4dDkg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJw2WjOewfY30kV7zrgPQ4uGjfJlfejcSiIazlBcEOdPGrjUrMOyvy+xfpRlBK6bRy0afqR1Uw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:7306:: with SMTP id di6mr16139066ejc.93.1643121205668; Tue, 25 Jan 2022 06:33:25 -0800 (PST) Received: from debianHome.localdomain (dynamic-077-010-144-044.77.10.pool.telefonica.de. [77.10.144.44]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id gz12sm6291530ejc.124.2022.01.25.06.33.24 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 25 Jan 2022 06:33:25 -0800 (PST) From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , Eric Paris Cc: Andrew Morton , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH] mm: create security context for memfd_secret inodes Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 15:33:04 +0100 Message-Id: <20220125143304.34628-1-cgzones@googlemail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Create a security context for the inodes created by memfd_secret(2) via the LSM hook inode_init_security_anon to allow a fine grained control. As secret memory areas can affect hibernation and have a global shared limit access control might be desirable. Signed-off-by: Christian G=C3=B6ttsche --- An alternative way of checking memfd_secret(2) is to create a new LSM hook and e.g. for SELinux check via a new process class permission. --- mm/secretmem.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 22b310adb53d..b61cd2f661bc 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -164,11 +164,20 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned lo= ng flags) { struct file *file =3D ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); struct inode *inode; + const char *anon_name =3D "[secretmem]"; + const struct qstr qname =3D QSTR_INIT(anon_name, strlen(anon_name)); + int err; =20 inode =3D alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb); if (IS_ERR(inode)) return ERR_CAST(inode); =20 + err =3D security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &qname, NULL); + if (err) { + file =3D ERR_PTR(err); + goto err_free_inode; + } + file =3D alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem", O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops); if (IS_ERR(file)) --=20 2.34.1