From nobody Tue Nov 26 15:39:39 2024 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1B3E41DB534; Thu, 17 Oct 2024 11:56:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=193.142.43.55 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1729166194; cv=none; b=SOCCZzIJjbpES1KCAgM3i+1YNVezqG89EwOG/I49NuWA0ISXpF04u9ZBVoQPNoKfLbvz6x8Es4pMY4t/7kH6paMfvEaAGLQ3uY/4yDB/mV8bEvQeGulKhlckyJkGM68+LVp1AASMFU4ag3S8vdqyYJ92pe6ilnx/muvLLP1cLXg= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1729166194; c=relaxed/simple; bh=nas7BScfj5ZHBbAL4SFmYHoxvhBWreXBlibIWYlTejY=; h=Date:From:To:Subject:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:MIME-Version: Message-ID:Content-Type; b=MV4J7twzpHWMN+XWqtftAHxRvt7641TdocjLD2Ot8Reg7/9UmRwnb60Y36havAEUpJIN0chgMqEzmAhzToRDFiyELKJebmBh8nrVqwc4UDQzrjTuEL9Xe8C9k5a9cKHrvqoHTqaOmEVO8eBx56WYAFDBzT1eHvqE9YbsutHGII4= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linutronix.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linutronix.de; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=b7vcyYwG; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=Ia47uyzw; arc=none smtp.client-ip=193.142.43.55 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linutronix.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linutronix.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="b7vcyYwG"; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="Ia47uyzw" Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 11:56:26 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1729166187; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=86gHrE5OOfxReUlZttInfVoMGnq6/yrPTD1iA5QtJUs=; b=b7vcyYwGyK9mbDul+2Akq789zh0klad7E6wT76ev2b/Rovmqyz2ZpM2GF74+YIXRxq7mhG DZiUPksK+0EQAsmdL00fn3zA9AN9BEMlDRX2/jcWTjtDlzA3Uw3x/zi2+P8LLHI86xPiOO ZMf+tEV1i6VGFqEJOYxh65nht5n/aAuzyHWDzB+r+GNyi5hVUBzukfoM0GYNUiXhnhs8eL wEkTx8I6OsIy0n0mP/Es5VvI5B20in+nuANTV0Fk7N1l5YadhkZbKx9HWrtBlfy9jv4kea kglMfXVYUhmO3CAD6OVPn5DMAcT3vUO7aYqq1Vmea/iV7u7tTgV7iT4UiuPAnA== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1729166187; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=86gHrE5OOfxReUlZttInfVoMGnq6/yrPTD1iA5QtJUs=; b=Ia47uyzwy84ZZVLfcBpXe+9S0oxi3aaSHeMy09eRkaIt1mlP4Yu1SOEXTdjY+s7goplrbQ Nvke5arAS/0l7mCg== From: "tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania" Sender: tip-bot2@linutronix.de Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: x86/sev] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Cc: Nikunj A Dadhania , "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" , Tom Lendacky , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20241009092850.197575-7-nikunj@amd.com> References: <20241009092850.197575-7-nikunj@amd.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <172916618679.1442.5671372574992974574.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails Precedence: bulk Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip: Commit-ID: 0a895c0d9b73d934de95aa0dd4e631c394bdd25d Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/0a895c0d9b73d934de95aa0dd4e631c39= 4bdd25d Author: Nikunj A Dadhania AuthorDate: Wed, 09 Oct 2024 14:58:37 +05:30 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) CommitterDate: Wed, 16 Oct 2024 18:41:40 +02:00 virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Currently, the sev-guest driver is the only user of SNP guest messaging. The snp_guest_dev structure holds all the allocated buffers, secrets page and VMPCK details. In preparation for adding messaging allocation and initialization APIs, decouple snp_guest_dev from messaging-related information by carving out the guest message context structure(snp_msg_desc). Incorporate this newly added context into snp_send_guest_request() and all related functions, replacing the use of the snp_guest_dev. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009092850.197575-7-nikunj@amd.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 21 +++- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 178 +++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 27fa1c9..2e49c4a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -234,6 +234,27 @@ struct snp_secrets_page { u8 rsvd4[3744]; } __packed; =20 +struct snp_msg_desc { + /* request and response are in unencrypted memory */ + struct snp_guest_msg *request, *response; + + /* + * Avoid information leakage by double-buffering shared messages + * in fields that are in regular encrypted memory. + */ + struct snp_guest_msg secret_request, secret_response; + + struct snp_secrets_page *secrets; + struct snp_req_data input; + + void *certs_data; + + struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx; + + u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; + u8 *vmpck; +}; + /* * The SVSM Calling Area (CA) related structures. */ diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/se= v-guest/sev-guest.c index 1bddef8..fca5c45 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c @@ -40,26 +40,13 @@ struct snp_guest_dev { struct device *dev; struct miscdevice misc; =20 - void *certs_data; - struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx; - /* request and response are in unencrypted memory */ - struct snp_guest_msg *request, *response; - - /* - * Avoid information leakage by double-buffering shared messages - * in fields that are in regular encrypted memory. - */ - struct snp_guest_msg secret_request, secret_response; + struct snp_msg_desc *msg_desc; =20 - struct snp_secrets_page *secrets; - struct snp_req_data input; union { struct snp_report_req report; struct snp_derived_key_req derived_key; struct snp_ext_report_req ext_report; } req; - u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; - u8 *vmpck; }; =20 /* @@ -76,12 +63,12 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when co= mmunicating with the PSP. /* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_cmd_mutex); =20 -static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] =3D {0}; =20 - if (snp_dev->vmpck) - return !memcmp(snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); + if (mdesc->vmpck) + return !memcmp(mdesc->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); =20 return true; } @@ -103,30 +90,30 @@ static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_d= ev) * vulnerable. If the sequence number were incremented for a fresh IV the = ASP * will reject the request. */ -static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { - dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling VMPCK%d communication key to prevent I= V reuse.\n", + pr_alert("Disabling VMPCK%d communication key to prevent IV reuse.\n", vmpck_id); - memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); - snp_dev->vmpck =3D NULL; + memzero_explicit(mdesc->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); + mdesc->vmpck =3D NULL; } =20 -static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { u64 count; =20 lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex); =20 /* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */ - count =3D *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno; + count =3D *mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno; =20 return count + 1; } =20 /* Return a non-zero on success */ -static u64 snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +static u64 snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { - u64 count =3D __snp_get_msg_seqno(snp_dev); + u64 count =3D __snp_get_msg_seqno(mdesc); =20 /* * The message sequence counter for the SNP guest request is a 64-bit @@ -137,20 +124,20 @@ static u64 snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *sn= p_dev) * invalid number and will fail the message request. */ if (count >=3D UINT_MAX) { - dev_err(snp_dev->dev, "request message sequence counter overflow\n"); + pr_err("request message sequence counter overflow\n"); return 0; } =20 return count; } =20 -static void snp_inc_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +static void snp_inc_msg_seqno(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { /* * The counter is also incremented by the PSP, so increment it by 2 * and save in secrets page. */ - *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno +=3D 2; + *mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno +=3D 2; } =20 static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file) @@ -177,13 +164,13 @@ static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto(u8 *key, si= ze_t keylen) return ctx; } =20 -static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct sn= p_guest_req *req) +static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_g= uest_req *req) { - struct snp_guest_msg *resp_msg =3D &snp_dev->secret_response; - struct snp_guest_msg *req_msg =3D &snp_dev->secret_request; + struct snp_guest_msg *resp_msg =3D &mdesc->secret_response; + struct snp_guest_msg *req_msg =3D &mdesc->secret_request; struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *req_msg_hdr =3D &req_msg->hdr; struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *resp_msg_hdr =3D &resp_msg->hdr; - struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx =3D snp_dev->ctx; + struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx =3D mdesc->ctx; u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE] =3D {}; =20 pr_debug("response [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n", @@ -191,7 +178,7 @@ static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev = *snp_dev, struct snp_gues resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz); =20 /* Copy response from shared memory to encrypted memory. */ - memcpy(resp_msg, snp_dev->response, sizeof(*resp_msg)); + memcpy(resp_msg, mdesc->response, sizeof(*resp_msg)); =20 /* Verify that the sequence counter is incremented by 1 */ if (unlikely(resp_msg_hdr->msg_seqno !=3D (req_msg_hdr->msg_seqno + 1))) @@ -218,11 +205,11 @@ static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_de= v *snp_dev, struct snp_gues return 0; } =20 -static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, struct sn= p_guest_req *req) +static int enc_payload(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, u64 seqno, struct snp_g= uest_req *req) { - struct snp_guest_msg *msg =3D &snp_dev->secret_request; + struct snp_guest_msg *msg =3D &mdesc->secret_request; struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr =3D &msg->hdr; - struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx =3D snp_dev->ctx; + struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx =3D mdesc->ctx; u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE] =3D {}; =20 memset(msg, 0, sizeof(*msg)); @@ -253,7 +240,7 @@ static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u= 64 seqno, struct snp_gues return 0; } =20 -static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct sn= p_guest_req *req, +static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_g= uest_req *req, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { unsigned long req_start =3D jiffies; @@ -268,7 +255,7 @@ retry_request: * sequence number must be incremented or the VMPCK must be deleted to * prevent reuse of the IV. */ - rc =3D snp_issue_guest_request(req, &snp_dev->input, rio); + rc =3D snp_issue_guest_request(req, &mdesc->input, rio); switch (rc) { case -ENOSPC: /* @@ -278,7 +265,7 @@ retry_request: * order to increment the sequence number and thus avoid * IV reuse. */ - override_npages =3D snp_dev->input.data_npages; + override_npages =3D mdesc->input.data_npages; req->exit_code =3D SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST; =20 /* @@ -318,7 +305,7 @@ retry_request: * structure and any failure will wipe the VMPCK, preventing further * use anyway. */ - snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev); + snp_inc_msg_seqno(mdesc); =20 if (override_err) { rio->exitinfo2 =3D override_err; @@ -334,12 +321,12 @@ retry_request: } =20 if (override_npages) - snp_dev->input.data_npages =3D override_npages; + mdesc->input.data_npages =3D override_npages; =20 return rc; } =20 -static int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct sn= p_guest_req *req, +static int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_g= uest_req *req, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { u64 seqno; @@ -348,21 +335,21 @@ static int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_guest_de= v *snp_dev, struct snp_gues guard(mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex); =20 /* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */ - if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) { - dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n"); + if (is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) { + pr_err_ratelimited("VMPCK is disabled\n"); return -ENOTTY; } =20 /* Get message sequence and verify that its a non-zero */ - seqno =3D snp_get_msg_seqno(snp_dev); + seqno =3D snp_get_msg_seqno(mdesc); if (!seqno) return -EIO; =20 /* Clear shared memory's response for the host to populate. */ - memset(snp_dev->response, 0, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + memset(mdesc->response, 0, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); =20 - /* Encrypt the userspace provided payload in snp_dev->secret_request. */ - rc =3D enc_payload(snp_dev, seqno, req); + /* Encrypt the userspace provided payload in mdesc->secret_request. */ + rc =3D enc_payload(mdesc, seqno, req); if (rc) return rc; =20 @@ -370,27 +357,26 @@ static int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_guest_de= v *snp_dev, struct snp_gues * Write the fully encrypted request to the shared unencrypted * request page. */ - memcpy(snp_dev->request, &snp_dev->secret_request, - sizeof(snp_dev->secret_request)); + memcpy(mdesc->request, &mdesc->secret_request, + sizeof(mdesc->secret_request)); =20 - rc =3D __handle_guest_request(snp_dev, req, rio); + rc =3D __handle_guest_request(mdesc, req, rio); if (rc) { if (rc =3D=3D -EIO && rio->exitinfo2 =3D=3D SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR(SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LE= N)) return rc; =20 - dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, - "Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, exitinfo2: 0x%llx\n", - rc, rio->exitinfo2); + pr_alert("Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, exitinfo2: 0x%llx\n", + rc, rio->exitinfo2); =20 - snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev); + snp_disable_vmpck(mdesc); return rc; } =20 - rc =3D verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, req); + rc =3D verify_and_dec_payload(mdesc, req); if (rc) { - dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Detected unexpected decode failure from ASP. rc= : %d\n", rc); - snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev); + pr_alert("Detected unexpected decode failure from ASP. rc: %d\n", rc); + snp_disable_vmpck(mdesc); return rc; } =20 @@ -405,6 +391,7 @@ struct snp_req_resp { static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_requ= est_ioctl *arg) { struct snp_report_req *report_req =3D &snp_dev->req.report; + struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc =3D snp_dev->msg_desc; struct snp_report_resp *report_resp; struct snp_guest_req req =3D {}; int rc, resp_len; @@ -420,7 +407,7 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, st= ruct snp_guest_request_io * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the * authtag. */ - resp_len =3D sizeof(report_resp->data) + snp_dev->ctx->authsize; + resp_len =3D sizeof(report_resp->data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize; report_resp =3D kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!report_resp) return -ENOMEM; @@ -434,7 +421,7 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, st= ruct snp_guest_request_io req.resp_sz =3D resp_len; req.exit_code =3D SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST; =20 - rc =3D snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &req, arg); + rc =3D snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req, arg); if (rc) goto e_free; =20 @@ -450,6 +437,7 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_de= v, struct snp_guest_reque { struct snp_derived_key_req *derived_key_req =3D &snp_dev->req.derived_key; struct snp_derived_key_resp derived_key_resp =3D {0}; + struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc =3D snp_dev->msg_desc; struct snp_guest_req req =3D {}; int rc, resp_len; /* Response data is 64 bytes and max authsize for GCM is 16 bytes. */ @@ -463,7 +451,7 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_de= v, struct snp_guest_reque * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the * authtag. */ - resp_len =3D sizeof(derived_key_resp.data) + snp_dev->ctx->authsize; + resp_len =3D sizeof(derived_key_resp.data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize; if (sizeof(buf) < resp_len) return -ENOMEM; =20 @@ -480,7 +468,7 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_de= v, struct snp_guest_reque req.resp_sz =3D resp_len; req.exit_code =3D SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST; =20 - rc =3D snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &req, arg); + rc =3D snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req, arg); if (rc) return rc; =20 @@ -500,6 +488,7 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev= , struct snp_guest_reques =20 { struct snp_ext_report_req *report_req =3D &snp_dev->req.ext_report; + struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc =3D snp_dev->msg_desc; struct snp_report_resp *report_resp; struct snp_guest_req req =3D {}; int ret, npages =3D 0, resp_len; @@ -533,7 +522,7 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev= , struct snp_guest_reques * the host. If host does not supply any certs in it, then copy * zeros to indicate that certificate data was not provided. */ - memset(snp_dev->certs_data, 0, report_req->certs_len); + memset(mdesc->certs_data, 0, report_req->certs_len); npages =3D report_req->certs_len >> PAGE_SHIFT; cmd: /* @@ -541,12 +530,12 @@ cmd: * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the * authtag. */ - resp_len =3D sizeof(report_resp->data) + snp_dev->ctx->authsize; + resp_len =3D sizeof(report_resp->data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize; report_resp =3D kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!report_resp) return -ENOMEM; =20 - snp_dev->input.data_npages =3D npages; + mdesc->input.data_npages =3D npages; =20 req.msg_version =3D arg->msg_version; req.msg_type =3D SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ; @@ -557,11 +546,11 @@ cmd: req.resp_sz =3D resp_len; req.exit_code =3D SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST; =20 - ret =3D snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &req, arg); + ret =3D snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req, arg); =20 /* If certs length is invalid then copy the returned length */ if (arg->vmm_error =3D=3D SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN) { - report_req->certs_len =3D snp_dev->input.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT; + report_req->certs_len =3D mdesc->input.data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT; =20 if (copy_to_sockptr(io->req_data, report_req, sizeof(*report_req))) ret =3D -EFAULT; @@ -570,7 +559,7 @@ cmd: if (ret) goto e_free; =20 - if (npages && copy_to_sockptr(certs_address, snp_dev->certs_data, report_= req->certs_len)) { + if (npages && copy_to_sockptr(certs_address, mdesc->certs_data, report_re= q->certs_len)) { ret =3D -EFAULT; goto e_free; } @@ -994,6 +983,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_devic= e *pdev) struct snp_secrets_page *secrets; struct device *dev =3D &pdev->dev; struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev; + struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc; struct miscdevice *misc; void __iomem *mapping; int ret; @@ -1018,43 +1008,47 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_d= evice *pdev) if (!snp_dev) goto e_unmap; =20 + mdesc =3D devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNE= L); + if (!mdesc) + goto e_unmap; + /* Adjust the default VMPCK key based on the executing VMPL level */ if (vmpck_id =3D=3D -1) vmpck_id =3D snp_vmpl; =20 ret =3D -EINVAL; - snp_dev->vmpck =3D get_vmpck(vmpck_id, secrets, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seq= no); - if (!snp_dev->vmpck) { + mdesc->vmpck =3D get_vmpck(vmpck_id, secrets, &mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno); + if (!mdesc->vmpck) { dev_err(dev, "Invalid VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); goto e_unmap; } =20 /* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */ - if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) { + if (is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) { dev_err(dev, "Empty VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id); goto e_unmap; } =20 platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev); snp_dev->dev =3D dev; - snp_dev->secrets =3D secrets; + mdesc->secrets =3D secrets; =20 /* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */ - snp_dev->request =3D alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)= ); - if (!snp_dev->request) + mdesc->request =3D alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + if (!mdesc->request) goto e_unmap; =20 - snp_dev->response =3D alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg= )); - if (!snp_dev->response) + mdesc->response =3D alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + if (!mdesc->response) goto e_free_request; =20 - snp_dev->certs_data =3D alloc_shared_pages(dev, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); - if (!snp_dev->certs_data) + mdesc->certs_data =3D alloc_shared_pages(dev, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); + if (!mdesc->certs_data) goto e_free_response; =20 ret =3D -EIO; - snp_dev->ctx =3D snp_init_crypto(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); - if (!snp_dev->ctx) + mdesc->ctx =3D snp_init_crypto(mdesc->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); + if (!mdesc->ctx) goto e_free_cert_data; =20 misc =3D &snp_dev->misc; @@ -1063,9 +1057,9 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_dev= ice *pdev) misc->fops =3D &snp_guest_fops; =20 /* Initialize the input addresses for guest request */ - snp_dev->input.req_gpa =3D __pa(snp_dev->request); - snp_dev->input.resp_gpa =3D __pa(snp_dev->response); - snp_dev->input.data_gpa =3D __pa(snp_dev->certs_data); + mdesc->input.req_gpa =3D __pa(mdesc->request); + mdesc->input.resp_gpa =3D __pa(mdesc->response); + mdesc->input.data_gpa =3D __pa(mdesc->certs_data); =20 /* Set the privlevel_floor attribute based on the vmpck_id */ sev_tsm_ops.privlevel_floor =3D vmpck_id; @@ -1082,17 +1076,18 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_d= evice *pdev) if (ret) goto e_free_ctx; =20 + snp_dev->msg_desc =3D mdesc; dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using VMPCK%d communication = key)\n", vmpck_id); return 0; =20 e_free_ctx: - kfree(snp_dev->ctx); + kfree(mdesc->ctx); e_free_cert_data: - free_shared_pages(snp_dev->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); + free_shared_pages(mdesc->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); e_free_response: - free_shared_pages(snp_dev->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); e_free_request: - free_shared_pages(snp_dev->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); e_unmap: iounmap(mapping); return ret; @@ -1101,11 +1096,12 @@ e_unmap: static void __exit sev_guest_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev =3D platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc =3D snp_dev->msg_desc; =20 - free_shared_pages(snp_dev->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); - free_shared_pages(snp_dev->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); - free_shared_pages(snp_dev->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); - kfree(snp_dev->ctx); + free_shared_pages(mdesc->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE); + free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + kfree(mdesc->ctx); misc_deregister(&snp_dev->misc); }