From nobody Tue Dec 16 18:35:54 2025 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE398C4167B for ; Fri, 8 Dec 2023 17:18:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1574428AbjLHRSf (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Dec 2023 12:18:35 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51206 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236017AbjLHRSD (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Dec 2023 12:18:03 -0500 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A5F1E1BC9; Fri, 8 Dec 2023 09:17:39 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 08 Dec 2023 17:17:30 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1702055851; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=p5I1PE4ntSVvjF9JpGfi75yHfQMQHozzyEBjmGauZSE=; b=mCo0sziGbJqCN3kveAwaunAGhVuwlDf316/+w6CCwvg6VM1YrY0QpGT1mFREgSbmhjUJOO +XOEj1WPAZ7bfi6Bwi3uwhurr7liGgpMHWCvt2MzNiWlIEcmFa3yBm3z67ww74bn8w7fQq YYweMCNcDKmuhJTqMYRDGkUVOrJh+rzoonzcqM472v+nRatBltzNG01N1v6OIQJfVzOVD7 EVZazpl32DiJEO/B+lXp51RsCyQ+Z1WT1Fw2yVIoXjfiJfsbT9QZiBQ/STniy2ccLYLYbU c6eAoc0S6GY9NyW+Ri1lcYdUvNWLew+ujQUYHnDxlr1PwNmvTfMC2NX1dyiZfQ== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1702055851; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=p5I1PE4ntSVvjF9JpGfi75yHfQMQHozzyEBjmGauZSE=; b=3gXYCp2PwopLIW4zd1KsShcub21WPxl8fOfOM/GOTYFK+6p88HQdcHD6oFr+wJrcwSzeqF 2KZ9LS+3Rcev39Cg== From: "tip-bot2 for Kai Huang" Sender: tip-bot2@linutronix.de Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: x86/tdx] x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot Cc: Kai Huang , Dave Hansen , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Isaku Yamahata , David Hildenbrand , Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <170205585066.398.11120945556484858254.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The following commit has been merged into the x86/tdx branch of tip: Commit-ID: 765a0542fdc7aad7cbc1da3bd19bed6297b54e2c Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/765a0542fdc7aad7cbc1da3bd19bed629= 7b54e2c Author: Kai Huang AuthorDate: Fri, 08 Dec 2023 09:07:21 -08:00 Committer: Dave Hansen CommitterDate: Fri, 08 Dec 2023 09:11:58 -08:00 x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious host and certain physical attacks. A CPU-attested software module called 'the TDX module' runs inside a new isolated memory range as a trusted hypervisor to manage and run protected VMs. Pre-TDX Intel hardware has support for a memory encryption architecture called MKTME. The memory encryption hardware underpinning MKTME is also used for Intel TDX. TDX ends up "stealing" some of the physical address space from the MKTME architecture for crypto-protection to VMs. The BIOS is responsible for partitioning the "KeyID" space between legacy MKTME and TDX. The KeyIDs reserved for TDX are called 'TDX private KeyIDs' or 'TDX KeyIDs' for short. During machine boot, TDX microcode verifies that the BIOS programmed TDX private KeyIDs consistently and correctly programmed across all CPU packages. The MSRs are locked in this state after verification. This is why MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING gets used for TDX enumeration: it indicates not just that the hardware supports TDX, but that all the boot-time security checks passed. The TDX module is expected to be loaded by the BIOS when it enables TDX, but the kernel needs to properly initialize it before it can be used to create and run any TDX guests. The TDX module will be initialized by the KVM subsystem when KVM wants to use TDX. Detect platform TDX support by detecting TDX private KeyIDs. The TDX module itself requires one TDX KeyID as the 'TDX global KeyID' to protect its metadata. Each TDX guest also needs a TDX KeyID for its own protection. Just use the first TDX KeyID as the global KeyID and leave the rest for TDX guests. If no TDX KeyID is left for TDX guests, disable TDX as initializing the TDX module alone is useless. [ dhansen: add X86_FEATURE, replace helper function ] Signed-off-by: Kai Huang Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231208170740.53979-1-dave.hansen%40inte= l.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 6 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpuf= eatures.h index 4af140c..45ddc6b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3 ( 7*32+ 4) /* Cache Allocation Technology L3 */ #define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2 ( 7*32+ 5) /* Cache Allocation Technology L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3 ( 7*32+ 6) /* Code and Data Prioritization L3 = */ +#define X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM ( 7*32+ 7) /* Platform supports bein= g a TDX host */ #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface = */ #define X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED ( 7*32+10) /* "" Use compacted XSTATE (XSA= VES or XSAVEC) */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-in= dex.h index 1d51e18..66c12d4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -536,6 +536,9 @@ #define MSR_RELOAD_PMC0 0x000014c1 #define MSR_RELOAD_FIXED_CTR0 0x00001309 =20 +/* KeyID partitioning between MKTME and TDX */ +#define MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING 0x00000087 + /* * AMD64 MSRs. Not complete. See the architecture manual for a more * complete list. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h index f3d5305..e5dd1cb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h @@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, uns= igned long p1, u64 __seamcall(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args); u64 __seamcall_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args); u64 __seamcall_saved_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args); +void tdx_init(void); +#else +static inline void tdx_init(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ =20 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index b14fc8c..b968a24 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include =20 #include "cpu.h" =20 @@ -1987,6 +1988,7 @@ static __init void identify_boot_cpu(void) setup_cr_pinning(); =20 tsx_init(); + tdx_init(); lkgs_init(); } =20 diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/Makefile b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/Makefile index 46ef8f7..90da47e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/Makefile @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -obj-y +=3D seamcall.o +obj-y +=3D seamcall.o tdx.o diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94689ae --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright(c) 2023 Intel Corporation. + * + * Intel Trusted Domain Extensions (TDX) support + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "virt/tdx: " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static u32 tdx_global_keyid __ro_after_init; +static u32 tdx_guest_keyid_start __ro_after_init; +static u32 tdx_nr_guest_keyids __ro_after_init; + +static __init int record_keyid_partitioning(u32 *tdx_keyid_start, + u32 *nr_tdx_keyids) +{ + u32 _nr_mktme_keyids, _tdx_keyid_start, _nr_tdx_keyids; + int ret; + + /* + * IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTIONING: + * Bit [31:0]: Number of MKTME KeyIDs. + * Bit [63:32]: Number of TDX private KeyIDs. + */ + ret =3D rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING, &_nr_mktme_keyids, + &_nr_tdx_keyids); + if (ret || !_nr_tdx_keyids) + return -EINVAL; + + /* TDX KeyIDs start after the last MKTME KeyID. */ + _tdx_keyid_start =3D _nr_mktme_keyids + 1; + + *tdx_keyid_start =3D _tdx_keyid_start; + *nr_tdx_keyids =3D _nr_tdx_keyids; + + return 0; +} + +void __init tdx_init(void) +{ + u32 tdx_keyid_start, nr_tdx_keyids; + int err; + + err =3D record_keyid_partitioning(&tdx_keyid_start, &nr_tdx_keyids); + if (err) + return; + + pr_info("BIOS enabled: private KeyID range [%u, %u)\n", + tdx_keyid_start, tdx_keyid_start + nr_tdx_keyids); + + /* + * The TDX module itself requires one 'global KeyID' to protect + * its metadata. If there's only one TDX KeyID, there won't be + * any left for TDX guests thus there's no point to enable TDX + * at all. + */ + if (nr_tdx_keyids < 2) { + pr_err("initialization failed: too few private KeyIDs available.\n"); + return; + } + + /* + * Just use the first TDX KeyID as the 'global KeyID' and + * leave the rest for TDX guests. + */ + tdx_global_keyid =3D tdx_keyid_start; + tdx_guest_keyid_start =3D tdx_keyid_start + 1; + tdx_nr_guest_keyids =3D nr_tdx_keyids - 1; + + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM); +}