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client-ip=162.221.158.21; receiver=esa4.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; envelope-from="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-sender="andrew.cooper3@citrix.com"; x-conformance=sidf_compatible Received-SPF: Pass (esa4.hc3370-68.iphmx.com: domain of Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com designates 162.221.158.21 as permitted sender) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=162.221.158.21; receiver=esa4.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; envelope-from="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-sender="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-conformance=sidf_compatible; x-record-type="v=spf1"; x-record-text="v=spf1 ip4:209.167.231.154 ip4:178.63.86.133 ip4:195.66.111.40/30 ip4:85.115.9.32/28 ip4:199.102.83.4 ip4:192.28.146.160 ip4:192.28.146.107 ip4:216.52.6.88 ip4:216.52.6.188 ip4:162.221.158.21 ip4:162.221.156.83 ~all" Received-SPF: None (esa4.hc3370-68.iphmx.com: no sender authenticity information available from domain of postmaster@mail.citrix.com) identity=helo; client-ip=162.221.158.21; receiver=esa4.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; envelope-from="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-sender="postmaster@mail.citrix.com"; x-conformance=sidf_compatible IronPort-SDR: nXe/XpJHLVinRkvDT26EflYdgPqJ6k4MG41OPO9NrDLP0GIc5wwtj7ksK0MT8z615OaM+bV1gt AAYrt+66X7TPhhJH68xzQocxT+SAEq1cVTp2t73QM6HFNjTUN66k6u0RPT2qJ9S+wMV0jh6Cjy xOaOd9euDd/Kdxvly6k9rqHbf8fQCMZy1YxWAOpLQZuIZe5XEj8KrwIf3lAGA8l3rDiPitgKlQ CRINQ7dQcsMXWWMdFUG1v+3mzROTMt9TVE9BtjFVHLKkLX3RH8/ZDlylzF1MiTdeAcc8n+uRCF txQ= X-SBRS: 2.7 X-MesageID: 6621883 X-Ironport-Server: esa4.hc3370-68.iphmx.com X-Remote-IP: 162.221.158.21 X-Policy: $RELAYED X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,568,1559534400"; d="scan'208";a="6621883" From: Andrew Cooper To: Xen-devel Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 19:24:36 +0100 Message-ID: <20190930182437.25478-2-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.11.0 In-Reply-To: <20190930182437.25478-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> References: <20190930182437.25478-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH for-4.13 1/2] xen/nospec: Introduce CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_ARRAY_HARDEN X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Juergen Gross , Andrew Cooper , Wei Liu , Jan Beulich , =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Sender: "Xen-devel" X-ZohoMail-DKIM: fail (Header signature does not verify) There are legitimate circumstance where array hardening is not wanted or needed. Allow it to be turned off. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper --- CC: Jan Beulich CC: Wei Liu CC: Roger Pau Monn=C3=A9 CC: Juergen Gross --- xen/common/Kconfig | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ xen/include/xen/nospec.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/common/Kconfig b/xen/common/Kconfig index 16829f6274..9644cc9911 100644 --- a/xen/common/Kconfig +++ b/xen/common/Kconfig @@ -77,6 +77,27 @@ config HAS_CHECKPOLICY string option env=3D"XEN_HAS_CHECKPOLICY" =20 +menu "Speculative hardening" + +config SPECULATIVE_ARRAY_HARDEN + bool "Speculative Array Hardening" + default y + ---help--- + Contemporary processors may use speculative execution as a + performance optimisation, but this can potentially be abused by an + attacker to leak data via speculative sidechannels. + + One source of data leakage is via speculative out-of-bounds array + accesses. + + When enabled, specific array accesses which have been deemed liable + to be speculatively abused will be hardened to avoid out-of-bounds + accesses. + + If unsure, say Y. + +endmenu + config KEXEC bool "kexec support" default y diff --git a/xen/include/xen/nospec.h b/xen/include/xen/nospec.h index 2ac8feccc2..e627a4da52 100644 --- a/xen/include/xen/nospec.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/nospec.h @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsig= ned long index, } #endif =20 +#ifdef CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_ARRAY_HARDEN /* * array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check * @@ -58,6 +59,17 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsi= gned long index, \ (typeof(_i)) (_i & _mask); \ }) +#else +/* No index hardening. */ +#define array_index_nospec(index, size) \ +({ \ + typeof(index) _i =3D (index); \ + typeof(size) _s =3D (size); \ + \ + (void)_s; \ + _i; \ +}) +#endif /* CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_ARRAY_HARDEN */ =20 /* * array_access_nospec - allow nospec access for static size arrays --=20 2.11.0 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel From nobody Tue Nov 11 05:43:33 2025 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=fail; spf=none (zoho.com: 192.237.175.120 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of lists.xenproject.org) smtp.mailfrom=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1569867958; cv=none; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; b=gEeBvVA2Oq5tiw2AkoQKNDYjwaFOw6rdECuIKKIT21GoQlAPsYmlQGG5ZUKec10VBDcBiSkJ5rhOOaBueAuFTEDVHNg7HOkQdLA7hvYsU0s5LDR5OTWOsaG1twIovN7eKdiUKIs18e/xYd2OBuuUOUERqEK00tBtfCzRBixP/lA= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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spf=Pass smtp.mailfrom=Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com; spf=None smtp.helo=postmaster@mail.citrix.com Received-SPF: none (zoho.com: 192.237.175.120 is neither permitted nor denied by domain of lists.xenproject.org) client-ip=192.237.175.120; envelope-from=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org; helo=lists.xenproject.org; Received-SPF: None (esa6.hc3370-68.iphmx.com: no sender authenticity information available from domain of andrew.cooper3@citrix.com) identity=pra; client-ip=162.221.158.21; receiver=esa6.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; envelope-from="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-sender="andrew.cooper3@citrix.com"; x-conformance=sidf_compatible Received-SPF: Pass (esa6.hc3370-68.iphmx.com: domain of Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com designates 162.221.158.21 as permitted sender) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=162.221.158.21; receiver=esa6.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; envelope-from="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-sender="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-conformance=sidf_compatible; x-record-type="v=spf1"; x-record-text="v=spf1 ip4:209.167.231.154 ip4:178.63.86.133 ip4:195.66.111.40/30 ip4:85.115.9.32/28 ip4:199.102.83.4 ip4:192.28.146.160 ip4:192.28.146.107 ip4:216.52.6.88 ip4:216.52.6.188 ip4:162.221.158.21 ip4:162.221.156.83 ~all" Received-SPF: None (esa6.hc3370-68.iphmx.com: no sender authenticity information available from domain of postmaster@mail.citrix.com) identity=helo; client-ip=162.221.158.21; receiver=esa6.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; envelope-from="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-sender="postmaster@mail.citrix.com"; x-conformance=sidf_compatible IronPort-SDR: zGDRzt5ve405+IDaJp1rpw8t4rzt1xDRUu4BqFnh7x7mUy0eFO01ArpxQNlpuHBCk3yNN7FT5l gh07f/yAmYF3lMYLMDcmdAKIKDb5TN2GJz4ez4gqj2ncTl0wPwvNaCbv1st7N1vtwPmh6MSDqB MpAnuUoktxcwdLPGP/mxDmmnZIHLb3m1dadYS3pZRCSDThR1dQmOZgKWQDwJtTKksT7n9r+nH8 bpdvgKfKkZasaApmC9V58IkvLOz4CqmYiA2/GW0GDs9YmN8Srhw1q5/u/GpH9Duqhf9Cxp0h7p Hls= X-SBRS: 2.7 X-MesageID: 6556716 X-Ironport-Server: esa6.hc3370-68.iphmx.com X-Remote-IP: 162.221.158.21 X-Policy: $RELAYED X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,568,1559534400"; d="scan'208";a="6556716" From: Andrew Cooper To: Xen-devel Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 19:24:37 +0100 Message-ID: <20190930182437.25478-3-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.11.0 In-Reply-To: <20190930182437.25478-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> References: <20190930182437.25478-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH for-4.13 2/2] xen/nospec: Introduce CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_BRANCH_HARDEN and disable it X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Juergen Gross , Wei Liu , Andrew Cooper , Norbert Manthey , Jan Beulich , =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Sender: "Xen-devel" X-ZohoMail-DKIM: fail (Header signature does not verify) The code generation for barrier_nospec_true() is not correct. We are takin= g a perf it from the added fences, but not gaining any speculative safety. This is caused by inline assembly trying to fight the compiler optimiser, a= nd the optimiser winning. There is no clear way to achieve safety, so turn the perf hit off for now. This also largely reverts 3860d5534df4. The name 'l1tf-barrier', and making barrier_nospec_true() depend on CONFIG_HVM was constrained by what could be discussed publicly at the time. Now that MDS is public, neither aspects are correct. As l1tf-barrier hasn't been in a release of Xen, and CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_BRANCH_HARDEN is disabled until we can find a safe way of implementing the functionality, remove the l1tf-barrier command line option. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper --- CC: Jan Beulich CC: Wei Liu CC: Roger Pau Monn=C3=A9 CC: Juergen Gross CC: Norbert Manthey --- docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc | 8 +------- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 17 ++--------------- xen/common/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++ xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- xen/include/asm-x86/nospec.h | 4 ++-- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h | 1 - 6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line= .pandoc index fc64429064..b9c5b822ca 100644 --- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc @@ -1932,7 +1932,7 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ss= bd=3Druntime`). ### spec-ctrl (x86) > `=3D List of [ , xen=3D, {pv,hvm,msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=3D, > bti-thunk=3Dretpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,eager-fpu, -> l1d-flush,l1tf-barrier}=3D ]` +> l1d-flush}=3D ]` =20 Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations. By default, X= en will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support, @@ -2004,12 +2004,6 @@ Irrespective of Xen's setting, the feature is virtua= lised for HVM guests to use. By default, Xen will enable this mitigation on hardware believed to = be vulnerable to L1TF. =20 -On hardware vulnerable to L1TF, the `l1tf-barrier=3D` option can be used t= o force -or prevent Xen from protecting evaluations inside the hypervisor with a ba= rrier -instruction to not load potentially secret information into L1 cache. By -default, Xen will enable this mitigation on hardware believed to be vulner= able -to L1TF. - ### sync_console > `=3D ` =20 diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c index 4761be81bd..5ea8870981 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ #include #include =20 -#include #include #include #include @@ -53,7 +52,6 @@ bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb =3D true; bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd =3D false; int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu =3D -1; int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush =3D -1; -int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1tf_barrier =3D -1; =20 bool __initdata bsp_delay_spec_ctrl; uint8_t __read_mostly default_xen_spec_ctrl; @@ -98,8 +96,6 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) if ( opt_pv_l1tf_domu < 0 ) opt_pv_l1tf_domu =3D 0; =20 - opt_l1tf_barrier =3D 0; - disable_common: opt_rsb_pv =3D false; opt_rsb_hvm =3D false; @@ -175,8 +171,6 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) opt_eager_fpu =3D val; else if ( (val =3D parse_boolean("l1d-flush", s, ss)) >=3D 0 ) opt_l1d_flush =3D val; - else if ( (val =3D parse_boolean("l1tf-barrier", s, ss)) >=3D 0 ) - opt_l1tf_barrier =3D val; else rc =3D -EINVAL; =20 @@ -337,7 +331,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, = uint64_t caps) "\n"); =20 /* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */ - printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s\= n", + printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s, Other:%s%s%s\n", thunk =3D=3D THUNK_NONE ? "N/A" : thunk =3D=3D THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" : thunk =3D=3D THUNK_LFENCE ? "LFENCE" : @@ -348,8 +342,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, = uint64_t caps) (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ? " SSBD+" : " SSBD-", opt_ibpb ? " IBPB" : "", opt_l1d_flush ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "", - opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm ? " VERW" : "", - opt_l1tf_barrier ? " L1TF_BARRIER" : "= "); + opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm ? " VERW" : ""); =20 /* L1TF diagnostics, printed if vulnerable or PV shadowing is in use. = */ if ( cpu_has_bug_l1tf || opt_pv_l1tf_hwdom || opt_pv_l1tf_domu ) @@ -1034,12 +1027,6 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) else if ( opt_l1d_flush =3D=3D -1 ) opt_l1d_flush =3D cpu_has_bug_l1tf && !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DF= L); =20 - /* By default, enable L1TF_VULN on L1TF-vulnerable hardware */ - if ( opt_l1tf_barrier =3D=3D -1 ) - opt_l1tf_barrier =3D cpu_has_bug_l1tf && (opt_smt || !opt_l1d_flus= h); - if ( opt_l1tf_barrier > 0 ) - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_L1TF_VULN); - /* * We do not disable HT by default on affected hardware. * diff --git a/xen/common/Kconfig b/xen/common/Kconfig index 9644cc9911..d851e63083 100644 --- a/xen/common/Kconfig +++ b/xen/common/Kconfig @@ -96,6 +96,23 @@ config SPECULATIVE_ARRAY_HARDEN =20 If unsure, say Y. =20 +config SPECULATIVE_BRANCH_HARDEN + bool "Speculative Branch Hardening" + depends on BROKEN + ---help--- + Contemporary processors may use speculative execution as a + performance optimisation, but this can potentially be abused by an + attacker to leak data via speculative sidechannels. + + One source of misbehaviour is by executing the wrong basic block + following a conditional jump. + + When enabled, specific conditions which have been deemed liable to + be speculatively abused will be hardened to avoid entering the wrong + basic block. + + !!! WARNING - This is broken and doesn't generate safe code !!! + endmenu =20 config KEXEC diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufea= tures.h index 91eccf5161..ecb651c35d 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMAP, X86_SYNTH(11)) /* SMAP = gets used by Xen itself XEN_CPUFEATURE(LFENCE_DISPATCH, X86_SYNTH(12)) /* lfence set as Dispatch= Serialising */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IND_THUNK_LFENCE, X86_SYNTH(13)) /* Use IND_THUNK_LFENCE */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IND_THUNK_JMP, X86_SYNTH(14)) /* Use IND_THUNK_JMP */ -XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_L1TF_VULN, X86_SYNTH(15)) /* L1TF protection requir= ed */ +/* 15 unused. */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_PV, X86_SYNTH(16)) /* MSR_SPEC_CTRL used by = Xen for PV */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_HVM, X86_SYNTH(17)) /* MSR_SPEC_CTRL used by = Xen for HVM */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_PV, X86_SYNTH(18)) /* RSB overwrite needed f= or PV */ diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/nospec.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/nospec.h index 2aa47b3455..df7f9b13d7 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/nospec.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/nospec.h @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ /* Allow to insert a read memory barrier into conditionals */ static always_inline bool barrier_nospec_true(void) { -#ifdef CONFIG_HVM - alternative("", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_SC_L1TF_VULN); +#ifdef CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_BRANCH_HARDEN + alternative("", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); #endif return true; } diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctr= l.h index 1339ddd7ef..ba03bb42e5 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ extern bool opt_ibpb; extern bool opt_ssbd; extern int8_t opt_eager_fpu; extern int8_t opt_l1d_flush; -extern int8_t opt_l1tf_barrier; =20 extern bool bsp_delay_spec_ctrl; extern uint8_t default_xen_spec_ctrl; --=20 2.11.0 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel