From: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

The VncSurface struct maintains update statistics in an array:

    VncRectStat stats[VNC_STAT_ROWS][VNC_STAT_COLS];

where the dimensions are defined as:

  #define VNC_STAT_RECT  64
  #define VNC_STAT_COLS (VNC_MAX_WIDTH / VNC_STAT_RECT)
  #define VNC_STAT_ROWS (VNC_MAX_HEIGHT / VNC_STAT_RECT)

If VNC_MAX_WIDTH / VNC_MAX_HEIGHT are not an exact multiple of
VNC_STAT_REC, the COLS/ROWS will be undersized by 1.

Unfortunately:

  #define VNC_MAX_HEIGHT 2160

is not a multiple of 64, so there is potential for OOB reads and
writes in the 'stats' array, if the guest surface is over 2112
pixels in height. An array overflow occurs when vnc_update_stats()
records new statistics, either scribbling over data later in the
VncDisplay struct that 'stats' is embedded in, or performing an
OOB write on the allocated struct memory.

Fixes: CVE-2026-48002
Reported-by: boy juju <agx1657748706@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20260521103353.1645561-3-berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.h b/ui/vnc.h
index 0750bf5f72f..c8d87cd5301 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.h
+++ b/ui/vnc.h
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ typedef void VncSendHextileTile(VncState *vs,
 #define VNC_DIRTY_BPL(x) (sizeof((x)->dirty) / VNC_MAX_HEIGHT * BITS_PER_BYTE)
 
 #define VNC_STAT_RECT  64
-#define VNC_STAT_COLS (VNC_MAX_WIDTH / VNC_STAT_RECT)
-#define VNC_STAT_ROWS (VNC_MAX_HEIGHT / VNC_STAT_RECT)
+#define VNC_STAT_COLS DIV_ROUND_UP(VNC_MAX_WIDTH, VNC_STAT_RECT)
+#define VNC_STAT_ROWS DIV_ROUND_UP(VNC_MAX_HEIGHT, VNC_STAT_RECT)
 
 #define VNC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE 16
 
-- 
2.54.0