docs/devel/index.rst | 1 + docs/devel/security.rst | 220 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 221 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/devel/security.rst
At KVM Forum 2018 I gave a presentation on security in QEMU:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAdRf_hwxU8 (video)
https://vmsplice.net/~stefan/stefanha-kvm-forum-2018.pdf (slides)
This patch adds a security guide to the developer docs. This document
covers things that developers should know about security in QEMU. It is
just a starting point that we can expand on later. I hope it will be
useful as a resource for new contributors and will save code reviewers
from explaining the same concepts many times.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
---
docs/devel/index.rst | 1 +
docs/devel/security.rst | 220 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 221 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 docs/devel/security.rst
diff --git a/docs/devel/index.rst b/docs/devel/index.rst
index ebbab636ce..fd0b5fa387 100644
--- a/docs/devel/index.rst
+++ b/docs/devel/index.rst
@@ -20,3 +20,4 @@ Contents:
stable-process
testing
decodetree
+ security
diff --git a/docs/devel/security.rst b/docs/devel/security.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c6a6c9973d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/devel/security.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+==============
+Security Guide
+==============
+Overview
+--------
+This guide covers security topics relevant to developers working on QEMU. It
+includes an explanation of the security requirements that QEMU gives its users,
+the architecture of the code, and secure coding practices.
+
+Security Requirements
+---------------------
+QEMU supports many different use cases, some of which have stricter security
+requirements than others. The community has agreed on the overall security
+requirements that users may depend on. These requirements define what is
+considered supported from a security perspective.
+
+Virtualization Use Case
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The virtualization use case covers cloud and virtual private server (VPS)
+hosting, as well as traditional data center and desktop virtualization. These
+use cases rely on hardware virtualization extensions to execute guest code
+safely on the physical CPU at close-to-native speed.
+
+The following entities are **untrusted**, meaning that they may be buggy or
+malicious:
+
+* Guest
+* User-facing interfaces (e.g. VNC, SPICE, WebSocket)
+* Network protocols (e.g. NBD, live migration)
+* User-supplied files (e.g. disk images, kernels, device trees)
+
+Bugs affecting these entities are evaluated on whether they can cause damage in
+real-world use cases and treated as security bugs if this is the case.
+
+Non-virtualization Use Case
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The non-virtualization use case covers emulation using the Tiny Code Generator
+(TCG). In principle the TCG and device emulation code used in conjunction with
+the non-virtualization use case should meet the same security requirements as
+the virtualization use case. However, for historical reasons much of the
+non-virtualization use case code was not written with these security
+requirements in mind.
+
+Bugs affecting the non-virtualization use case are not considered security
+bugs at this time. Users with non-virtualization use cases must not rely on
+QEMU to provide guest isolation or any security guarantees.
+
+Architecture
+------------
+This section describes the design principles that ensure the security
+requirements are met.
+
+Guest Isolation
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Guest isolation is the confinement of guest code to the virtual machine. When
+guest code gains control of execution on the host this is called escaping the
+virtual machine. Isolation also includes resource limits such as CPU, memory,
+disk, or network throttling. Guests must be unable to exceed their resource
+limits.
+
+QEMU presents an attack surface to the guest in the form of emulated devices.
+The guest must not be able to gain control of QEMU. Bugs in emulated devices
+could allow malicious guests to gain code execution in QEMU. At this point the
+guest has escaped the virtual machine and is able to act in the context of the
+QEMU process on the host.
+
+Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. A
+malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access their data.
+Disk image files and network traffic must be protected from other guests unless
+explicitly shared between them by the user.
+
+Principle of Least Privilege
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The principle of least privilege states that each component only has access to
+the privileges necessary for its function. In the case of QEMU this means that
+each process only has access to resources belonging to the guest.
+
+The QEMU process should not have access to any resources that are inaccessible
+to the guest. This way the guest does not gain anything by escaping into the
+QEMU process since it already has access to those same resources from within
+the guest.
+
+Following the principle of least privilege immediately fulfills guest isolation
+requirements. For example, guest A only has access to its own disk image file
+``a.img`` and not guest B's disk image file ``b.img``.
+
+In reality certain resources are inaccessible to the guest but must be
+available to QEMU to perform its function. For example, host system calls are
+necessary for QEMU but are not exposed to guests. A guest that escapes into
+the QEMU process can then begin invoking host system calls.
+
+New features must be designed to follow the principle of least privilege.
+Should this not be possible for technical reasons, the security risk must be
+clearly documented so users are aware of the trade-off of enabling the feature.
+
+Isolation mechanisms
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Several isolation mechanisms are available to realize this architecture of
+guest isolation and the principle of least privilege. With the exception of
+Linux seccomp, these mechanisms are all deployed by management tools that
+launch QEMU, such as libvirt. They are also platform-specific so they are only
+described briefly for Linux here.
+
+The fundamental isolation mechanism is that QEMU processes must run as
+**unprivileged users**. Sometimes it seems more convenient to launch QEMU as
+root to give it access to host devices (e.g. ``/dev/net/tun``) but this poses a
+huge security risk. File descriptor passing can be used to give an otherwise
+unprivileged QEMU process access to host devices without running QEMU as root.
+
+**SELinux** and **AppArmor** make it possible to confine processes beyond the
+traditional UNIX process and file permissions model. They restrict the QEMU
+process from accessing processes and files on the host system that are not
+needed by QEMU.
+
+**Resource limits** and **cgroup controllers** provide throughput and utilization
+limits on key resources such as CPU time, memory, and I/O bandwidth.
+
+**Linux namespaces** can be used to make process, file system, and other system
+resources unavailable to QEMU. A namespaced QEMU process is restricted to only
+those resources that were granted to it.
+
+**Linux seccomp** is available via the QEMU ``--sandbox`` option. It disables
+system calls that are not needed by QEMU, thereby reducing the host kernel
+attack surface.
+
+Secure coding practices
+-----------------------
+At the source code level there are several points to keep in mind. Both
+developers and security researchers must be aware of them so that they can
+develop safe code and audit existing code properly.
+
+General Secure C Coding Practices
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Most CVEs (security bugs) reported against QEMU are not specific to
+virtualization or emulation. They are simply C programming bugs. Therefore
+it's critical to be aware of common classes of security bugs.
+
+There is a wide selection of resources available covering secure C coding. For
+example, the `CERT C Coding Standard
+<https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/confluence/display/c/SEI+CERT+C+Coding+Standard>`_
+covers the most important classes of security bugs.
+
+Instead of describing them in detail here, only the names of the most important
+classes of security bugs are mentioned:
+
+* Buffer overflows
+* Use-after-free and double-free
+* Integer overflows
+* Format string vulnerabilities
+
+Some of these classes of bugs can be detected by analyzers. Static analysis is
+performed regularly by Coverity and the most obvious of these bugs are even
+reported by compilers. Dynamic analysis is possible with valgrind, tsan, and
+asan.
+
+Input Validation
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Inputs from the guest or external sources (e.g. network, files) cannot be
+trusted and may be invalid. Inputs must be checked before using them in a way
+that could crash the program, expose host memory to the guest, or otherwise be
+exploitable by an attacker.
+
+The most sensitive attack surface is device emulation. All hardware register
+accesses and data read from guest memory must be validated. A typical example
+is a device that contains multiple units that are selectable by the guest via
+an index register::
+
+ typedef struct {
+ ProcessingUnit unit[2];
+ ...
+ } MyDeviceState;
+
+ static void mydev_writel(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
+ {
+ MyDeviceState *mydev = opaque;
+ ProcessingUnit *unit;
+
+ switch (addr) {
+ case MYDEV_SELECT_UNIT:
+ unit = &mydev->unit[val]; <-- this input wasn't validated!
+ ...
+ }
+ }
+
+If ``val`` is not in range [0, 1] then an out-of-bounds memory access will take
+place when ``unit`` is dereferenced. The code must check that ``val`` is 0 or
+1 and handle the case where it is invalid.
+
+Unexpected Device Accesses
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The guest may access device registers in unusual orders or at unexpected
+moments. Device emulation code must not assume that the guest follows the
+typical "theory of operation" presented in driver writer manuals. The guest
+may make nonsense accesses to device registers such as starting operations
+before the device has been fully initialized.
+
+A related issue is that device emulation code must be prepared for unexpected
+device register accesses while asynchronous operations are in progress. A
+well-behaved guest might wait for a completion interrupt before accessing
+certain device registers. Device emulation code must handle the case where the
+guest overwrites registers or submits further requests before an ongoing
+request completes. Unexpected accesses must not cause memory corruption or
+leaks in QEMU.
+
+Live migration
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Device state can be saved to disk image files and shared with other users.
+Live migration code must validate inputs when loading device state so an
+attacker cannot gain control by crafting invalid device states. Device state
+is therefore considered untrusted even though it is typically generated by QEMU
+itself.
+
+Guest Memory Access Races
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Guests with multiple vCPUs may modify guest RAM while device emulation code is
+running. Device emulation code must copy in descriptors and other guest RAM
+structures and only process the local copy. This prevents
+time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) race conditions that could cause QEMU to
+crash when a vCPU thread modifies guest RAM while device emulation is
+processing it.
--
2.20.1
Hi Stefan, On 4/18/19 6:13 PM, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote: > At KVM Forum 2018 I gave a presentation on security in QEMU: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAdRf_hwxU8 (video) > https://vmsplice.net/~stefan/stefanha-kvm-forum-2018.pdf (slides) > > This patch adds a security guide to the developer docs. This document > covers things that developers should know about security in QEMU. It is > just a starting point that we can expand on later. I hope it will be > useful as a resource for new contributors and will save code reviewers > from explaining the same concepts many times. > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> > --- > docs/devel/index.rst | 1 + > docs/devel/security.rst | 220 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 221 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 docs/devel/security.rst > > diff --git a/docs/devel/index.rst b/docs/devel/index.rst > index ebbab636ce..fd0b5fa387 100644 > --- a/docs/devel/index.rst > +++ b/docs/devel/index.rst > @@ -20,3 +20,4 @@ Contents: > stable-process > testing > decodetree > + security > diff --git a/docs/devel/security.rst b/docs/devel/security.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..c6a6c9973d > --- /dev/null > +++ b/docs/devel/security.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@ > +============== > +Security Guide > +============== > +Overview > +-------- > +This guide covers security topics relevant to developers working on QEMU. It > +includes an explanation of the security requirements that QEMU gives its users, > +the architecture of the code, and secure coding practices. > + > +Security Requirements > +--------------------- > +QEMU supports many different use cases, some of which have stricter security > +requirements than others. The community has agreed on the overall security > +requirements that users may depend on. These requirements define what is > +considered supported from a security perspective. > + > +Virtualization Use Case > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > +The virtualization use case covers cloud and virtual private server (VPS) > +hosting, as well as traditional data center and desktop virtualization. These > +use cases rely on hardware virtualization extensions to execute guest code > +safely on the physical CPU at close-to-native speed. > + > +The following entities are **untrusted**, meaning that they may be buggy or > +malicious: > + > +* Guest > +* User-facing interfaces (e.g. VNC, SPICE, WebSocket) > +* Network protocols (e.g. NBD, live migration) > +* User-supplied files (e.g. disk images, kernels, device trees) What about pass-thru USB/PCI devices? > + > +Bugs affecting these entities are evaluated on whether they can cause damage in > +real-world use cases and treated as security bugs if this is the case. > + > +Non-virtualization Use Case > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > +The non-virtualization use case covers emulation using the Tiny Code Generator > +(TCG). In principle the TCG and device emulation code used in conjunction with > +the non-virtualization use case should meet the same security requirements as > +the virtualization use case. However, for historical reasons much of the > +non-virtualization use case code was not written with these security > +requirements in mind. > + > +Bugs affecting the non-virtualization use case are not considered security > +bugs at this time. Users with non-virtualization use cases must not rely on > +QEMU to provide guest isolation or any security guarantees. > + > +Architecture > +------------ > +This section describes the design principles that ensure the security > +requirements are met. > + > +Guest Isolation > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > +Guest isolation is the confinement of guest code to the virtual machine. When > +guest code gains control of execution on the host this is called escaping the > +virtual machine. Isolation also includes resource limits such as CPU, memory, > +disk, or network throttling. Guests must be unable to exceed their resource I'm unsure but I'd have written "... such as throttling of CPU, memory, disk or network". > +limits. > + > +QEMU presents an attack surface to the guest in the form of emulated devices. > +The guest must not be able to gain control of QEMU. Bugs in emulated devices > +could allow malicious guests to gain code execution in QEMU. At this point the > +guest has escaped the virtual machine and is able to act in the context of the > +QEMU process on the host. > + > +Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. A > +malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access their data. > +Disk image files and network traffic must be protected from other guests unless > +explicitly shared between them by the user. > + > +Principle of Least Privilege > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > +The principle of least privilege states that each component only has access to > +the privileges necessary for its function. In the case of QEMU this means that > +each process only has access to resources belonging to the guest. > + > +The QEMU process should not have access to any resources that are inaccessible > +to the guest. This way the guest does not gain anything by escaping into the > +QEMU process since it already has access to those same resources from within > +the guest. > + > +Following the principle of least privilege immediately fulfills guest isolation > +requirements. For example, guest A only has access to its own disk image file > +``a.img`` and not guest B's disk image file ``b.img``. > + > +In reality certain resources are inaccessible to the guest but must be > +available to QEMU to perform its function. For example, host system calls are > +necessary for QEMU but are not exposed to guests. A guest that escapes into > +the QEMU process can then begin invoking host system calls. > + > +New features must be designed to follow the principle of least privilege. > +Should this not be possible for technical reasons, the security risk must be > +clearly documented so users are aware of the trade-off of enabling the feature. > + > +Isolation mechanisms > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > +Several isolation mechanisms are available to realize this architecture of > +guest isolation and the principle of least privilege. With the exception of > +Linux seccomp, these mechanisms are all deployed by management tools that > +launch QEMU, such as libvirt. They are also platform-specific so they are only > +described briefly for Linux here. > + > +The fundamental isolation mechanism is that QEMU processes must run as > +**unprivileged users**. Sometimes it seems more convenient to launch QEMU as > +root to give it access to host devices (e.g. ``/dev/net/tun``) but this poses a > +huge security risk. File descriptor passing can be used to give an otherwise > +unprivileged QEMU process access to host devices without running QEMU as root. > + > +**SELinux** and **AppArmor** make it possible to confine processes beyond the > +traditional UNIX process and file permissions model. They restrict the QEMU > +process from accessing processes and files on the host system that are not > +needed by QEMU. > + > +**Resource limits** and **cgroup controllers** provide throughput and utilization > +limits on key resources such as CPU time, memory, and I/O bandwidth. > + > +**Linux namespaces** can be used to make process, file system, and other system > +resources unavailable to QEMU. A namespaced QEMU process is restricted to only > +those resources that were granted to it. > + > +**Linux seccomp** is available via the QEMU ``--sandbox`` option. It disables > +system calls that are not needed by QEMU, thereby reducing the host kernel > +attack surface. > + > +Secure coding practices > +----------------------- > +At the source code level there are several points to keep in mind. Both > +developers and security researchers must be aware of them so that they can > +develop safe code and audit existing code properly. > + > +General Secure C Coding Practices > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > +Most CVEs (security bugs) reported against QEMU are not specific to > +virtualization or emulation. They are simply C programming bugs. Therefore > +it's critical to be aware of common classes of security bugs. > + > +There is a wide selection of resources available covering secure C coding. For > +example, the `CERT C Coding Standard > +<https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/confluence/display/c/SEI+CERT+C+Coding+Standard>`_ > +covers the most important classes of security bugs. > + > +Instead of describing them in detail here, only the names of the most important > +classes of security bugs are mentioned: > + > +* Buffer overflows > +* Use-after-free and double-free > +* Integer overflows > +* Format string vulnerabilities > + > +Some of these classes of bugs can be detected by analyzers. Static analysis is > +performed regularly by Coverity and the most obvious of these bugs are even > +reported by compilers. Dynamic analysis is possible with valgrind, tsan, and > +asan. > + > +Input Validation > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > +Inputs from the guest or external sources (e.g. network, files) cannot be > +trusted and may be invalid. Inputs must be checked before using them in a way > +that could crash the program, expose host memory to the guest, or otherwise be > +exploitable by an attacker. > + > +The most sensitive attack surface is device emulation. All hardware register > +accesses and data read from guest memory must be validated. A typical example > +is a device that contains multiple units that are selectable by the guest via > +an index register:: > + > + typedef struct { > + ProcessingUnit unit[2]; > + ... > + } MyDeviceState; > + > + static void mydev_writel(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val) > + { > + MyDeviceState *mydev = opaque; > + ProcessingUnit *unit; > + > + switch (addr) { > + case MYDEV_SELECT_UNIT: > + unit = &mydev->unit[val]; <-- this input wasn't validated! > + ... > + } > + } > + > +If ``val`` is not in range [0, 1] then an out-of-bounds memory access will take > +place when ``unit`` is dereferenced. The code must check that ``val`` is 0 or > +1 and handle the case where it is invalid. > + > +Unexpected Device Accesses > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > +The guest may access device registers in unusual orders or at unexpected > +moments. Device emulation code must not assume that the guest follows the > +typical "theory of operation" presented in driver writer manuals. The guest > +may make nonsense accesses to device registers such as starting operations > +before the device has been fully initialized. > + > +A related issue is that device emulation code must be prepared for unexpected > +device register accesses while asynchronous operations are in progress. A > +well-behaved guest might wait for a completion interrupt before accessing > +certain device registers. Device emulation code must handle the case where the > +guest overwrites registers or submits further requests before an ongoing > +request completes. Unexpected accesses must not cause memory corruption or > +leaks in QEMU. Might worth to tell such unexpected accesses might be logged with 'qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, ...) and audited with -d guest_errors? > + > +Live migration > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > +Device state can be saved to disk image files and shared with other users. > +Live migration code must validate inputs when loading device state so an > +attacker cannot gain control by crafting invalid device states. Device state > +is therefore considered untrusted even though it is typically generated by QEMU > +itself. > + > +Guest Memory Access Races > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > +Guests with multiple vCPUs may modify guest RAM while device emulation code is > +running. Device emulation code must copy in descriptors and other guest RAM > +structures and only process the local copy. This prevents > +time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) race conditions that could cause QEMU to > +crash when a vCPU thread modifies guest RAM while device emulation is > +processing it. > Thanks for this document! Regards, Phil.
On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 06:47:18PM +0200, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote: > On 4/18/19 6:13 PM, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote: > > +Virtualization Use Case > > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > +The virtualization use case covers cloud and virtual private server (VPS) > > +hosting, as well as traditional data center and desktop virtualization. These > > +use cases rely on hardware virtualization extensions to execute guest code > > +safely on the physical CPU at close-to-native speed. > > + > > +The following entities are **untrusted**, meaning that they may be buggy or > > +malicious: > > + > > +* Guest > > +* User-facing interfaces (e.g. VNC, SPICE, WebSocket) > > +* Network protocols (e.g. NBD, live migration) > > +* User-supplied files (e.g. disk images, kernels, device trees) > > What about pass-thru USB/PCI devices? Can you give a real-world example? > > +Guest Isolation > > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > +Guest isolation is the confinement of guest code to the virtual machine. When > > +guest code gains control of execution on the host this is called escaping the > > +virtual machine. Isolation also includes resource limits such as CPU, memory, > > +disk, or network throttling. Guests must be unable to exceed their resource > > I'm unsure but I'd have written "... such as throttling of CPU, memory, > disk or network". Will change in v2. > > +Unexpected Device Accesses > > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > +The guest may access device registers in unusual orders or at unexpected > > +moments. Device emulation code must not assume that the guest follows the > > +typical "theory of operation" presented in driver writer manuals. The guest > > +may make nonsense accesses to device registers such as starting operations > > +before the device has been fully initialized. > > + > > +A related issue is that device emulation code must be prepared for unexpected > > +device register accesses while asynchronous operations are in progress. A > > +well-behaved guest might wait for a completion interrupt before accessing > > +certain device registers. Device emulation code must handle the case where the > > +guest overwrites registers or submits further requests before an ongoing > > +request completes. Unexpected accesses must not cause memory corruption or > > +leaks in QEMU. > > Might worth to tell such unexpected accesses might be logged with > 'qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, ...) and audited with -d guest_errors? Will add in v2. Stefan
Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> 于2019年4月23日周二 下午4:49写道: > On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 06:47:18PM +0200, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote: > > On 4/18/19 6:13 PM, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote: > > > +Virtualization Use Case > > > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > +The virtualization use case covers cloud and virtual private server > (VPS) > > > +hosting, as well as traditional data center and desktop > virtualization. These > > > +use cases rely on hardware virtualization extensions to execute guest > code > > > +safely on the physical CPU at close-to-native speed. > > > + > > > +The following entities are **untrusted**, meaning that they may be > buggy or > > > +malicious: > > > + > > > +* Guest > > > +* User-facing interfaces (e.g. VNC, SPICE, WebSocket) > > > +* Network protocols (e.g. NBD, live migration) > > > +* User-supplied files (e.g. disk images, kernels, device trees) > > > > What about pass-thru USB/PCI devices? > > Can you give a real-world example? > > Maybe Philippe means qemu maybe interact with the malicious USB/PCI devices. Just like usb-fuzzer recently added to syzkaller. I'm not sure how much qemu communicate with the real device in pass-thru(VFIO?). If there are too much, it may be take consideration. Thanks, Li Qiang > > > +Guest Isolation > > > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > +Guest isolation is the confinement of guest code to the virtual > machine. When > > > +guest code gains control of execution on the host this is called > escaping the > > > +virtual machine. Isolation also includes resource limits such as > CPU, memory, > > > +disk, or network throttling. Guests must be unable to exceed their > resource > > > > I'm unsure but I'd have written "... such as throttling of CPU, memory, > > disk or network". > > Will change in v2. > > > > +Unexpected Device Accesses > > > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > +The guest may access device registers in unusual orders or at > unexpected > > > +moments. Device emulation code must not assume that the guest > follows the > > > +typical "theory of operation" presented in driver writer manuals. > The guest > > > +may make nonsense accesses to device registers such as starting > operations > > > +before the device has been fully initialized. > > > + > > > +A related issue is that device emulation code must be prepared for > unexpected > > > +device register accesses while asynchronous operations are in > progress. A > > > +well-behaved guest might wait for a completion interrupt before > accessing > > > +certain device registers. Device emulation code must handle the case > where the > > > +guest overwrites registers or submits further requests before an > ongoing > > > +request completes. Unexpected accesses must not cause memory > corruption or > > > +leaks in QEMU. > > > > Might worth to tell such unexpected accesses might be logged with > > 'qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, ...) and audited with -d guest_errors? > > Will add in v2. > > Stefan >
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