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d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1665143057; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references:list-id:list-help: list-unsubscribe:list-subscribe:list-post; bh=YDl5bx/QBvGSPnVAt3s2HJqCTEkmFKFIpeekb5q9jX4=; b=i53tSL2Glm8Fyvqh2PhV9FBc+Y18ZopbCs2tPtHuOaX2tQb33TDRmo6EkYVtL52IHbmLXj q93wuJtRBaeyCQ6SMKHHnFHFU7MTlrsdyY3GUBvCGjEiNAD4CUxVBUQ4/rwqlnjawB3nTa xQWjGIFrosEw7eXrCfyxPCl4lEHVxFk= X-MC-Unique: 05ndrvmhMReni4Wl-NX_aw-1 X-Original-To: libvir-list@listman.corp.redhat.com From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= To: libvir-list@redhat.com Subject: [libvirt PATCH 10/12] docs/kbase: describe attestation for SEV guests Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2022 12:43:05 +0100 Message-Id: <20221007114307.1461861-11-berrange@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20221007114307.1461861-1-berrange@redhat.com> References: <20221007114307.1461861-1-berrange@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.8 X-BeenThere: libvir-list@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development discussions about the libvirt library & tools List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: libvir-list-bounces@redhat.com Sender: "libvir-list" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.1 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @redhat.com) X-ZM-MESSAGEID: 1665143060180100007 Expand the SEV guest kbase guide with information about how to configure a SEV/SEV-ES guest when attestation is required, and mention the use of virt-qemu-sev-validate as a way to confirm it. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrang=C3=A9 Reviewed-by: Kashyap Chamarthy =20 --- docs/kbase/launch_security_sev.rst | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs/kbase/launch_security_sev.rst b/docs/kbase/launch_securit= y_sev.rst index 2734832487..a19a5a4b25 100644 --- a/docs/kbase/launch_security_sev.rst +++ b/docs/kbase/launch_security_sev.rst @@ -206,6 +206,20 @@ libvirt to the correct OVMF binary. ... =20 +If intending to attest the boot measurement, it is required to use a +firmware binary that is stateless, as persistent NVRAM can undermine +the trust of the secure guest. This is achieved by telling libvirt +that a stateless binary is required + +:: + + ... + + hvm + + + ... + Memory ------ =20 @@ -373,6 +387,94 @@ running: # dmesg | grep -i sev AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active =20 +Guest attestation for SEV/SEV-ES from a trusted host +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D + +Before a confidential guest is used, it may be desirable to attest to boot +measurement. To be trustworthy the attestation process needs to be perform= ed +from a machine that is already trusted. This would typically be a physical +machine that the guest owner controls, or could be a previously launched +confidential guest that has already itself been attested. Most notably, it= is +**not** possible to securely attest a guest from the hypervisor host itsel= f, +as the goal of the attestation process is to detect whether the hypervisor= is +malicious. + +Performing an attestation requires that the ```` element is +configured with a guest owner DH certificate, and a session data blob. The= se +must be unique for every guest launch attempt. Any reuse will open avenues= of +attack for the hypervisor to fake the measurement. Unique data can be gene= rated +using the ``sevctl`` tool. + +First of all the PDH for the hypervisor host needs to be obtained. The adm= in +of the hypervisor can extract this using:: + + $ sevctl export --full ${hostname}.pdh + +Upon receiving the PDH associated with the hypervisor, the guest owner sho= uld +validate its integrity:: + + $ sevctl verify --sev ${hostname}.pdh + PDH EP384 D256 008cec87d6bd9df67a35e7d6057a933463cd8a02440f60c5df150821b= 5662ee0 + =E2=AC=91 PEK EP384 E256 431ba88424378200d58b6fb5db9657268c599b1be25f80= 47ac2e2981eff667e6 + =E2=80=A2=E2=AC=91 OCA EP384 E256 b4f1d0a2144186d1aa9c63f19039834e729= f508000aa05a76ba044f8e1419765 + =E2=AC=91 CEK EP384 E256 22c27ee3c1c33287db24d3c06869a5ae933eb44148f= db70838019e267077c6b8 + =E2=AC=91 ASK R4096 R384 d8cd9d1798c311c96e009a91552f17b4ddc4886a= 064ec933697734965b9ab29db803c79604e2725658f0861bfaf09ad4 + =E2=80=A2=E2=AC=91 ARK R4096 R384 3d2c1157c29ef7bd4207fc0c8b08d= b080e579ceba267f8c93bec8dce73f5a5e2e60d959ac37ea82176c1a0c61ae203ed + + =E2=80=A2 =3D self signed, =E2=AC=91 =3D signs, =E2=80=A2=CC=B7 =3D inv= alid self sign, =E2=AC=91=CC=B8 =3D invalid signs + +Assuming this is successful, it is now possible to generate a unique launch +data for the guest boot attempt:: + + $ sevctl export --name ${myvmname} ${hostname}.pdh ${policy} + +This will generate four files + + * ``${myvmname}_tik.bin`` + * ``${myvmname}_tek.bin`` + * ``${myvmname}_godh.bin`` + * ``${myvmname}_session.bin`` + +The ``tik.bin`` and ``tek.bin`` files will be needed to perform the boot +attestation, and must be kept somewhere secure, away from the hypervisor +host. + +The ``godh.bin`` file contents should be copied into the ```` field +in the ```` configuration, while the ``session.bin`` file +contents should be copied into the ```` field. + +When launching the guest, it should be set to remain in the paused state w= ith +no vCPUs running:: + + $ virsh start --paused ${myvmname} + +With it launched, it is possible to query the launch measurement:: + + $ virsh domlaunchsecinfo ${myvmname} + sev-measurement: LMnv8i8N2QejezMPkscShF0cyPYCslgUoCxGWRqQuyt0Q0aUjVkH/T6= NcmkwZkWp + sev-api-major : 0 + sev-api-minor : 24 + sev-build-id : 15 + sev-policy : 3 + +The techiques required to validate the measurement reported are beyond the +scope of this document. Fortunately, libvirt provides a tool that can be u= sed +to perform this validation:: + + $ virt-qemu-sev-validate \ + --measurement LMnv8i8N2QejezMPkscShF0cyPYCslgUoCxGWRqQuyt0Q0aUjVkH/T= 6NcmkwZkWp + --api-major 0 + --api-minor 24 + --build-id 15 + --policy 3 + --tik ${myvmname}_tik.bin + --tek ${myvmname}_tek.bin + OK: Looks good to me + +The `man page <../manpages/virt-qemu-sev-validate.html>`__ for +``virt-qemu-sev-validate`` outlines a great many other ways to invoke this +tool. + Limitations =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D =20 --=20 2.37.3