From nobody Thu May 16 20:39:23 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.108; envelope-from=bounce+27952+75903+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=mail02.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75903+1787277+3901457@groups.io ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1622553179; cv=none; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; b=eYXMDL0JRKwFXFM02OcqKOJ1z7tE3MNKp2niTvEUXP73vOaMu1unGzeg7N3tnY/YBwFw4xNNc6jujYlprWEWQvI4BnG5Ae9/h46+WbKnOeuiCtRVcgZD4jwRMRgPZN15TiodPDP2zwQ13JKWJaBvZtRQDABSIV82TsF0KGBrHRo= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; t=1622553179; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Subscribe:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To; bh=jHaEPg5n8KQq7ULZRewo2mRj54SsUF+WRPAWVXfPaNk=; b=BHzgH7pWUyPrWq5Glg/US9z66zRANesURaqZjKH9HVU66IS0xkbl2JfMrMvlJGHI4ZCxi20DzzKvrwa4OANlGWNw3jljdwJqMOMSAvc+cLxc2u8HY8Pfuw9CZyxiBVtH8qz6GkbMUrzU+1STocyvE6cSrzoZ2Dxc27Q5Tq0aCb4= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75903+1787277+3901457@groups.io Received: from mail02.groups.io (mail02.groups.io [66.175.222.108]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 162255317955897.85401066750967; Tue, 1 Jun 2021 06:12:59 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id g02kYY1788612xSgTlvAXpJI; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:59 -0700 X-Received: from mail-lj1-f176.google.com (mail-lj1-f176.google.com [209.85.208.176]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web10.57507.1622553177009996246 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:57 -0700 X-Received: by mail-lj1-f176.google.com with SMTP id t17so9456966ljk.7 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: 8tkkuPhtK5S6k1l2dpej0E4Ux1787277AA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz/0scBcSKD8TF8YSmvFtPU8WX1SSEmfm8W9sG1jfbDP3i5fyI0j+cvelqki1TGWS/mr0x6pw== X-Received: by 2002:a2e:7018:: with SMTP id l24mr2196716ljc.12.1622553174175; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: from gilgamesh.lab.semihalf.net ([83.142.187.85]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y5sm1681460lfa.148.2021.06.01.06.12.53 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:53 -0700 (PDT) From: "Grzegorz Bernacki" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: leif@nuviainc.com, ardb+tianocore@kernel.org, Samer.El-Haj-Mahmoud@arm.com, sunny.Wang@arm.com, mw@semihalf.com, upstream@semihalf.com, jiewen.yao@intel.com, jian.j.wang@intel.com, min.m.xu@intel.com, lersek@redhat.com, Grzegorz Bernacki Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 1/6] SecurityPkg: Create library for setting Secure Boot variables. Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 15:12:24 +0200 Message-Id: <20210601131229.630611-3-gjb@semihalf.com> In-Reply-To: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> References: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-Help: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,gjb@semihalf.com Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1622553179; bh=Kd6uo/lf2aGcPC71oZ53O6AIW/iDGKuzvQVjxAOdHaE=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=PrAxPhkPp3p1aBr3q/8QOthESe4XyMx/ZEFXrLpqzehOzjLFavumTEEstxhTk++7xwi RKmwQSc0EC4F0y0PLU9HS60AwTLsrV+n1rT1NSNsqD1Y/m2MM+pE87MNjqjfje3B1rAIh 2dVrYeDnrUF5ABRqeGdUXyV0t7OWLqi+0Pw= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" This commits add library, which consist functions related creation/removal Secure Boot variables. Some of the functions was moved from SecureBootConfigImpl.c file. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Bernacki Reviewed-by: Pete Batard Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang Tested-by: Pete Batard on Raspberry Pi 4 --- SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc = | 1 + SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.inf = | 79 ++ SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.= inf | 1 + SecurityPkg/Include/Library/SecureBootVariableLib.h = | 252 +++++ SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.c = | 979 ++++++++++++++++++++ SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl= .c | 189 +--- SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.uni = | 16 + 7 files changed, 1329 insertions(+), 188 deletions(-) create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVar= iableLib.inf create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Include/Library/SecureBootVariableLib.h create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVar= iableLib.c create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVar= iableLib.uni diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc index bd4b810bce..854f250625 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc +++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ RpmcLib|SecurityPkg/Library/RpmcLibNull/RpmcLibNull.inf TcgEventLogRecordLib|SecurityPkg/Library/TcgEventLogRecordLib/TcgEventLo= gRecordLib.inf MmUnblockMemoryLib|MdePkg/Library/MmUnblockMemoryLib/MmUnblockMemoryLibN= ull.inf + SecureBootVariableLib|SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBo= otVariableLib.inf =20 [LibraryClasses.ARM] # diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLi= b.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84367841d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.inf @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +## @file +# Provides initialization of Secure Boot keys and databases. +# +# Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
+# Copyright (c) 2021, Semihalf All rights reserved.
+# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +# +## + +[Defines] + INF_VERSION =3D 0x00010005 + BASE_NAME =3D SecureBootVariableLib + MODULE_UNI_FILE =3D SecureBootVariableLib.uni + FILE_GUID =3D D4FFF5CA-6D8E-4DBD-8A4B-7C7CEBD97F6F + MODULE_TYPE =3D DXE_DRIVER + VERSION_STRING =3D 1.0 + LIBRARY_CLASS =3D SecureBootVariableLib|DXE_DRIVER DXE_= RUNTIME_DRIVER UEFI_APPLICATION + +# +# The following information is for reference only and not required by the = build tools. +# +# VALID_ARCHITECTURES =3D IA32 X64 AARCH64 +# + +[Sources] + SecureBootVariableLib.c + +[Packages] + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec + MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec + SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec + CryptoPkg/CryptoPkg.dec + +[LibraryClasses] + BaseLib + BaseMemoryLib + DebugLib + MemoryAllocationLib + BaseCryptLib + DxeServicesLib + +[Guids] + ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"SetupMode" + ## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"SetupMode" + ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"SecureBoot" + ## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"SecureBoot" + ## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"PK" + ## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"KEK" + ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"PKDefault" + ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"KEKDefault" + ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"dbDefault" + ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"dbxDefault" + ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"dbtDefault" + gEfiGlobalVariableGuid + + ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"DB" + ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"DBX" + ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"DBT" + gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid + + ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"SecureBootEnable" + ## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"SecureBootEnable" + gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid + + ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"CustomMode" + ## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"CustomMode" + gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid + + gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid ## CONSUMES + gEfiCertX509Guid ## CONSUMES + gEfiCertPkcs7Guid ## CONSUMES + + gDefaultPKFileGuid + gDefaultKEKFileGuid + gDefaultdbFileGuid + gDefaultdbxFileGuid + gDefaultdbtFileGuid + diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBo= otConfigDxe.inf b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/Sec= ureBootConfigDxe.inf index 573efa6379..30d9cd8025 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gDxe.inf +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gDxe.inf @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ DevicePathLib FileExplorerLib PeCoffLib + SecureBootVariableLib =20 [Guids] ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"CustomMode" diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/SecureBootVariableLib.h b/Security= Pkg/Include/Library/SecureBootVariableLib.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2961c93a36 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Include/Library/SecureBootVariableLib.h @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +/** @file + Provides a function to enroll keys based on default values. + +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+(C) Copyright 2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
+Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 2021, Semihalf All rights reserved.
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +**/ + +#ifndef __SECURE_BOOT_VARIABLE_LIB_H__ +#define __SECURE_BOOT_VARIABLE_LIB_H__ + +/** + + Set the platform secure boot mode into "Custom" or "Standard" mode. + + @param[in] SecureBootMode New secure boot mode: STANDARD_SECURE= _BOOT_MODE or + CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE. + + @return EFI_SUCCESS The platform has switched to the spec= ial mode successfully. + @return other Fail to operate the secure boot mode. + +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SetSecureBootMode ( + IN UINT8 SecureBootMode +); + +/** + Fetches the value of SetupMode variable. + + @param[out] SetupMode Pointer to UINT8 for SetupMode output + + @retval other Error codes from GetVariable. +--*/ +BOOLEAN +EFIAPI +GetSetupMode ( + OUT UINT8 *SetupMode +); + +/** + Create a time based data payload by concatenating the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHE= NTICATION_2 + descriptor with the input data. NO authentication is required in this fu= nction. + + @param[in, out] DataSize On input, the size of Data buffer in by= tes. + On output, the size of data returned in= Data + buffer in bytes. + @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be = wrapped or + pointer to NULL to wrap an empty payloa= d. + On output, Pointer to the new payload d= ate buffer allocated from pool, + it's caller's responsibility to free th= e memory when finish using it. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully. + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resources t= o create time based payload. + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid. + @retval Others Unexpected error happens. + +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +CreateTimeBasedPayload ( + IN OUT UINTN *DataSize, + IN OUT UINT8 **Data +); + +/** + Sets the content of the 'db' variable based on 'dbDefault' variable cont= ent. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2(), GetTime() = and SetVariable() +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +EnrollDbFromDefault ( + VOID +); + +/** + Clears the content of the 'db' variable. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2(), GetTime() = and SetVariable() +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +DeleteDb ( + VOID +); + +/** + Sets the content of the 'dbx' variable based on 'dbxDefault' variable co= ntent. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2(), GetTime() = and SetVariable() +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +EnrollDbxFromDefault ( + VOID +); + +/** + Clears the content of the 'dbx' variable. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2(), GetTime() = and SetVariable() +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +DeleteDbx ( + VOID +); + +/** + Sets the content of the 'dbt' variable based on 'dbtDefault' variable co= ntent. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2(), GetTime() = and SetVariable() +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +EnrollDbtFromDefault ( + VOID +); + +/** + Clears the content of the 'dbt' variable. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2(), GetTime() = and SetVariable() +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +DeleteDbt ( + VOID +); + +/** + Sets the content of the 'KEK' variable based on 'KEKDefault' variable co= ntent. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2(), GetTime() = and SetVariable() +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +EnrollKEKFromDefault ( + VOID +); + +/** + Clears the content of the 'KEK' variable. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2(), GetTime() = and SetVariable() +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +DeleteKEK ( + VOID +); + +/** + Sets the content of the 'PK' variable based on 'PKDefault' variable cont= ent. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2(), GetTime() = and SetVariable() +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +EnrollPKFromDefault ( + VOID +); + +/** + Clears the content of the 'PK' variable. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2(), GetTime() = and SetVariable() +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +DeletePlatformKey ( + VOID +); + +/** Initializes PKDefault variable with data from FFS section. + + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable was initialized successfully. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Variable already exists. +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootInitPKDefault ( + IN VOID + ); + +/** Initializes KEKDefault variable with data from FFS section. + + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable was initialized successfully. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Variable already exists. +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootInitKEKDefault ( + IN VOID + ); + +/** Initializes dbDefault variable with data from FFS section. + + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable was initialized successfully. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Variable already exists. +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootInitdbDefault ( + IN VOID + ); + +/** Initializes dbtDefault variable with data from FFS section. + + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable was initialized successfully. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Variable already exists. +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootInitdbtDefault ( + IN VOID + ); + +/** Initializes dbxDefault variable with data from FFS section. + + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable was initialized successfully. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Variable already exists. +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootInitdbxDefault ( + IN VOID + ); +#endif diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLi= b.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..16bad5530a --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.c @@ -0,0 +1,979 @@ +/** @file + This library provides functions to set/clear Secure Boot + keys and databases. + +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+(C) Copyright 2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
+Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 2021, Semihalf All rights reserved.
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +**/ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "Library/DxeServicesLib.h" + +/** Creates EFI Signature List structure. + + @param[in] Data A pointer to signature data. + @param[in] Size Size of signature data. + @param[out] SigList Created Signature List. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Signature List was created successfully. + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate memory. +--*/ +STATIC +EFI_STATUS +CreateSigList ( + IN VOID *Data, + IN UINTN Size, + OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **SigList + ) +{ + UINTN SigListSize; + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *TmpSigList; + EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigData; + + // + // Allocate data for Signature Database + // + SigListSize =3D sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA= ) - 1 + Size; + TmpSigList =3D (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SigListSize); + if (TmpSigList =3D=3D NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + // + // Only gEfiCertX509Guid type is supported + // + TmpSigList->SignatureListSize =3D (UINT32)SigListSize; + TmpSigList->SignatureSize =3D (UINT32) (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 = + Size); + TmpSigList->SignatureHeaderSize =3D 0; + CopyGuid (&TmpSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid); + + // + // Copy key data + // + SigData =3D (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) (TmpSigList + 1); + CopyGuid (&SigData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid); + CopyMem (&SigData->SignatureData[0], Data, Size); + + *SigList =3D TmpSigList; + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Adds new signature list to signature database. + + @param[in] SigLists A pointer to signature database. + @param[in] SiglListAppend A signature list to be added. + @param[out] *SigListOut Created signature database. + @param[out] SigListsSize A size of created signature database. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Signature List was added successfully. + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate memory. +--*/ +STATIC +EFI_STATUS +ConcatenateSigList ( + IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigLists, + IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigListAppend, + OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **SigListOut, + IN OUT UINTN *SigListsSize +) +{ + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *TmpSigList; + UINT8 *Offset; + UINTN NewSigListsSize; + + NewSigListsSize =3D *SigListsSize + SigListAppend->SignatureListSize; + + TmpSigList =3D (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (NewSigListsSize); + if (TmpSigList =3D=3D NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + CopyMem (TmpSigList, SigLists, *SigListsSize); + + Offset =3D (UINT8 *)TmpSigList; + Offset +=3D *SigListsSize; + CopyMem ((VOID *)Offset, SigListAppend, SigListAppend->SignatureListSize= ); + + *SigListsSize =3D NewSigListsSize; + *SigListOut =3D TmpSigList; + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Create a EFI Signature List with data fetched from section specified as = a argument. + Found keys are verified using RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509(). + + @param[in] KeyFileGuid A pointer to to the FFS filename GUID + @param[out] SigListsSize A pointer to size of signature list + @param[out] SigListsOut a pointer to a callee-allocated buffer = with signature lists + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully. + @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Section with key has not been found. + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Embedded key has a wrong format. + @retval Others Unexpected error happens. + +--*/ +STATIC +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootFetchData ( + IN EFI_GUID *KeyFileGuid, + OUT UINTN *SigListsSize, + OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **SigListOut +) +{ + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *EfiSig; + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *TmpEfiSig; + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *TmpEfiSig2; + EFI_STATUS Status; + VOID *Buffer; + VOID *RsaPubKey; + UINTN Size; + UINTN KeyIndex; + + + KeyIndex =3D 0; + EfiSig =3D NULL; + *SigListsSize =3D 0; + while (1) { + Status =3D GetSectionFromAnyFv ( + KeyFileGuid, + EFI_SECTION_RAW, + KeyIndex, + &Buffer, + &Size + ); + + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SUCCESS) { + RsaPubKey =3D NULL; + if (RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (Buffer, Size, &RsaPubKey) =3D=3D FALSE)= { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Invalid key format: %d\n", __FUNCTION__,= KeyIndex)); + if (EfiSig !=3D NULL) { + FreePool(EfiSig); + } + FreePool(Buffer); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + Status =3D CreateSigList (Buffer, Size, &TmpEfiSig); + + // + // Concatenate lists if more than one section found + // + if (KeyIndex =3D=3D 0) { + EfiSig =3D TmpEfiSig; + *SigListsSize =3D TmpEfiSig->SignatureListSize; + } else { + ConcatenateSigList (EfiSig, TmpEfiSig, &TmpEfiSig2, SigListsSize); + FreePool (EfiSig); + FreePool (TmpEfiSig); + EfiSig =3D TmpEfiSig2; + } + + KeyIndex++; + FreePool (Buffer); + } if (Status =3D=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND) { + break; + } + }; + + if (KeyIndex =3D=3D 0) { + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + + *SigListOut =3D EfiSig; + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Create a time based data payload by concatenating the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHE= NTICATION_2 + descriptor with the input data. NO authentication is required in this fu= nction. + + @param[in, out] DataSize On input, the size of Data buffer in by= tes. + On output, the size of data returned in= Data + buffer in bytes. + @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be = wrapped or + pointer to NULL to wrap an empty payloa= d. + On output, Pointer to the new payload d= ate buffer allocated from pool, + it's caller's responsibility to free th= e memory when finish using it. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully. + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resources t= o create time based payload. + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid. + @retval Others Unexpected error happens. + +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +CreateTimeBasedPayload ( + IN OUT UINTN *DataSize, + IN OUT UINT8 **Data + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT8 *NewData; + UINT8 *Payload; + UINTN PayloadSize; + EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *DescriptorData; + UINTN DescriptorSize; + EFI_TIME Time; + + if (Data =3D=3D NULL || DataSize =3D=3D NULL) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + // + // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed= but the + // parameters to the SetVariable() call still need to be prepared as aut= henticated + // variable. So we create EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_2 descriptor withou= t certificate + // data in it. + // + Payload =3D *Data; + PayloadSize =3D *DataSize; + + DescriptorSize =3D OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo= ) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData); + NewData =3D (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DescriptorSize + PayloadSize); + if (NewData =3D=3D NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + if ((Payload !=3D NULL) && (PayloadSize !=3D 0)) { + CopyMem (NewData + DescriptorSize, Payload, PayloadSize); + } + + DescriptorData =3D (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) (NewData); + + ZeroMem (&Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME)); + Status =3D gRT->GetTime (&Time, NULL); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FreePool(NewData); + return Status; + } + Time.Pad1 =3D 0; + Time.Nanosecond =3D 0; + Time.TimeZone =3D 0; + Time.Daylight =3D 0; + Time.Pad2 =3D 0; + CopyMem (&DescriptorData->TimeStamp, &Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME)); + + DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength =3D OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFI= CATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData); + DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wRevision =3D 0x0200; + DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType =3D WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID; + CopyGuid (&DescriptorData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid); + + if (Payload !=3D NULL) { + FreePool(Payload); + } + + *DataSize =3D DescriptorSize + PayloadSize; + *Data =3D NewData; + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Internal helper function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, N= O authentication + required. + + @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable. + @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully. + @retval Others The driver failed to start the device. + +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +DeleteVariable ( + IN CHAR16 *VariableName, + IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + VOID* Variable; + UINT8 *Data; + UINTN DataSize; + UINT32 Attr; + + GetVariable2 (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, NULL); + if (Variable =3D=3D NULL) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + FreePool (Variable); + + Data =3D NULL; + DataSize =3D 0; + Attr =3D EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | E= FI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS + | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; + + Status =3D CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &Data); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Sta= tus)); + return Status; + } + + Status =3D gRT->SetVariable ( + VariableName, + VendorGuid, + Attr, + DataSize, + Data + ); + if (Data !=3D NULL) { + FreePool (Data); + } + return Status; +} + +/** + + Set the platform secure boot mode into "Custom" or "Standard" mode. + + @param[in] SecureBootMode New secure boot mode: STANDARD_SECURE= _BOOT_MODE or + CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE. + + @return EFI_SUCCESS The platform has switched to the spec= ial mode successfully. + @return other Fail to operate the secure boot mode. + +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SetSecureBootMode ( + IN UINT8 SecureBootMode + ) +{ + return gRT->SetVariable ( + EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, + &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, + EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCES= S, + sizeof (UINT8), + &SecureBootMode + ); +} + + +/** + Enroll a key/certificate based on a default variable. + + @param[in] VariableName The name of the key/database. + @param[in] DefaultName The name of the default variable. + @param[in] VendorGuid The namespace (ie. vendor GUID) of the va= riable + + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Out of memory while allocating AuthHeader. + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful enrollment. + @return Error codes from GetTime () and SetVariab= le (). +--*/ +STATIC +EFI_STATUS +EnrollFromDefault ( + IN CHAR16 *VariableName, + IN CHAR16 *DefaultName, + IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid + ) +{ + VOID *Data; + UINTN DataSize; + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D EFI_SUCCESS; + + DataSize =3D 0; + Status =3D GetVariable2 (DefaultName, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Data, &D= ataSize); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "error: GetVariable (\"%s): %r\n", DefaultName,= Status)); + return Status; + } + + CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8 **)&Data); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Sta= tus)); + return Status; + } + + // + // Allocate memory for auth variable + // + Status =3D gRT->SetVariable ( + VariableName, + VendorGuid, + (EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS), + DataSize, + Data + ); + + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "error: %a (\"%s\", %g): %r\n", __FUNCTION__, Var= iableName, + VendorGuid, Status)); + } + + if (Data !=3D NULL) { + FreePool (Data); + } + + return Status; +} + +/** Initializes PKDefault variable with data from FFS section. + + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable was initialized successfully. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Variable already exists. +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootInitPKDefault ( + IN VOID + ) +{ + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *EfiSig; + UINTN SigListsSize; + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT8 *Data; + UINTN DataSize; + + // + // Check if variable exists, if so do not change it + // + Status =3D GetVariable2 (EFI_PK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariab= leGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize); + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SUCCESS) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s exists. Old value is preserved\n", EF= I_PK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME)); + FreePool (Data); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status !=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { + return Status; + } + + // + // Variable does not exist, can be initialized + // + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PK_DEFAULT_VARI= ABLE_NAME)); + + Status =3D SecureBootFetchData (&gDefaultPKFileGuid, &SigListsSize, &Efi= Sig); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Content for %s not found\n", EFI_PK_DEFAULT_VARIA= BLE_NAME)); + return Status; + } + + Status =3D gRT->SetVariable ( + EFI_PK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_A= CCESS, + SigListsSize, + (VOID *)EfiSig + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Failed to set %s\n", EFI_PK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME= )); + } + + FreePool (EfiSig); + + return Status; +} + +/** Initializes KEKDefault variable with data from FFS section. + + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable was initialized successfully. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Variable already exists. +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootInitKEKDefault ( + IN VOID + ) +{ + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *EfiSig; + UINTN SigListsSize; + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT8 *Data; + UINTN DataSize; + + // + // Check if variable exists, if so do not change it + // + Status =3D GetVariable2 (EFI_KEK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVaria= bleGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize); + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SUCCESS) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s exists. Old value is preserved\n", EF= I_KEK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME)); + FreePool (Data); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status !=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { + return Status; + } + + // + // Variable does not exist, can be initialized + // + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_KEK_DEFAULT_VAR= IABLE_NAME)); + + Status =3D SecureBootFetchData (&gDefaultKEKFileGuid, &SigListsSize, &Ef= iSig); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Content for %s not found\n", EFI_KEK_DEFAULT_VARI= ABLE_NAME)); + return Status; + } + + + Status =3D gRT->SetVariable ( + EFI_KEK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_A= CCESS, + SigListsSize, + (VOID *)EfiSig + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Failed to set %s\n", EFI_KEK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAM= E)); + } + + FreePool (EfiSig); + + return Status; +} + +/** Initializes dbDefault variable with data from FFS section. + + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable was initialized successfully. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Variable already exists. +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootInitdbDefault ( + IN VOID + ) +{ + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *EfiSig; + UINTN SigListsSize; + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT8 *Data; + UINTN DataSize; + + Status =3D GetVariable2 (EFI_DB_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariab= leGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize); + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SUCCESS) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s exists. Old value is preserved\n", EF= I_DB_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME)); + FreePool (Data); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status !=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { + return Status; + } + + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_DB_DEFAULT_VARI= ABLE_NAME)); + + Status =3D SecureBootFetchData (&gDefaultdbFileGuid, &SigListsSize, &Efi= Sig); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return Status; + } + + Status =3D gRT->SetVariable ( + EFI_DB_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_A= CCESS, + SigListsSize, + (VOID *)EfiSig + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Failed to set %s\n", EFI_DB_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NA= ME)); + } + + FreePool (EfiSig); + + return Status; +} + +/** Initializes dbxDefault variable with data from FFS section. + + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable was initialized successfully. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Variable already exists. +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootInitdbxDefault ( + IN VOID + ) +{ + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *EfiSig; + UINTN SigListsSize; + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT8 *Data; + UINTN DataSize; + + // + // Check if variable exists, if so do not change it + // + Status =3D GetVariable2 (EFI_DBX_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVaria= bleGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize); + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SUCCESS) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s exists. Old value is preserved\n", EF= I_DBX_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME)); + FreePool (Data); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status !=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { + return Status; + } + + // + // Variable does not exist, can be initialized + // + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_DBX_DEFAULT_VAR= IABLE_NAME)); + + Status =3D SecureBootFetchData (&gDefaultdbxFileGuid, &SigListsSize, &Ef= iSig); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Content for %s not found\n", EFI_DBX_DEFAULT_VARI= ABLE_NAME)); + return Status; + } + + Status =3D gRT->SetVariable ( + EFI_DBX_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_A= CCESS, + SigListsSize, + (VOID *)EfiSig + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Failed to set %s\n", EFI_DBX_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAM= E)); + } + + FreePool (EfiSig); + + return Status; +} + +/** Initializes dbtDefault variable with data from FFS section. + + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable was initialized successfully. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Variable already exists. +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootInitdbtDefault ( + IN VOID + ) +{ + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *EfiSig; + UINTN SigListsSize; + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT8 *Data; + UINTN DataSize; + + // + // Check if variable exists, if so do not change it + // + Status =3D GetVariable2 (EFI_DBT_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVaria= bleGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize); + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SUCCESS) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s exists. Old value is preserved\n", EF= I_DBT_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME)); + FreePool (Data); + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status !=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { + return Status; + } + + // + // Variable does not exist, can be initialized + // + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_DBT_DEFAULT_VAR= IABLE_NAME)); + + Status =3D SecureBootFetchData (&gDefaultdbtFileGuid, &SigListsSize, &Ef= iSig); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return Status; + } + + Status =3D gRT->SetVariable ( + EFI_DBT_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_A= CCESS, + SigListsSize, + (VOID *)EfiSig + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Failed to set %s\n", EFI_DBT_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAM= E)); + } + + FreePool (EfiSig); + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Fetches the value of SetupMode variable. + + @param[out] SetupMode Pointer to UINT8 for SetupMode output + + @retval other Retval from GetVariable. +--*/ +BOOLEAN +EFIAPI +GetSetupMode ( + OUT UINT8 *SetupMode +) +{ + UINTN Size; + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Size =3D sizeof (*SetupMode); + Status =3D gRT->GetVariable ( + EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + NULL, + &Size, + SetupMode + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return Status; + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Sets the content of the 'db' variable based on 'dbDefault' variable cont= ent. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2 (), GetTime (= ) and SetVariable () +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +EnrollDbFromDefault ( + VOID +) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D EnrollFromDefault ( + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, + EFI_DB_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid + ); + + return Status; +} + +/** + Clears the content of the 'db' variable. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2 (), GetTime (= ) and SetVariable () +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +DeleteDb ( + VOID +) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D DeleteVariable ( + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid + ); + + return Status; +} + +/** + Sets the content of the 'dbx' variable based on 'dbxDefault' variable co= ntent. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2 (), GetTime (= ) and SetVariable () +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +EnrollDbxFromDefault ( + VOID +) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D EnrollFromDefault ( + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, + EFI_DBX_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid + ); + + return Status; +} + +/** + Clears the content of the 'dbx' variable. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2 (), GetTime (= ) and SetVariable () +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +DeleteDbx ( + VOID +) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D DeleteVariable ( + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid + ); + + return Status; +} + +/** + Sets the content of the 'dbt' variable based on 'dbtDefault' variable co= ntent. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2 (), GetTime (= ) and SetVariable () +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +EnrollDbtFromDefault ( + VOID +) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D EnrollFromDefault ( + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, + EFI_DBT_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid); + + return Status; +} + +/** + Clears the content of the 'dbt' variable. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2 (), GetTime (= ) and SetVariable () +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +DeleteDbt ( + VOID +) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D DeleteVariable ( + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid + ); + + return Status; +} + +/** + Sets the content of the 'KEK' variable based on 'KEKDefault' variable co= ntent. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2 (), GetTime (= ) and SetVariable () +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +EnrollKEKFromDefault ( + VOID +) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D EnrollFromDefault ( + EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, + EFI_KEK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid + ); + + return Status; +} + +/** + Clears the content of the 'KEK' variable. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2 (), GetTime (= ) and SetVariable () +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +DeleteKEK ( + VOID +) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D DeleteVariable ( + EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid + ); + + return Status; +} + +/** + Sets the content of the 'KEK' variable based on 'KEKDefault' variable co= ntent. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES If memory allocation for EFI_VARIABLE_= AUTHENTICATION_2 fails + while VendorGuid is NULL. + @retval other Errors from GetVariable2 (), GetTime (= ) and SetVariable () +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +EnrollPKFromDefault ( + VOID +) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D EnrollFromDefault ( + EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, + EFI_PK_DEFAULT_VARIABLE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid + ); + + return Status; +} + +/** + Remove the PK variable. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete PK successfully. + @retval Others Could not allow to delete PK. + +--*/ +EFI_STATUS +DeletePlatformKey ( + VOID +) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return Status; + } + + Status =3D DeleteVariable ( + EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid + ); + return Status; +} diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBo= otConfigImpl.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/Secu= reBootConfigImpl.c index e82bfe7757..67e5e594ed 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gImpl.c +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gImpl.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent =20 #include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h" #include +#include =20 CHAR16 mSecureBootStorageName[] =3D L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATIO= N"; =20 @@ -237,168 +238,6 @@ SaveSecureBootVariable ( return Status; } =20 -/** - Create a time based data payload by concatenating the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHE= NTICATION_2 - descriptor with the input data. NO authentication is required in this fu= nction. - - @param[in, out] DataSize On input, the size of Data buffer in by= tes. - On output, the size of data returned in= Data - buffer in bytes. - @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be = wrapped or - pointer to NULL to wrap an empty payloa= d. - On output, Pointer to the new payload d= ate buffer allocated from pool, - it's caller's responsibility to free th= e memory when finish using it. - - @retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully. - @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resources t= o create time based payload. - @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid. - @retval Others Unexpected error happens. - -**/ -EFI_STATUS -CreateTimeBasedPayload ( - IN OUT UINTN *DataSize, - IN OUT UINT8 **Data - ) -{ - EFI_STATUS Status; - UINT8 *NewData; - UINT8 *Payload; - UINTN PayloadSize; - EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *DescriptorData; - UINTN DescriptorSize; - EFI_TIME Time; - - if (Data =3D=3D NULL || DataSize =3D=3D NULL) { - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; - } - - // - // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed= but the - // parameters to the SetVariable() call still need to be prepared as aut= henticated - // variable. So we create EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_2 descriptor withou= t certificate - // data in it. - // - Payload =3D *Data; - PayloadSize =3D *DataSize; - - DescriptorSize =3D OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo= ) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData); - NewData =3D (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DescriptorSize + PayloadSize); - if (NewData =3D=3D NULL) { - return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; - } - - if ((Payload !=3D NULL) && (PayloadSize !=3D 0)) { - CopyMem (NewData + DescriptorSize, Payload, PayloadSize); - } - - DescriptorData =3D (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) (NewData); - - ZeroMem (&Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME)); - Status =3D gRT->GetTime (&Time, NULL); - if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { - FreePool(NewData); - return Status; - } - Time.Pad1 =3D 0; - Time.Nanosecond =3D 0; - Time.TimeZone =3D 0; - Time.Daylight =3D 0; - Time.Pad2 =3D 0; - CopyMem (&DescriptorData->TimeStamp, &Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME)); - - DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength =3D OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFI= CATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData); - DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wRevision =3D 0x0200; - DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType =3D WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID; - CopyGuid (&DescriptorData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid); - - if (Payload !=3D NULL) { - FreePool(Payload); - } - - *DataSize =3D DescriptorSize + PayloadSize; - *Data =3D NewData; - return EFI_SUCCESS; -} - -/** - Internal helper function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, N= O authentication - required. - - @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable. - @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable. - - @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully. - @retval Others The driver failed to start the device. - -**/ -EFI_STATUS -DeleteVariable ( - IN CHAR16 *VariableName, - IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid - ) -{ - EFI_STATUS Status; - VOID* Variable; - UINT8 *Data; - UINTN DataSize; - UINT32 Attr; - - GetVariable2 (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, NULL); - if (Variable =3D=3D NULL) { - return EFI_SUCCESS; - } - FreePool (Variable); - - Data =3D NULL; - DataSize =3D 0; - Attr =3D EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | E= FI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS - | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; - - Status =3D CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &Data); - if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { - DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Sta= tus)); - return Status; - } - - Status =3D gRT->SetVariable ( - VariableName, - VendorGuid, - Attr, - DataSize, - Data - ); - if (Data !=3D NULL) { - FreePool (Data); - } - return Status; -} - -/** - - Set the platform secure boot mode into "Custom" or "Standard" mode. - - @param[in] SecureBootMode New secure boot mode: STANDARD_SECURE= _BOOT_MODE or - CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE. - - @return EFI_SUCCESS The platform has switched to the spec= ial mode successfully. - @return other Fail to operate the secure boot mode. - -**/ -EFI_STATUS -SetSecureBootMode ( - IN UINT8 SecureBootMode - ) -{ - return gRT->SetVariable ( - EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, - &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, - EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCES= S, - sizeof (UINT8), - &SecureBootMode - ); -} - /** This code checks if the encode type and key strength of X.509 certificate is qualified. @@ -646,32 +485,6 @@ ON_EXIT: return Status; } =20 -/** - Remove the PK variable. - - @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete PK successfully. - @retval Others Could not allow to delete PK. - -**/ -EFI_STATUS -DeletePlatformKey ( - VOID -) -{ - EFI_STATUS Status; - - Status =3D SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); - if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { - return Status; - } - - Status =3D DeleteVariable ( - EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, - &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid - ); - return Status; -} - /** Enroll a new KEK item from public key storing file (*.pbk). =20 diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLi= b.uni b/SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.uni new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2c51e4db53 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.uni @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// /** @file +// +// Provides initialization of Secure Boot keys and databases. +// +// Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
+// Copyright (c) 2021, Semihalf All rights reserved.
+// +// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +// +// **/ + + +#string STR_MODULE_ABSTRACT #language en-US "Provides function= to initialize PK, KEK and databases based on default variables." + +#string STR_MODULE_DESCRIPTION #language en-US "Provides function= to initialize PK, KEK and databases based on default variables." + --=20 2.25.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#75903): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/75903 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/83232297/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- From nobody Thu May 16 20:39:23 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.108; envelope-from=bounce+27952+75902+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=mail02.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75902+1787277+3901457@groups.io ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1622553178; cv=none; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; b=KOztI8N2fBpWBqqVayvZydgEuEJtAl0fU4YTNx3ZbLBg1qnhcAlQadRgPUw03hzRerARB8oZuL/4tics6pL/J+61SPP4l8G6YTzgFsPIXVu4b0EAuwUZgeh0RaKZRKbmkhxXLsJ5F2QnTNw95mIttsUygq2t2RQncGVXxU7X4SY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; t=1622553178; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Subscribe:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To; bh=m8E8TNqOQvXa/7GTo+hMId5b1g2ehmDaI2uUcqoCROI=; b=VnRpLzwIaDPtQ06wWQ8AKdrjEsSvwthkHWi0RZmYYuyF87/valamHLnY9L5AkAfkdwgd7wh1vx9dmeOvM6MmRQvkDtCaeYYsJWJ+YgME0HLGmZ2FW4getQJRgmCAEyqIuRxM0LBPONg0kMfnaZI8VcVtaSFeFSBJMnCZt1pAkgQ= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75902+1787277+3901457@groups.io Received: from mail02.groups.io (mail02.groups.io [66.175.222.108]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1622553178309965.8431212729222; Tue, 1 Jun 2021 06:12:58 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id 9NzvYY1788612xh8Is98ybw4; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:57 -0700 X-Received: from mail-lf1-f43.google.com (mail-lf1-f43.google.com [209.85.167.43]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.57659.1622553177134695328 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:57 -0700 X-Received: by mail-lf1-f43.google.com with SMTP id v8so21721727lft.8 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: CRn3MgosfqmsLKiLPt8ziH9ax1787277AA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz1QtaCvr5j02nyizEDRN3UBiukWji8t5QszHSmP6lyj4ZbkxQgU3l7jqZp8fTBsGYbt1nJbg== X-Received: by 2002:ac2:5e33:: with SMTP id o19mr18376897lfg.11.1622553175073; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:55 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: from gilgamesh.lab.semihalf.net ([83.142.187.85]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y5sm1681460lfa.148.2021.06.01.06.12.54 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:54 -0700 (PDT) From: "Grzegorz Bernacki" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: leif@nuviainc.com, ardb+tianocore@kernel.org, Samer.El-Haj-Mahmoud@arm.com, sunny.Wang@arm.com, mw@semihalf.com, upstream@semihalf.com, jiewen.yao@intel.com, jian.j.wang@intel.com, min.m.xu@intel.com, lersek@redhat.com, Grzegorz Bernacki Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 2/6] SecurityPkg: Create include file for default key content. Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 15:12:25 +0200 Message-Id: <20210601131229.630611-4-gjb@semihalf.com> In-Reply-To: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> References: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-Help: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,gjb@semihalf.com Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1622553177; bh=3c+3hzQw3T2DmnKGOMfjEd2QJa50BILM05baA05jEAQ=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=gE5L7BBtvM1yrhZQSnDP59VRP46WuVuNJM1ld4fELv1uFf32hOuhc97GbfdRYbOodE9 XEwLGvOnDYUInHCBYTywYw0pDtBebpacJR9fsNQRcLZwRa/6oTr7zL0gwb7ob/JVncDFe tlkK8c73PK8r7JzoYgWbZKOKn2vbWLC6qPI= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" This commits add file which can be included by platform Flash Description File. It allows to specify certificate files, which will be embedded into binary file. The content of these files can be used to initialize Secure Boot default keys and databases. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Bernacki Reviewed-by: Pete Batard Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang Tested-by: Pete Batard on Raspberry Pi 4 --- SecurityPkg/SecureBootDefaultKeys.fdf.inc | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+) create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/SecureBootDefaultKeys.fdf.inc diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecureBootDefaultKeys.fdf.inc b/SecurityPkg/Secure= BootDefaultKeys.fdf.inc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..056586b204 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/SecureBootDefaultKeys.fdf.inc @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ + +!if $(DEFAULT_KEYS) =3D=3D TRUE + FILE FREEFORM =3D 85254ea7-4759-4fc4-82d4-5eed5fb0a4a0 { + !ifdef $(PK_DEFAULT_FILE) + SECTION RAW =3D $(PK_DEFAULT_FILE) + !endif + SECTION UI =3D "PK Default" + } + + FILE FREEFORM =3D 6f64916e-9f7a-4c35-b952-cd041efb05a3 { + !ifdef $(KEK_DEFAULT_FILE1) + SECTION RAW =3D $(KEK_DEFAULT_FILE1) + !endif + !ifdef $(KEK_DEFAULT_FILE2) + SECTION RAW =3D $(KEK_DEFAULT_FILE2) + !endif + !ifdef $(KEK_DEFAULT_FILE3) + SECTION RAW =3D $(KEK_DEFAULT_FILE3) + !endif + SECTION UI =3D "KEK Default" + } + + FILE FREEFORM =3D c491d352-7623-4843-accc-2791a7574421 { + !ifdef $(DB_DEFAULT_FILE1) + SECTION RAW =3D $(DB_DEFAULT_FILE1) + !endif + !ifdef $(DB_DEFAULT_FILE2) + SECTION RAW =3D $(DB_DEFAULT_FILE2) + !endif + !ifdef $(DB_DEFAULT_FILE3) + SECTION RAW =3D $(DB_DEFAULT_FILE3) + !endif + SECTION UI =3D "DB Default" + } + + FILE FREEFORM =3D 36c513ee-a338-4976-a0fb-6ddba3dafe87 { + !ifdef $(DBT_DEFAULT_FILE1) + SECTION RAW =3D $(DBT_DEFAULT_FILE1) + !endif + !ifdef $(DBT_DEFAULT_FILE2) + SECTION RAW =3D $(DBT_DEFAULT_FILE2) + !endif + !ifdef $(DBT_DEFAULT_FILE3) + SECTION RAW =3D $(DBT_DEFAULT_FILE3) + !endif + SECTION UI =3D "DBT Default" + } + + FILE FREEFORM =3D 5740766a-718e-4dc0-9935-c36f7d3f884f { + !ifdef $(DBX_DEFAULT_FILE1) + SECTION RAW =3D $(DBX_DEFAULT_FILE1) + !endif + !ifdef $(DBX_DEFAULT_FILE2) + SECTION RAW =3D $(DBX_DEFAULT_FILE2) + !endif + !ifdef $(DBX_DEFAULT_FILE3) + SECTION RAW =3D $(DBX_DEFAULT_FILE3) + !endif + SECTION UI =3D "DBX Default" + } + +!endif --=20 2.25.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#75902): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/75902 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/83232296/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- From nobody Thu May 16 20:39:23 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.108; envelope-from=bounce+27952+75904+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=mail02.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75904+1787277+3901457@groups.io ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1622553184; cv=none; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; b=eu2IM+t5JDN0S+eAyQ4n71BlvqgNmULWLFwA8RdeZ3iLI3yWmvFMIneMjUdcEdZOg3euVH9Jyt9f5Yi/pcKV/Sd4J5mBEsrlQn6v0X7xgU4+k7eL8fJVKKO8leGOCyFzNHZYeEdoMSuXJBzPc8HtNmgCk59l8/Cf3vHy6f/8nNs= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; t=1622553184; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Subscribe:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To; bh=E907uVa04jXhVpsT3tGWAG2RxC4xwEsl1u1/ZoHjR6A=; b=cfrD8o/eeTirOaw0fVjFHl9D5I1ORBXI0aqaNW1kig/ldI3f1NzficJONXu2fL4AsGGJo9WnUwbcYf648Jw6HGjSfeJIH4l0mryOHCNDmd1o48oAQXOEho/bG98TRXRyql3Y3jntVxxnZNzN+1TSqJsJT6O5fRC3eCN9FXU8aN4= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75904+1787277+3901457@groups.io Received: from mail02.groups.io (mail02.groups.io [66.175.222.108]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1622553184332155.09268162320097; Tue, 1 Jun 2021 06:13:04 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id TIRlYY1788612x3PH5gzlvVr; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:13:04 -0700 X-Received: from mail-lj1-f174.google.com (mail-lj1-f174.google.com [209.85.208.174]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.57660.1622553178019267359 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:58 -0700 X-Received: by mail-lj1-f174.google.com with SMTP id bn21so11851241ljb.1 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:57 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: c3z5Fi6wNPihOAPicwGavjbOx1787277AA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzPVYruHPz9Je47CGPUpYHbYodKG0V0iCK9pbtbY22KdljPyTjO60MTR6nDLRYJeGmUjzdsWQ== X-Received: by 2002:a05:651c:2122:: with SMTP id a34mr21102002ljq.286.1622553176056; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: from gilgamesh.lab.semihalf.net ([83.142.187.85]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y5sm1681460lfa.148.2021.06.01.06.12.55 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:55 -0700 (PDT) From: "Grzegorz Bernacki" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: leif@nuviainc.com, ardb+tianocore@kernel.org, Samer.El-Haj-Mahmoud@arm.com, sunny.Wang@arm.com, mw@semihalf.com, upstream@semihalf.com, jiewen.yao@intel.com, jian.j.wang@intel.com, min.m.xu@intel.com, lersek@redhat.com, Grzegorz Bernacki Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 3/6] SecurityPkg: Add SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe driver Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 15:12:26 +0200 Message-Id: <20210601131229.630611-5-gjb@semihalf.com> In-Reply-To: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> References: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-Help: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,gjb@semihalf.com Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1622553184; bh=XDN37uVM9H1zrGO90qdmbPp861N3S7MfYqmSJ7oPZmE=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=eVcw1woJKOKnPMtOpS8KYomJDbPlKW6+WhqCMRkhzASwAjGGneFTDDuhmqvO9+d74Pi 3aJwGx9ckZFMyCmtnDEO4L5yjN20Aj9TkSoTOzPeN4pQw6DRpQXuMBSC1OwrMC79zocB3 xNnCCKD2jS3LFBeJfpp6XpyIQEJFqkdUR1Q= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" This driver initializes default Secure Boot keys and databases based on keys embedded in flash. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Bernacki Reviewed-by: Pete Batard Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang Tested-by: Pete Batard on Raspberry Pi 4 --- SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/SecureBootDefau= ltKeysDxe.inf | 46 +++++++++++++ SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/SecureBootDefau= ltKeysDxe.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++ SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/SecureBootDefau= ltKeysDxe.uni | 17 +++++ 3 files changed, 132 insertions(+) create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeys= Dxe/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe.inf create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeys= Dxe/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe.c create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeys= Dxe/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe.uni diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/Sec= ureBootDefaultKeysDxe.inf b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDef= aultKeysDxe/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..27345eab2e --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/SecureBoot= DefaultKeysDxe.inf @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +## @file +# Initializes Secure Boot default keys +# +# Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
+# Copyright (c) 2021, Semihalf All rights reserved.
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +# +## +[Defines] + INF_VERSION =3D 0x00010005 + BASE_NAME =3D SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe + FILE_GUID =3D C937FCB7-25AC-4376-89A2-4EA8B317DE83 + MODULE_TYPE =3D DXE_DRIVER + ENTRY_POINT =3D SecureBootDefaultKeysEntryPoint + +# +# VALID_ARCHITECTURES =3D IA32 X64 AARCH64 +# +[Sources] + SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe.c + +[Packages] + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec + MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec + SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec + +[LibraryClasses] + BaseLib + BaseMemoryLib + MemoryAllocationLib + UefiDriverEntryPoint + DebugLib + SecureBootVariableLib + +[Guids] + ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"PKDefault" + ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"KEKDefault" + ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"dbDefault" + ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"dbtDefault" + ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"dbxDefault" + gEfiGlobalVariableGuid + +[Depex] + gEfiVariableArchProtocolGuid AND + gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid + diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/Sec= ureBootDefaultKeysDxe.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefau= ltKeysDxe/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0928489e15 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/SecureBoot= DefaultKeysDxe.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/** @file + This driver init default Secure Boot variables + +Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 2021, Semihalf All rights reserved.
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +**/ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + The entry point for SecureBootDefaultKeys driver. + + @param[in] ImageHandle The image handle of the driver. + @param[in] SystemTable The system table. + + @retval EFI_ALREADY_STARTED The driver already exists in system. + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to execute entry point due to lack o= f resources. + @retval EFI_SUCCESS All the related protocols are installed o= n the driver. + @retval Others Fail to get the SecureBootEnable variable. + +**/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +SecureBootDefaultKeysEntryPoint ( + IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, + IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status =3D SecureBootInitPKDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Cannot initialize PKDefault: %r\n", __FUNCTIO= N__, Status)); + return Status; + } + + Status =3D SecureBootInitKEKDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Cannot initialize KEKDefault: %r\n", __FUNCT= ION__, Status)); + return Status; + } + Status =3D SecureBootInitdbDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Cannot initialize dbDefault: %r\n", __FUNCTI= ON__, Status)); + return Status; + } + + Status =3D SecureBootInitdbtDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: dbtDefault not initialized\n", __FUNCTION__)); + } + + Status =3D SecureBootInitdbxDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: dbxDefault not initialized\n", __FUNCTION__)); + } + + return Status; +} + diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/Sec= ureBootDefaultKeysDxe.uni b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDef= aultKeysDxe/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe.uni new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30f03aee5d --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/SecureBoot= DefaultKeysDxe.uni @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// /** @file +// Provides the capability to intialize Secure Boot default variables +// +// Module which initializes Secure boot default variables. +// +// Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
+// Copyright (c) 2021, Semihalf All rights reserved.
+// +// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +// +// **/ + + +#string STR_MODULE_ABSTRACT #language en-US "Module which init= ializes Secure boot default variables" + +#string STR_MODULE_DESCRIPTION #language en-US "This module reads= embedded keys and initializes Secure Boot default variables." + --=20 2.25.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#75904): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/75904 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/83232299/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- From nobody Thu May 16 20:39:23 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.108; envelope-from=bounce+27952+75905+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=mail02.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75905+1787277+3901457@groups.io ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1622553185; cv=none; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; b=Ha0TsmDIwTuUpTXbPaZtLteIN3nENjogNEh8w1XmJH6qibR12CWkkzr+KZXiGVi2SYzuWRXDwS8MTWSnQhBSq91uiKaePXpMYkDj4+CJ62gWJeQSrjnigm48YDAVh8BUxz5MMWY4D3PXSBByVGLhA6Ht8HXMayFTLbLY8gBIDv4= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; t=1622553185; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Subscribe:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To; bh=VNvB+9O9qJL03EqXMcCvL8WuLdc6wdcKimJcCY2d+uo=; b=eKRySkNLT3nuW6GzKKspYpDN1Wx5IuzmEfrXNizjBGpRuf3h+WkURqkOk1vBrK0iSgBlLI3PQc5Kyet1HgjqHfUrkNqrhfFJkMh6Mg6fbAtxK4CLKKAwzQ6ZMGnH+PSEVaAhhzujEqIHPZ279HkW9QpHJG9ty5mOBgD1A0AY1lE= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75905+1787277+3901457@groups.io Received: from mail02.groups.io (mail02.groups.io [66.175.222.108]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 162255318512475.00987827248491; Tue, 1 Jun 2021 06:13:05 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id eCh7YY1788612xKVmnoOctKC; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:13:04 -0700 X-Received: from mail-lf1-f44.google.com (mail-lf1-f44.google.com [209.85.167.44]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web12.57418.1622553178932386231 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:59 -0700 X-Received: by mail-lf1-f44.google.com with SMTP id b18so17632913lfv.11 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:58 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: sxiyvhWcN2YquRZfWerIGLlKx1787277AA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxKAJs/0Pe3Hmgwoc/SpshJdsWkIupJqT8Y2rdW2VYB77xuAaSxz6FQss56cDT7XyUHIpURhg== X-Received: by 2002:ac2:560f:: with SMTP id v15mr8373161lfd.431.1622553177001; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:57 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: from gilgamesh.lab.semihalf.net ([83.142.187.85]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y5sm1681460lfa.148.2021.06.01.06.12.56 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:56 -0700 (PDT) From: "Grzegorz Bernacki" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: leif@nuviainc.com, ardb+tianocore@kernel.org, Samer.El-Haj-Mahmoud@arm.com, sunny.Wang@arm.com, mw@semihalf.com, upstream@semihalf.com, jiewen.yao@intel.com, jian.j.wang@intel.com, min.m.xu@intel.com, lersek@redhat.com, Grzegorz Bernacki Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 4/6] SecurityPkg: Add EnrollFromDefaultKeys application. Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 15:12:27 +0200 Message-Id: <20210601131229.630611-6-gjb@semihalf.com> In-Reply-To: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> References: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-Help: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,gjb@semihalf.com Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1622553184; bh=Ez6R+3DIm5BxQylNgMqflgSxC3ahn8Znd4nMHhkK7Ug=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=s45s/wJF7NHFkDckArA5hE7LM3VDZwzp1+5nqTEsJ3n5cnkf8XGQqx5PZZZlyVfldeB sybOpyImYmoKHDFvGCr++M4rLfi4lK7ckGbzO2qmkd2EDu4E9Bszs1EgEF4MCj90bCGBh MM0TqsC8MPFjgLhVXRgo3bKYRCZeWb4ZGGE= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" This application allows user to force key enrollment from Secure Boot default variables. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Bernacki Reviewed-by: Pete Batard Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang Tested-by: Pete Batard on Raspberry Pi 4 --- SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp.inf | 47 ++= +++++++ SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp.c | 107 ++= ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 154 insertions(+) create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultK= eysApp.inf create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultK= eysApp.c diff --git a/SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp.= inf b/SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d79ca3844 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp.inf @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +## @file +# Enroll PK, KEK, db, dbx from Default variables +# +# Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
+# Copyright (c) 2021, Semihalf All rights reserved.
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +## + +[Defines] + INF_VERSION =3D 1.28 + BASE_NAME =3D EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp + FILE_GUID =3D 6F18CB2F-1293-4BC1-ABB8-35F84C71812E + MODULE_TYPE =3D UEFI_APPLICATION + VERSION_STRING =3D 0.1 + ENTRY_POINT =3D UefiMain + +[Sources] + EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp.c + +[Packages] + MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec + SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec + +[Guids] + gEfiCertPkcs7Guid + gEfiCertSha256Guid + gEfiCertX509Guid + gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid + gEfiGlobalVariableGuid + gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid + gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid + +[Protocols] + gEfiSmbiosProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES + +[LibraryClasses] + BaseLib + BaseMemoryLib + DebugLib + MemoryAllocationLib + PrintLib + UefiApplicationEntryPoint + UefiBootServicesTableLib + UefiLib + UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib + SecureBootVariableLib diff --git a/SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp.= c b/SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1907ce1d4e --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/** @file + Enroll default PK, KEK, db, dbx. + +Copyright (c) 2021, ARM Ltd. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 2021, Semihalf All rights reserved.
+ +SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +**/ + +#include // gEfiCustomModeEnableGu= id +#include // EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME +#include // EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DAT= ABASE +#include // GUID_STRING_LENGTH +#include // CopyGuid() +#include // ASSERT() +#include // FreePool() +#include // AsciiSPrint() +#include // gBS +#include // AsciiPrint() +#include // gRT +#include +#include + +#define FAIL(fmt...) AsciiPrint("EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp: " fmt) + +/** + Entry point function of this shell application. +**/ +EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +UefiMain ( + IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, + IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT8 SetupMode; + + Status =3D GetSetupMode (&SetupMode); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FAIL ("Cannot get SetupMode variable: %r\n", Status); + return 1; + } + + if (SetupMode =3D=3D USER_MODE) { + FAIL ("Skipped - USER_MODE\n"); + return 1; + } + + Status =3D SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FAIL ("Cannot set CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE: %r\n", Status); + return 1; + } + + Status =3D EnrollDbFromDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FAIL ("Cannot enroll db: %r\n", Status); + goto error; + } + + Status =3D EnrollDbxFromDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FAIL ("Cannot enroll dbt: %r\n", Status); + } + + Status =3D EnrollDbtFromDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FAIL ("Cannot enroll dbx: %r\n", Status); + } + + Status =3D EnrollKEKFromDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FAIL ("Cannot enroll KEK: %r\n", Status); + goto cleardbs; + } + + Status =3D EnrollPKFromDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FAIL ("Cannot enroll PK: %r\n", Status); + goto clearKEK; + } + + Status =3D SetSecureBootMode (STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FAIL ("Cannot set CustomMode to STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE\n" + "Please do it manually, otherwise system can be easily compromised\n= "); + } + return 0; + +clearKEK: + DeleteKEK (); + +cleardbs: + DeleteDbt (); + DeleteDbx (); + DeleteDb (); + +error: + Status =3D SetSecureBootMode (STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FAIL ("Cannot set CustomMode to STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE\n" + "Please do it manually, otherwise system can be easily compromised\n= "); + } + + return 1; +} --=20 2.25.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#75905): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/75905 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/83232300/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- From nobody Thu May 16 20:39:23 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.108; envelope-from=bounce+27952+75906+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=mail02.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75906+1787277+3901457@groups.io ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1622553187; cv=none; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; b=jew4QVvhV0eipPNmIEPVcOlEtnDpWYhcrcc3HHo20cjzkEN1ij1tK/lYcv7sPM3dWIbuBWFWXflcBT4oci13ICfv30ILB1uKxEQzcuMeheCZ64sbQ5N5fGRoxl7bdu3ZCLS6f/Fxf3OtrVQSM/dwxeOx2WoYDnSEQpAu/kfjTfo= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; t=1622553187; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Subscribe:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To; bh=L1fLeSa05lsvA4+6MzKpYiI9cbd8L3VF904NAKP67d8=; b=XUiLCvvMpCMeeVoLOeT1+ugUVmMajkF7uE9azSRmzs56PMk4AGS0vDd9svUvaZ7aIEMKgOhzhDFIHBNVSwCawC+43QvSo/p10Xix2gRElyQBDeLKb91bsnqNNdnp2skI9EUcnRgvjE4ZVZ0xRus57MrLLE2tyni5r5pIkUrCXGo= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75906+1787277+3901457@groups.io Received: from mail02.groups.io (mail02.groups.io [66.175.222.108]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1622553187486264.2555076931926; Tue, 1 Jun 2021 06:13:07 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id 86NFYY1788612xDdooSfr8Ln; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:13:07 -0700 X-Received: from mail-lj1-f176.google.com (mail-lj1-f176.google.com [209.85.208.176]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web12.57419.1622553181204473057 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:13:01 -0700 X-Received: by mail-lj1-f176.google.com with SMTP id e2so19162337ljk.4 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:13:00 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: NuIg2Zrh6l9BAL2C9EfwYHETx1787277AA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyoFaj4ix18TZ7K+6zn2UWBQWpRbL/UdwSLoISMRXQZFE/BPsPlHJKFQG5bT/0QsjYm+EaApA== X-Received: by 2002:a2e:8056:: with SMTP id p22mr7260496ljg.341.1622553178122; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:58 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: from gilgamesh.lab.semihalf.net ([83.142.187.85]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y5sm1681460lfa.148.2021.06.01.06.12.57 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:57 -0700 (PDT) From: "Grzegorz Bernacki" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: leif@nuviainc.com, ardb+tianocore@kernel.org, Samer.El-Haj-Mahmoud@arm.com, sunny.Wang@arm.com, mw@semihalf.com, upstream@semihalf.com, jiewen.yao@intel.com, jian.j.wang@intel.com, min.m.xu@intel.com, lersek@redhat.com, Grzegorz Bernacki Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 5/6] SecurityPkg: Add new modules to Security package. Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 15:12:28 +0200 Message-Id: <20210601131229.630611-7-gjb@semihalf.com> In-Reply-To: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> References: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-Help: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,gjb@semihalf.com Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1622553187; bh=mCE6+DrvPx/OovfqnVTgxemfTuiEuI6WvU6KHSXJc9g=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=rBNgOWIOf3siEsBQshA9q7HqxEIpdtPZJO9uh1MUssy9VnLLDMeBA2+F7mhAAbDNnNO ahfy8BtWuFlX8GigGaExSxlCpVsuQEJzqQFDnTp2MQdyxlDq55PbpdhYxkDv01C6c6Zex lAa2jBIyOzZw4nhxyJzIS96M7b+/rsb4T1w= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" This commits adds modules related to initialization and usage of default Secure Boot key variables to SecurityPkg. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Bernacki Reviewed-by: Pete Batard Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang Tested-by: Pete Batard on Raspberry Pi 4 --- SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 14 ++++++++++++++ SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec index 4001650fa2..dad3cae0ba 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec +++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec @@ -190,6 +190,20 @@ ## GUID used to enforce loading order between Tcg2Acpi and Tcg2Smm gTcg2MmSwSmiRegisteredGuid =3D { 0x9d4548b9, 0xa48d, 0x4db4, { 0= x9a, 0x68, 0x32, 0xc5, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x20, 0x18 } } =20 + ## GUID used to specify section with default PK content + gDefaultPKFileGuid =3D { 0x85254ea7, 0x4759, 0x4fc4, { 0= x82, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0xed, 0x5f, 0xb0, 0xa4, 0xa0 } } + + ## GUID used to specify section with default KEK content + gDefaultKEKFileGuid =3D { 0x6f64916e, 0x9f7a, 0x4c35, { 0= xb9, 0x52, 0xcd, 0x04, 0x1e, 0xfb, 0x05, 0xa3 } } + + ## GUID used to specify section with default db content + gDefaultdbFileGuid =3D { 0xc491d352, 0x7623, 0x4843, { 0= xac, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x91, 0xa7, 0x57, 0x44, 0x21 } } + + ## GUID used to specify section with default dbt content + gDefaultdbxFileGuid =3D { 0x5740766a, 0x718e, 0x4dc0, { 0= x99, 0x35, 0xc3, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0x3f, 0x88, 0x4f } } + + ## GUID used to specify section with default dbx content + gDefaultdbtFileGuid =3D { 0x36c513ee, 0xa338, 0x4976, { 0= xa0, 0xfb, 0x6d, 0xdb, 0xa3, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x87 } } =20 [Ppis] ## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked. diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc index 854f250625..e031775ca8 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc +++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dsc @@ -259,6 +259,10 @@ =20 [Components.IA32, Components.X64, Components.ARM, Components.AARCH64] SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf + SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBootVariableLib.inf + SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeys/EnrollFromDefaultKeys.inf + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeys/SecureBootDefaul= tKeys.inf + =20 [Components.IA32, Components.X64, Components.AARCH64] # --=20 2.25.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#75906): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/75906 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/83232301/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- From nobody Thu May 16 20:39:23 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.108; envelope-from=bounce+27952+75907+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=mail02.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75907+1787277+3901457@groups.io ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1622553182; cv=none; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; b=aiAHQEN8jANCVQpu9acYjwbkI9GTpBi0DMmJRgHQPIrvxDFNMHB7YWUjf/4zlBrHKk+07E+v9EhbH/WLPFa2TnN/CJZgw2HdDHphxcqAEXkQQu6Bz9TwdUiQ3AYWxcsCiuYuFaMbrfk5ld4fClMvUCHGNSyzJar+Cn9y9nz+Hqk= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; t=1622553182; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Subscribe:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To; bh=qOGn1ZMvocm4mjk0xlUAX8OasrZOaWB6gyw2LupcUzU=; b=hQCfHGd2GGbDi/tdeF98cB5mcNVXcrsP6nrotn4TBeQE25HJlzV5OmAx8lerCwxpJdV1bd9WujXxCEhlYzfXayyPG8MQnsaa6DFu+ijV5jc9QhYdlLZCrG37h9/ild39iwjM3mBHJ/6ZktwqoMyxme7XdQveuUD0gayH2NWyFu8= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75907+1787277+3901457@groups.io Received: from mail02.groups.io (mail02.groups.io [66.175.222.108]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1622553182890462.14378885928386; Tue, 1 Jun 2021 06:13:02 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id ftw0YY1788612xXA6psQFn11; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:13:02 -0700 X-Received: from mail-lf1-f44.google.com (mail-lf1-f44.google.com [209.85.167.44]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web12.57420.1622553181296253787 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:13:01 -0700 X-Received: by mail-lf1-f44.google.com with SMTP id a2so21681350lfc.9 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:13:01 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: EDfOTr4aPATFYzUhPCtlEhEzx1787277AA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyZP+5Wf7iaB5cfj38UBQX6RKt0a52AAhm07dsFyO0acsvDXG+sNaOx61NYBhPS69cynD0bNA== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6512:1303:: with SMTP id x3mr18375780lfu.276.1622553179325; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:59 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: from gilgamesh.lab.semihalf.net ([83.142.187.85]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y5sm1681460lfa.148.2021.06.01.06.12.58 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:59 -0700 (PDT) From: "Grzegorz Bernacki" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: leif@nuviainc.com, ardb+tianocore@kernel.org, Samer.El-Haj-Mahmoud@arm.com, sunny.Wang@arm.com, mw@semihalf.com, upstream@semihalf.com, jiewen.yao@intel.com, jian.j.wang@intel.com, min.m.xu@intel.com, lersek@redhat.com, Grzegorz Bernacki Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 6/6] SecurityPkg: Add option to reset secure boot keys. Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 15:12:29 +0200 Message-Id: <20210601131229.630611-8-gjb@semihalf.com> In-Reply-To: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> References: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-Help: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,gjb@semihalf.com Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1622553182; bh=AdblMmvrkogEwnux2nrJ4pL+tH5Zu5u4SesPuOznl+o=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=hqw5Fw6t9nabMqW91vAVKRadGidSDsPfZ3udPULqUi3YyFKHSLFTrRqzp1TkeURtmF0 Jy7vlEAWF4g4spR4fJm4FbWk5X4UU1MvRBjHXbM3BkvgZT/h+ugAey5BB6ebGYH/wD/pY OJLJlo5VF2K0i9wSRM0sUaXu1wdJt6FQFiQ= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" This commit add option which allows reset content of Secure Boot keys and databases to default variables. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Bernacki Reviewed-by: Pete Batard Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang Tested-by: Pete Batard on Raspberry Pi 4 --- SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.= inf | 1 + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigNvDa= ta.h | 2 + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr= | 6 + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl= .c | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++ SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStri= ngs.uni | 4 + 5 files changed, 167 insertions(+) diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBo= otConfigDxe.inf b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/Sec= ureBootConfigDxe.inf index 30d9cd8025..bd8d256dde 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gDxe.inf +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gDxe.inf @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ [Protocols] gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES + gEfiHiiPopupProtocolGuid =20 [Depex] gEfiHiiConfigRoutingProtocolGuid AND diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBo= otConfigNvData.h b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/Se= cureBootConfigNvData.h index 6e54a4b0f2..4ecc25efc3 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gNvData.h +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gNvData.h @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent =20 #define KEY_VALUE_FROM_DBX_TO_LIST_FORM 0x100f =20 +#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_RESET_TO_DEFAULT 0x1010 + #define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION 0x1100 #define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION 0x1101 #define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION 0x1102 diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBo= otConfig.vfr b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/Secure= BootConfig.vfr index fa7e11848c..e4560c592c 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= g.vfr +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= g.vfr @@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ formset endif; endif; =20 + text + help =3D STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_RESET_TO_DEFAULTS_HELP), + text =3D STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_RESET_TO_DEFAULTS), + flags =3D INTERACTIVE, + key =3D KEY_SECURE_BOOT_RESET_TO_DEFAULT; + endform; =20 // diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBo= otConfigImpl.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/Secu= reBootConfigImpl.c index 67e5e594ed..47f281873b 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gImpl.c +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gImpl.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent **/ =20 #include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h" +#include #include #include =20 @@ -4154,6 +4155,132 @@ ON_EXIT: return Status; } =20 +/** + This function reinitializes Secure Boot variables with default values. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page + @retval others Fail to delete or enroll signature data. +**/ + +STATIC EFI_STATUS +EFIAPI +KeyEnrollReset ( + VOID + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT8 SetupMode; + + Status =3D EFI_SUCCESS; + + Status =3D SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + return Status; + } + + // Clear all the keys and databases + Status =3D DeleteDb (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status !=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to clear DB: %r\n", Status)); + return Status; + } + + Status =3D DeleteDbx (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status !=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to clear DBX: %r\n", Status)); + return Status; + } + + Status =3D DeleteDbt (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status !=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to clear DBT: %r\n", Status)); + return Status; + } + + Status =3D DeleteKEK (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status !=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to clear KEK: %r\n", Status)); + return Status; + } + + Status =3D DeletePlatformKey (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && (Status !=3D EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to clear PK: %r\n", Status)); + return Status; + } + + // After PK clear, Setup Mode shall be enabled + Status =3D GetSetupMode (&SetupMode); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot get SetupMode variable: %r\n", + Status)); + return Status; + } + + if (SetupMode =3D=3D USER_MODE) { + DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "Skipped - USER_MODE\n")); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + Status =3D SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot set CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE: %r\n", + Status)); + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + // Enroll all the keys from default variables + Status =3D EnrollDbFromDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot enroll db: %r\n", Status)); + goto error; + } + + Status =3D EnrollDbxFromDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot enroll dbx: %r\n", Status)); + } + + Status =3D EnrollDbtFromDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot enroll dbt: %r\n", Status)); + } + + Status =3D EnrollKEKFromDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot enroll KEK: %r\n", Status)); + goto cleardbs; + } + + Status =3D EnrollPKFromDefault (); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot enroll PK: %r\n", Status)); + goto clearKEK; + } + + Status =3D SetSecureBootMode (STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot set CustomMode to STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MO= DE\n" + "Please do it manually, otherwise system can be easily compromised\n= ")); + } + + return Status; + +clearKEK: + DeleteKEK (); + +cleardbs: + DeleteDbt (); + DeleteDbx (); + DeleteDb (); + +error: + if (SetSecureBootMode (STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) !=3D EFI_SUCCESS) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Cannot set mode to Secure: %r\n", Status)); + } + return Status; +} + /** This function is called to provide results data to the driver. =20 @@ -4205,6 +4332,8 @@ SecureBootCallback ( SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData; BOOLEAN GetBrowserDataResult; ENROLL_KEY_ERROR EnrollKeyErrorCode; + EFI_HII_POPUP_PROTOCOL *HiiPopup; + EFI_HII_POPUP_SELECTION UserSelection; =20 Status =3D EFI_SUCCESS; SecureBootEnable =3D NULL; @@ -4755,6 +4884,31 @@ SecureBootCallback ( FreePool (SetupMode); } break; + case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_RESET_TO_DEFAULT: + { + Status =3D gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiHiiPopupProtocolGuid, NULL, (VO= ID **) &HiiPopup); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return Status; + } + Status =3D HiiPopup->CreatePopup ( + HiiPopup, + EfiHiiPopupStyleInfo, + EfiHiiPopupTypeYesNo, + Private->HiiHandle, + STRING_TOKEN (STR_RESET_TO_DEFAULTS_POPUP), + &UserSelection + ); + if (UserSelection =3D=3D EfiHiiPopupSelectionYes) { + Status =3D KeyEnrollReset (); + } + // + // Update secure boot strings after key reset + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SUCCESS) { + Status =3D UpdateSecureBootString (Private); + SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (Private, IfrNvData); + } + } default: break; } diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBo= otConfigStrings.uni b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe= /SecureBootConfigStrings.uni index ac783453cc..0d01701de7 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gStrings.uni +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfi= gStrings.uni @@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent #string STR_SECURE_BOOT_PROMPT #language en-US "Attempt Secure= Boot" #string STR_SECURE_BOOT_HELP #language en-US "Enable/Disable= the Secure Boot feature after platform reset" =20 +#string STR_SECURE_RESET_TO_DEFAULTS_HELP #language en-US "Enroll keys wi= th data from default variables" +#string STR_SECURE_RESET_TO_DEFAULTS #language en-US "Reset Secure B= oot Keys" +#string STR_RESET_TO_DEFAULTS_POPUP #language en-US "Secure Boot Ke= ys & databases will be initialized from defaults.\n Are you sure?" + #string STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE #language en-US "Enroll Signatu= re" #string STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE #language en-US "Delete Signatu= re" #string STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_LIST_FORM #language en-US "Delete Signatu= re List Form" --=20 2.25.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#75907): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/75907 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/83232302/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- From nobody Thu May 16 20:39:23 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.108; envelope-from=bounce+27952+75901+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=mail02.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75901+1787277+3901457@groups.io ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1622553181; cv=none; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; b=Nk99Jt3LICwot6EAarAn2DUenWNj+27KjjfbPHFpCVrBDNHn9UglTuJH6xr1MUO6Usj2NofdNP1bPbnC1WrJaEVbIOta8xHooZnCuJ6WSMgTU+aIYoG1dbwzDngdmI0sq+3Qkrny9w7R3yyRUqebJZFp5YZ3K+eg+cScimGo24c= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; t=1622553181; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Subscribe:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To; bh=jKYSDOnJX4lUhy3cz9kfxhfXt2MVotnqfvk/PkTuSuI=; b=JYX3GDVC+HvXX2peoFhlqmyiIsjcAUQP20CugVIKnEkLFg8hoogc+yH0UIidgaZxyTrZ+mUKE28yYDHzLy7b8/oYqIpJ6BlADWFeYGX7mZdOE+RfR9vRRdrJrT5Io4hb4LXh/3IAYWgBGYXcYNXGp5P/B4hD97XHLRoTOQOa9DE= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.108 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+75901+1787277+3901457@groups.io Received: from mail02.groups.io (mail02.groups.io [66.175.222.108]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1622553181723696.6452493150564; Tue, 1 Jun 2021 06:13:01 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id AUZxYY1788612xRHYNA8sIIg; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:13:01 -0700 X-Received: from mail-lj1-f179.google.com (mail-lj1-f179.google.com [209.85.208.179]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web09.57766.1622553175275366063 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:55 -0700 X-Received: by mail-lj1-f179.google.com with SMTP id e2so19161947ljk.4 for ; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:55 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: YGWT9xlMVk5oKIXweBQPpUClx1787277AA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJw87p7d/5cFE1B/b792KajhEJd3BBIBTmuvGmdkf0aV+Cw4xNOTBnvfYtrD+0QdopGWPaK02g== X-Received: by 2002:a2e:740f:: with SMTP id p15mr11086377ljc.122.1622553173047; Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:53 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: from gilgamesh.lab.semihalf.net ([83.142.187.85]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y5sm1681460lfa.148.2021.06.01.06.12.52 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 01 Jun 2021 06:12:52 -0700 (PDT) From: "Grzegorz Bernacki" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: leif@nuviainc.com, ardb+tianocore@kernel.org, Samer.El-Haj-Mahmoud@arm.com, sunny.Wang@arm.com, mw@semihalf.com, upstream@semihalf.com, jiewen.yao@intel.com, jian.j.wang@intel.com, min.m.xu@intel.com, lersek@redhat.com, Grzegorz Bernacki Subject: [edk2-devel] [edk2-platforms PATCH v2] Platform/RaspberryPi: Enable default Secure Boot variables initialization Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 15:12:23 +0200 Message-Id: <20210601131229.630611-2-gjb@semihalf.com> In-Reply-To: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> References: <20210601131229.630611-1-gjb@semihalf.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-Help: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,gjb@semihalf.com Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1622553181; bh=BBBLEuPds/jmQs8OiVSaGalSUMJ9Kb0p5HWYn+Me9Dg=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=Mcc5i7pT7JVtyH4XtsWp234zPZJRTU6IgMbRsyLIQ4Lnt2y3KWSaVIOKZsXXEqn0OMG yo/Ri3S+AMgvxBqLFeqxjbkXpkRuVM57ZkUSqvOdIT/IblljBcdg1Y8nQG8HezecWMNZC XY+JYyPeFKLlhotS4QHESzVPt253x87aTig= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" This commit allows to initialize Secure Boot default key and databases from data embedded in firmware binary. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Bernacki Reviewed-By: Samer El-Haj-Mahmoud Reviewed-by: Pete Batard Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang --- Platform/RaspberryPi/RPi4/RPi4.dsc | 5 ++++- Platform/RaspberryPi/RPi4/RPi4.fdf | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Platform/RaspberryPi/RPi4/RPi4.dsc b/Platform/RaspberryPi/RPi4= /RPi4.dsc index d8c6fdd4bd..1fb4df0b81 100644 --- a/Platform/RaspberryPi/RPi4/RPi4.dsc +++ b/Platform/RaspberryPi/RPi4/RPi4.dsc @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) =3D=3D TRUE TpmMeasurementLib|SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasurementLib/DxeTpmMeasure= mentLib.inf AuthVariableLib|SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf - + SecureBootVariableLib|SecurityPkg/Library/SecureBootVariableLib/SecureBo= otVariableLib.inf # re-use the UserPhysicalPresent() dummy implementation from the ovmf tr= ee PlatformSecureLib|OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLib/PlatformSecureLib.inf !else @@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ MemoryAllocationLib|MdePkg/Library/UefiMemoryAllocationLib/UefiMemoryAll= ocationLib.inf HiiLib|MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiHiiLib/UefiHiiLib.inf ShellLib|ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLib/UefiShellLib.inf + ShellCEntryLib|ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellCEntryLib/UefiShellCEntryLib.inf FileHandleLib|MdePkg/Library/UefiFileHandleLib/UefiFileHandleLib.inf =20 [LibraryClasses.common.UEFI_DRIVER] @@ -612,6 +613,8 @@ NULL|SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificatio= nLib.inf } SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDx= e.inf + SecurityPkg/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp/EnrollFromDefaultKeysApp.inf + SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/SecureBootDef= aultKeysDxe.inf !else MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStubDxe.inf !endif diff --git a/Platform/RaspberryPi/RPi4/RPi4.fdf b/Platform/RaspberryPi/RPi4= /RPi4.fdf index 1e13909a57..0e43d24c7a 100644 --- a/Platform/RaspberryPi/RPi4/RPi4.fdf +++ b/Platform/RaspberryPi/RPi4/RPi4.fdf @@ -189,7 +189,9 @@ READ_LOCK_STATUS =3D TRUE INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteDxe.i= nf INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf !if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) =3D=3D TRUE +!include SecurityPkg/SecureBootDefaultKeys.fdf.inc INF SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConf= igDxe.inf + INF SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootDefaultKeysDxe/SecureBoo= tDefaultKeysDxe.inf !endif INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe/MonotonicCounterRu= ntimeDxe.inf INF EmbeddedPkg/ResetRuntimeDxe/ResetRuntimeDxe.inf --=20 2.25.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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