From nobody Mon Feb 9 10:29:26 2026 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.12; envelope-from=bounce+27952+47948+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=web01.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47948+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail(p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1569331216; cv=none; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; b=dnNkFioHaj2xJhXRpCZAVVoUpLZ227/txw/siLF50oJWQSwe4WpzMWr4nTBXM2phraeDi/mEhUf3n0drOyACs9grIJcFmvd8tqLmnOFZV/omyYAiqMPrvEJYqNybLMku9EZ12nc1893gGwGo0lTSogRPrOYGWwijx1LQrAfMsqE= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; t=1569331216; h=Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Id:List-Unsubscribe:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To:ARC-Authentication-Results; bh=TraVhAMFpPjYJ1OpigQw3NBcLEqfaKWGVPoQqyYiTuE=; b=PuvErnGo3eK8rjBO3WSYqDIOEANpYCahgRSxMFUbe7CA1B4e+vQRYcuBad5uRWhPDqrxIqU3OiDNuySmixFlJ6aVT7fPFZQcICcqMDEBuPn62DMZhn15lTzQX1/5gcg78trzh4X9QCPySThGfa30G2fJ4QsRC+0Dud6Jmqcj0yY= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zoho.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47948+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail header.from= (p=none dis=none) header.from= Received: from web01.groups.io (web01.groups.io [66.175.222.12]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1569331216701681.1807711872602; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:20:16 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id 3XcfYY1788612xeJMJ881Vv1; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:20:16 -0700 X-Received: from mga12.intel.com (mga12.intel.com [192.55.52.136]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:20:15 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2019 06:20:04 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,544,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="189365444" X-Received: from dandanbi-mobl2.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.249.168.26]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Sep 2019 06:20:02 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Ray Ni , Zhichao Gao , Laszlo Ersek , Philippe Mathieu-Daude Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 5/5] ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 21:16:44 +0800 Message-Id: <20190924131644.10412-6-dandan.bi@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> References: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,dandan.bi@intel.com X-Gm-Message-State: kdY6zcSG5Tn9NP3siB5IbanQx1787277AA= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1569331216; bh=IEBILU13XuallzmmbDrO/w0EIwxsJ57/Zm8syBWgqWk=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=w3qx/Vi24hKFer7x2a4qJnE9jPfk9IiJ2LYZC78i132IAzxqGsgPWo4ZB3c0xV8I8dC /PvWL/Aiiif8LDV9xiE/mlRXHXOdBjGJ2fcjv+FsltxyHCGD79btg60TYUorR/rF8Tufx ZLnBiePDve0I4T1dklS2CtxeGrip8TIb7SI= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in ShellPkg which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Ray Ni Cc: Zhichao Gao Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude --- ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c | 11 ++++++++++- ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c | 11 ++++++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c b/ShellPkg/Applica= tion/Shell/ShellManParser.c index 6909f29441..4d5a5668aa 100644 --- a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c +++ b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c @@ -643,10 +643,19 @@ ProcessManFile( goto Done; } DevPath =3D ShellInfoObject.NewEfiShellProtocol->GetDevicePathFromFile= Path(CmdFilePathName); Status =3D gBS->LoadImage(FALSE, gImageHandle, DevPath, NULL, 0, = &CmdFileImgHandle); if(EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an I= mageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be = started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of a= n image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid the resource= leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (CmdFileImgHandle); + } *HelpText =3D NULL; goto Done; } Status =3D gBS->OpenProtocol( CmdFileImgHandle, diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c b/She= llPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c index 1b169d0d3c..5b6cba17f3 100644 --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ /** @file Main file for LoadPciRom shell Debug1 function. =20 (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- Copyright (c) 2005 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2005 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent =20 **/ =20 #include "UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib.h" @@ -332,10 +332,19 @@ LoadEfiDriversFromRomImage ( ImageBuffer, ImageLength, &ImageHandle ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded an= d an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can n= ot be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the executio= n of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resour= ce leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOA= D_FAIL), gShellDebug1HiiHandle, L"loadpcirom", FileName, ImageIndex); // PrintToken (STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_IMAGE_ERROR), = HiiHandle, ImageIndex, Status); } else { Status =3D gBS->StartImage (ImageHandle, NULL, NULL); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c b/ShellPkg/= Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c index 6a94b48c86..b6e7c952fa 100644 --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ /** @file Main file for attrib shell level 2 function. =20 (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent =20 **/ =20 #include "UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib.h" @@ -110,10 +110,19 @@ LoadDriver( NULL, 0, &LoadedDriverHandle); =20 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an Ima= geHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be st= arted right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an = image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (LoadedDriverHandle); + } ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOAD_NOT_IMAGE), gShel= lLevel2HiiHandle, FileName, Status); } else { // // Make sure it is a driver image // --=20 2.18.0.windows.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#47948): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/47948 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/34275948/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-