From nobody Mon Feb 9 03:12:52 2026 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.12; envelope-from=bounce+27952+47945+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=web01.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47945+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail(p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1569331182; cv=none; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; b=J3KgE44Sec5awX24f2TE9pSkNCA5+Za3137P/XQ7PLmLtgzWl9yhNxJ3OP7FZ5bqDuw2ez9HE8aUgGzwJJhOJUKGBiwR3WF+sMDxe02075wl9uAu/DqPIpo5oCIg3QkKQ6L8/jodA/23/gpPpCLmb68o/9YTc5rqMpBfR002ga0= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; t=1569331182; h=Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Id:List-Unsubscribe:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To:ARC-Authentication-Results; bh=kcnLK8iKm2P9WhCFT1Gs3KgQaMWiRBBVPq31vUJDc6E=; b=nMfKWrLYE0IKe7zd2gXE8yyjsamixlutvHPzlLKRfqg2FeedIJqvNLy/QWs+/9o4T1BO4xX8IGkVZ4sO5jhndYXHe6QHpjOdcuy3Xur7p6VKbQ3XWumh8oZKJoEj7mE70hA4miIuX/8JZzLALZcxnA8dkultkjygoVxwl5UqCEg= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zoho.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47945+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail header.from= (p=none dis=none) header.from= Received: from web01.groups.io (web01.groups.io [66.175.222.12]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1569331182286957.0362366725855; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:42 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id u7iXYY1788612xZl0dcPchy6; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:41 -0700 X-Received: from mga12.intel.com (mga12.intel.com [192.55.52.136]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:41 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:40 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,544,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="189365282" X-Received: from dandanbi-mobl2.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.249.168.26]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:34 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Jian J Wang , Hao A Wu , Liming Gao , Laszlo Ersek , Philippe Mathieu-Daude Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 2/5] MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 21:16:41 +0800 Message-Id: <20190924131644.10412-3-dandan.bi@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> References: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,dandan.bi@intel.com X-Gm-Message-State: gl6cCI9s8eAPPr5mAEF30jq9x1787277AA= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1569331181; bh=PEJ0XS30MdWOTSgw5U3GN5VOyfnCuQTDcT9W1V3Jed4=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=FRDqCsAfczV9FiQsbWDdFLS+jnqrwWJlXveo87N8/DZJLui44LXnp9Kn5SZe8wZFymk kCwbt2W+FpZtzsUrhqLnC72vaP5rVb7J68p94aOQCwG1tEHaHKkRqBhmmOxSVL/We4B+C 1aut6F1bKtFo3ihFVfl6uAjpM6GvAtov8q8= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in DxeCapsuleLibFmp which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Jian J Wang Cc: Hao A Wu Cc: Liming Gao Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude --- MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c b/MdeMod= ulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c index 95aa9de087..5dda561a04 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c @@ -1028,10 +1028,19 @@ StartFmpImage ( ImageSize, &ImageHandle ); DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpCapsule: LoadImage - %r\n", Status)); if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an Ima= geHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be st= arted right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an = image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } FreePool(DriverDevicePath); return Status; } =20 DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpCapsule: StartImage ...\n")); --=20 2.18.0.windows.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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