From nobody Mon Feb 9 03:13:38 2026 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.12; envelope-from=bounce+27952+47944+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=web01.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47944+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail(p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1569331172; cv=none; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; b=FkpVDwbfN+DU96oLX6xCwmB+aqoBHqGXH8RJCZS8HKYhIs9pPh41qlKH2Io7EEliuJ04IchcMjhflQCHIYSYjLpoZF3GpHk+5ywlbCet4D7DP2wfvWv28uqtA2zsjCGGmXTIrC+RTyBPiyMEKFjnnDiEL0JIiGrhLzhSlXYraZQ= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; t=1569331172; h=Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Id:List-Unsubscribe:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To:ARC-Authentication-Results; bh=/0zHNcpxVEBnPrOEmG9usN3Hvw7xg+Wqa72wwuuM6rU=; b=Z7mpjCSXB1rIVmDGegAObsQ2CtM/ZqjKhzjuFMcHtBdZb3O015T4uC+c3oETJo4NLTyfA74KsLidMRsJ6it4IIbze4YWI7Wh+gZwT+JfJCjGCVdzT/HsGlsFstMPsd0rKDZMd7NdsNEDCEIFn79OlF8z6ejy8QAJURHuK4GaMJM= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zoho.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47944+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail header.from= (p=none dis=none) header.from= Received: from web01.groups.io (web01.groups.io [66.175.222.12]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 15693311720511004.2731497492532; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:32 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id I3eKYY1788612xMCQo2fZ9XD; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:31 -0700 X-Received: from mga07.intel.com (mga07.intel.com [134.134.136.100]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:31 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:30 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,544,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="189365216" X-Received: from dandanbi-mobl2.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.249.168.26]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:28 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Leif Lindholm , Ard Biesheuvel , Laszlo Ersek , Philippe Mathieu-Daude Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 21:16:40 +0800 Message-Id: <20190924131644.10412-2-dandan.bi@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> References: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,dandan.bi@intel.com X-Gm-Message-State: 4yYKAeo4dpNhWOZuIfjSZhv7x1787277AA= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1569331171; bh=SFKEpqIx3geQKhXwQZcwSWgwV0+65Fs2cKoYZF12kZE=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=WYttxqt8xhRWpCSS+YX9W5Awfl391s+btkeJlX/thkVAZHSl2qwXEvkIBabh5CRcpcy 6+aQrTPwMDgAHWc6HWtEUKDMzyl0B1GhSXtB0ibCcsyZOH6IQzrbPKgUeAtbSdQore+TH ESCyy1IKar40fxTcc+NTub+qLG3nORgVumk= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in EmbeddedPkg which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Leif Lindholm Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude --- .../AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg= .c b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c index 591afbe7cc..fe05878b4b 100644 --- a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c +++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c @@ -71,10 +71,19 @@ StartEfiApplication ( =20 // Load the image from the device path with Boot Services function Status =3D gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, ParentImageHandle, DevicePath, NULL, 0, &ImageHandle); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an Ima= geHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be st= arted right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an = image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } return Status; } =20 // Passed LoadOptions to the EFI Application if (LoadOptionsSize !=3D 0) { diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c b/Em= beddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c index d9e7aa7d2b..e1036954ee 100644 --- a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c +++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c @@ -439,10 +439,22 @@ AndroidBootImgBoot ( + KernelSize; =20 Status =3D gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, gImageHandle, (EFI_DEVICE_PATH *)&KernelDevicePath, (VOID*)(UINTN)Kernel, KernelSize, &ImageHandle); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an Ima= geHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be st= arted right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an = image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } + return Status; + } =20 // Set kernel arguments Status =3D gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGui= d, (VOID **) &ImageInfo); ImageInfo->LoadOptions =3D NewKernelArg; --=20 2.18.0.windows.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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