From nobody Sat Apr 20 13:06:33 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.12; envelope-from=bounce+27952+47944+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=web01.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47944+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail(p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1569331172; cv=none; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; b=FkpVDwbfN+DU96oLX6xCwmB+aqoBHqGXH8RJCZS8HKYhIs9pPh41qlKH2Io7EEliuJ04IchcMjhflQCHIYSYjLpoZF3GpHk+5ywlbCet4D7DP2wfvWv28uqtA2zsjCGGmXTIrC+RTyBPiyMEKFjnnDiEL0JIiGrhLzhSlXYraZQ= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; t=1569331172; h=Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Id:List-Unsubscribe:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To:ARC-Authentication-Results; bh=/0zHNcpxVEBnPrOEmG9usN3Hvw7xg+Wqa72wwuuM6rU=; b=Z7mpjCSXB1rIVmDGegAObsQ2CtM/ZqjKhzjuFMcHtBdZb3O015T4uC+c3oETJo4NLTyfA74KsLidMRsJ6it4IIbze4YWI7Wh+gZwT+JfJCjGCVdzT/HsGlsFstMPsd0rKDZMd7NdsNEDCEIFn79OlF8z6ejy8QAJURHuK4GaMJM= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zoho.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47944+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail header.from= (p=none dis=none) header.from= Received: from web01.groups.io (web01.groups.io [66.175.222.12]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 15693311720511004.2731497492532; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:32 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id I3eKYY1788612xMCQo2fZ9XD; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:31 -0700 X-Received: from mga07.intel.com (mga07.intel.com [134.134.136.100]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:31 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:30 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,544,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="189365216" X-Received: from dandanbi-mobl2.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.249.168.26]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:28 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Leif Lindholm , Ard Biesheuvel , Laszlo Ersek , Philippe Mathieu-Daude Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 21:16:40 +0800 Message-Id: <20190924131644.10412-2-dandan.bi@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> References: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,dandan.bi@intel.com X-Gm-Message-State: 4yYKAeo4dpNhWOZuIfjSZhv7x1787277AA= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1569331171; bh=SFKEpqIx3geQKhXwQZcwSWgwV0+65Fs2cKoYZF12kZE=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=WYttxqt8xhRWpCSS+YX9W5Awfl391s+btkeJlX/thkVAZHSl2qwXEvkIBabh5CRcpcy 6+aQrTPwMDgAHWc6HWtEUKDMzyl0B1GhSXtB0ibCcsyZOH6IQzrbPKgUeAtbSdQore+TH ESCyy1IKar40fxTcc+NTub+qLG3nORgVumk= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in EmbeddedPkg which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Leif Lindholm Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude --- .../AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg= .c b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c index 591afbe7cc..fe05878b4b 100644 --- a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c +++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c @@ -71,10 +71,19 @@ StartEfiApplication ( =20 // Load the image from the device path with Boot Services function Status =3D gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, ParentImageHandle, DevicePath, NULL, 0, &ImageHandle); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an Ima= geHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be st= arted right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an = image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } return Status; } =20 // Passed LoadOptions to the EFI Application if (LoadOptionsSize !=3D 0) { diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c b/Em= beddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c index d9e7aa7d2b..e1036954ee 100644 --- a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c +++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c @@ -439,10 +439,22 @@ AndroidBootImgBoot ( + KernelSize; =20 Status =3D gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, gImageHandle, (EFI_DEVICE_PATH *)&KernelDevicePath, (VOID*)(UINTN)Kernel, KernelSize, &ImageHandle); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an Ima= geHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be st= arted right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an = image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } + return Status; + } =20 // Set kernel arguments Status =3D gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGui= d, (VOID **) &ImageInfo); ImageInfo->LoadOptions =3D NewKernelArg; --=20 2.18.0.windows.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#47944): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/47944 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/34275941/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- From nobody Sat Apr 20 13:06:33 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.12; envelope-from=bounce+27952+47945+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=web01.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47945+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail(p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1569331182; cv=none; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; b=J3KgE44Sec5awX24f2TE9pSkNCA5+Za3137P/XQ7PLmLtgzWl9yhNxJ3OP7FZ5bqDuw2ez9HE8aUgGzwJJhOJUKGBiwR3WF+sMDxe02075wl9uAu/DqPIpo5oCIg3QkKQ6L8/jodA/23/gpPpCLmb68o/9YTc5rqMpBfR002ga0= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; t=1569331182; h=Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Id:List-Unsubscribe:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To:ARC-Authentication-Results; bh=kcnLK8iKm2P9WhCFT1Gs3KgQaMWiRBBVPq31vUJDc6E=; b=nMfKWrLYE0IKe7zd2gXE8yyjsamixlutvHPzlLKRfqg2FeedIJqvNLy/QWs+/9o4T1BO4xX8IGkVZ4sO5jhndYXHe6QHpjOdcuy3Xur7p6VKbQ3XWumh8oZKJoEj7mE70hA4miIuX/8JZzLALZcxnA8dkultkjygoVxwl5UqCEg= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zoho.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47945+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail header.from= (p=none dis=none) header.from= Received: from web01.groups.io (web01.groups.io [66.175.222.12]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1569331182286957.0362366725855; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:42 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id u7iXYY1788612xZl0dcPchy6; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:41 -0700 X-Received: from mga12.intel.com (mga12.intel.com [192.55.52.136]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:41 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:40 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,544,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="189365282" X-Received: from dandanbi-mobl2.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.249.168.26]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:34 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Jian J Wang , Hao A Wu , Liming Gao , Laszlo Ersek , Philippe Mathieu-Daude Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 2/5] MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 21:16:41 +0800 Message-Id: <20190924131644.10412-3-dandan.bi@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> References: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,dandan.bi@intel.com X-Gm-Message-State: gl6cCI9s8eAPPr5mAEF30jq9x1787277AA= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1569331181; bh=PEJ0XS30MdWOTSgw5U3GN5VOyfnCuQTDcT9W1V3Jed4=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=FRDqCsAfczV9FiQsbWDdFLS+jnqrwWJlXveo87N8/DZJLui44LXnp9Kn5SZe8wZFymk kCwbt2W+FpZtzsUrhqLnC72vaP5rVb7J68p94aOQCwG1tEHaHKkRqBhmmOxSVL/We4B+C 1aut6F1bKtFo3ihFVfl6uAjpM6GvAtov8q8= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in DxeCapsuleLibFmp which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Jian J Wang Cc: Hao A Wu Cc: Liming Gao Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude --- MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c b/MdeMod= ulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c index 95aa9de087..5dda561a04 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c @@ -1028,10 +1028,19 @@ StartFmpImage ( ImageSize, &ImageHandle ); DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpCapsule: LoadImage - %r\n", Status)); if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an Ima= geHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be st= arted right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an = image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } FreePool(DriverDevicePath); return Status; } =20 DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpCapsule: StartImage ...\n")); --=20 2.18.0.windows.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#47945): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/47945 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/34275942/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- From nobody Sat Apr 20 13:06:33 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.12; envelope-from=bounce+27952+47946+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=web01.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47946+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail(p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1569331193; cv=none; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; b=oiNQ1mntbZuZEhE7vsN/F2W7lR0DbSk/E1/ucKMsiWjAGT5cNIOf/e+nfdQkBrAL+Mn4FlPp/YSY77njWrkSVUgW6M7hwk1rAVP2eNhkslmlEIPZ0mB+0WxLOuyKkjXCZvbCGl8rykSkojRvr9xI/0zP87Mm/yeGbnHgYUSYoDE= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; t=1569331193; h=Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Id:List-Unsubscribe:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To:ARC-Authentication-Results; bh=9/q47C+4mH01OTBRwHFS4fz5tSTX+JWDGo7CuihGAKQ=; b=imcwKxA86qq4wya2GKFzB/qkVmHsEf5FYXfT+v4hfKV/iijiO3Dm+0hnVqy5pGuLDFpCHZEubPCUhQG76Aw/dRDgtRMeyIlPMtjrEKVsUSkuidCoeAka2lzITWEVStHpBhH4g4C/jUa1PNH0TpZu7WhPTipcEJ/DFENx95bTQZI= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zoho.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47946+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail header.from= (p=none dis=none) header.from= Received: from web01.groups.io (web01.groups.io [66.175.222.12]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1569331193460272.45889958182306; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:53 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id sqQLYY1788612xSsclKfQeHf; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:52 -0700 X-Received: from mga01.intel.com (mga01.intel.com [192.55.52.88]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:52 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga101.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:52 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,544,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="189365338" X-Received: from dandanbi-mobl2.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.249.168.26]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:49 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Jian J Wang , Hao A Wu , Ray Ni , Zhichao Gao , Liming Gao , Laszlo Ersek , Philippe Mathieu-Daude Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 21:16:42 +0800 Message-Id: <20190924131644.10412-4-dandan.bi@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> References: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,dandan.bi@intel.com X-Gm-Message-State: kmSXQ5SfuIeltRDUmtC1BGmpx1787277AA= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1569331192; bh=tAe4zeHW0t06EMUIpbdO8lHmfsLO6INn3pv2E8pwRlE=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=gG3cdjeVX9WZ9rfG7d8fa00AyERvwxeMnjhQs/ooAAVcaa61AuShcKdOjIEhS8Fy4ze l6wdmFStOwiRpZAoRN+1r/pieimD4O+GG5rTCJOCljyT1kOillVmciOOZ7+q360yi2XN8 zGjuBOdzk2mPm/tn34J/JTtmValNlzmh3Bk= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Jian J Wang Cc: Hao A Wu Cc: Ray Ni Cc: Zhichao Gao Cc: Liming Gao Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao --- V3: Enahnce the error handling logic in BmLoadOption.c and BmMisc.c. MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c b/MdeModulePk= g/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c index 952033fc82..760d7647b8 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c @@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot ( if (FilePath !=3D NULL) { FreePool (FilePath); } =20 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an I= mageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be = started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of a= n image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource lea= k. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } // // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the f= ailure to load boot option // BmReportLoadFailure (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status= ); BootOption->Status =3D Status; diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c b/MdeMo= dulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c index 07592f8ebd..89372b3b97 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ /** @file Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing = load options. =20 -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
(C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent =20 **/ =20 @@ -1409,11 +1409,21 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption ( FileSize, &ImageHandle ); FreePool (FileBuffer); =20 - if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an I= mageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be = started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of a= n image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource lea= k. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } + } else { Status =3D gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtoco= lGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo); ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); =20 ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize =3D LoadOption->OptionalDataSize; ImageInfo->LoadOptions =3D LoadOption->OptionalData; diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c b/MdeModulePk= g/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c index 6b8fb4d924..89595747af 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ /** @file Misc library functions. =20 -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
(C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent =20 **/ =20 @@ -491,11 +491,21 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages ( ImageDevicePath, NULL, 0, &ImageHandle ); - if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an= ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not b= e started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of= an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource l= eak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } + } else { LoadCount++; // // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for // a 5 Minute period // --=20 2.18.0.windows.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#47946): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/47946 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/34275944/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- From nobody Sat Apr 20 13:06:33 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.12; envelope-from=bounce+27952+47947+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=web01.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47947+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail(p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1569331198; cv=none; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; b=MhmhSBLnv+mVp9CHk5wt4VxRNoz7JlRl6gBMtLIJgQraIZxuSkEMbW2QydDEeyLYfPLdJKrqk4HMU+rgXmZEvPym9RbD76ACBd8z0qnzuODVHG/bqZk4t3pg6I82v7kDwp3eLAWVUhgAPtbjC1QkYPr74Z5gpKov0gd5gKltekY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; t=1569331198; h=Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Id:List-Unsubscribe:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To:ARC-Authentication-Results; bh=WoYQoQOssVopr22eHcO+myzs+AMbOmSJtOdQBnmnEAo=; b=MdZAA1NWZPWhq8hjQC3wYzRoqwQMplMB3R4ed8xFTrecj8bAp2zeszNYpuzPCq+zGL4dYDeky12frdaH2teHdfLDx8R398WJQJgcE/8XoA4LYlXrZXudY09p883I5CZddqI8QvonM6Dq6pMoBLUtRzyHt+QKN0jvOuIdFGz8Cmk= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zoho.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47947+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail header.from= (p=none dis=none) header.from= Received: from web01.groups.io (web01.groups.io [66.175.222.12]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1569331198672468.0882053914431; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:58 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id bVQuYY1788612xntwe50xg1I; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:58 -0700 X-Received: from mga17.intel.com (mga17.intel.com [192.55.52.151]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:19:57 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:57 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,544,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="189365372" X-Received: from dandanbi-mobl2.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.249.168.26]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Sep 2019 06:19:55 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Jian J Wang , Hao A Wu , Liming Gao , Laszlo Ersek , Philippe Mathieu-Daude Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 21:16:43 +0800 Message-Id: <20190924131644.10412-5-dandan.bi@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> References: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,dandan.bi@intel.com X-Gm-Message-State: CAhu27p7aPO6LOxPbYUfTSEUx1787277AA= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1569331198; bh=EN1SgVK6Och+NqB6lrWUdXhSTXfTim46cmr5Q00Sj5w=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=v6SQrUixvbzx4TrJSNRloB7jqLf42sIrqzUSbS4kBfttnp0JVqFf9hx75yzfGxuUJ1r RNPI8Y/biVUbNiBnSb6jcrJEX9o6tJZtSJs0a/eVew3NjwDP/JzSIlkCBwSzoGKva8xrm EdzQ1vLaLkRjBDi/8O5xmGyFQKptjFZvAhQ= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the caller in PlatformDriOverrideDxe which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Jian J Wang Cc: Hao A Wu Cc: Liming Gao Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude --- .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideL= ib.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c index 2d3736b468..f91f038b7a 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ /** @file Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vverrid= e mapping. =20 - Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent =20 **/ =20 #include "InternalPlatDriOverrideDxe.h" @@ -1484,10 +1484,19 @@ GetDriverFromMapping ( ); ASSERT (DriverBinding !=3D NULL); DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle =3D ImageHandle; } } else { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded = and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can= not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execut= ion of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid reso= urce leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable =3D TRUE; DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle =3D NULL; } } } --=20 2.18.0.windows.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#47947): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/47947 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/34275945/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- From nobody Sat Apr 20 13:06:33 2024 Delivered-To: importer@patchew.org Received-SPF: pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) client-ip=66.175.222.12; envelope-from=bounce+27952+47948+1787277+3901457@groups.io; helo=web01.groups.io; Authentication-Results: mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47948+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail(p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1569331216; cv=none; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; b=dnNkFioHaj2xJhXRpCZAVVoUpLZ227/txw/siLF50oJWQSwe4WpzMWr4nTBXM2phraeDi/mEhUf3n0drOyACs9grIJcFmvd8tqLmnOFZV/omyYAiqMPrvEJYqNybLMku9EZ12nc1893gGwGo0lTSogRPrOYGWwijx1LQrAfMsqE= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zoho.com; s=zohoarc; t=1569331216; h=Cc:Date:From:In-Reply-To:List-Id:List-Unsubscribe:Message-ID:Reply-To:References:Sender:Subject:To:ARC-Authentication-Results; bh=TraVhAMFpPjYJ1OpigQw3NBcLEqfaKWGVPoQqyYiTuE=; b=PuvErnGo3eK8rjBO3WSYqDIOEANpYCahgRSxMFUbe7CA1B4e+vQRYcuBad5uRWhPDqrxIqU3OiDNuySmixFlJ6aVT7fPFZQcICcqMDEBuPn62DMZhn15lTzQX1/5gcg78trzh4X9QCPySThGfa30G2fJ4QsRC+0Dud6Jmqcj0yY= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.zoho.com; dkim=pass; spf=pass (zoho.com: domain of groups.io designates 66.175.222.12 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=bounce+27952+47948+1787277+3901457@groups.io; dmarc=fail header.from= (p=none dis=none) header.from= Received: from web01.groups.io (web01.groups.io [66.175.222.12]) by mx.zohomail.com with SMTPS id 1569331216701681.1807711872602; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:20:16 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: X-Received: by 127.0.0.2 with SMTP id 3XcfYY1788612xeJMJ881Vv1; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:20:16 -0700 X-Received: from mga12.intel.com (mga12.intel.com [192.55.52.136]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:20:15 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2019 06:20:04 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,544,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="189365444" X-Received: from dandanbi-mobl2.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.249.168.26]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Sep 2019 06:20:02 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Ray Ni , Zhichao Gao , Laszlo Ersek , Philippe Mathieu-Daude Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 5/5] ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 21:16:44 +0800 Message-Id: <20190924131644.10412-6-dandan.bi@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> References: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Unsubscribe: Sender: devel@edk2.groups.io List-Id: Mailing-List: list devel@edk2.groups.io; contact devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Reply-To: devel@edk2.groups.io,dandan.bi@intel.com X-Gm-Message-State: kdY6zcSG5Tn9NP3siB5IbanQx1787277AA= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=groups.io; q=dns/txt; s=20140610; t=1569331216; bh=IEBILU13XuallzmmbDrO/w0EIwxsJ57/Zm8syBWgqWk=; h=Cc:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To; b=w3qx/Vi24hKFer7x2a4qJnE9jPfk9IiJ2LYZC78i132IAzxqGsgPWo4ZB3c0xV8I8dC /PvWL/Aiiif8LDV9xiE/mlRXHXOdBjGJ2fcjv+FsltxyHCGD79btg60TYUorR/rF8Tufx ZLnBiePDve0I4T1dklS2CtxeGrip8TIb7SI= X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @groups.io) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in ShellPkg which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Ray Ni Cc: Zhichao Gao Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude --- ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c | 11 ++++++++++- ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c | 11 ++++++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c b/ShellPkg/Applica= tion/Shell/ShellManParser.c index 6909f29441..4d5a5668aa 100644 --- a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c +++ b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c @@ -643,10 +643,19 @@ ProcessManFile( goto Done; } DevPath =3D ShellInfoObject.NewEfiShellProtocol->GetDevicePathFromFile= Path(CmdFilePathName); Status =3D gBS->LoadImage(FALSE, gImageHandle, DevPath, NULL, 0, = &CmdFileImgHandle); if(EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an I= mageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be = started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of a= n image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid the resource= leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (CmdFileImgHandle); + } *HelpText =3D NULL; goto Done; } Status =3D gBS->OpenProtocol( CmdFileImgHandle, diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c b/She= llPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c index 1b169d0d3c..5b6cba17f3 100644 --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ /** @file Main file for LoadPciRom shell Debug1 function. =20 (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- Copyright (c) 2005 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2005 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent =20 **/ =20 #include "UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib.h" @@ -332,10 +332,19 @@ LoadEfiDriversFromRomImage ( ImageBuffer, ImageLength, &ImageHandle ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded an= d an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can n= ot be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the executio= n of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resour= ce leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOA= D_FAIL), gShellDebug1HiiHandle, L"loadpcirom", FileName, ImageIndex); // PrintToken (STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_IMAGE_ERROR), = HiiHandle, ImageIndex, Status); } else { Status =3D gBS->StartImage (ImageHandle, NULL, NULL); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c b/ShellPkg/= Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c index 6a94b48c86..b6e7c952fa 100644 --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ /** @file Main file for attrib shell level 2 function. =20 (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent =20 **/ =20 #include "UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib.h" @@ -110,10 +110,19 @@ LoadDriver( NULL, 0, &LoadedDriverHandle); =20 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an Ima= geHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be st= arted right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an = image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status =3D=3D EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (LoadedDriverHandle); + } ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOAD_NOT_IMAGE), gShel= lLevel2HiiHandle, FileName, Status); } else { // // Make sure it is a driver image // --=20 2.18.0.windows.1 -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#47948): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/47948 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/34275948/1787277 Group Owner: devel+owner@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [importer@patchew.org] -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-