hw/9pfs/9p-local.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
This function has to ensure it doesn't follow a symlink that could be used
to escape the virtfs directory. This could be easily achieved if fchmodat()
on linux honored the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag as described in POSIX, but
it doesn't. There was a tentative to implement a new fchmodat2() syscall
with the correct semantics:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9596301/
but it didn't gain much momentum. Also it was suggested to look at an O_PATH
based solution in the first place.
The current implementation covers most use-cases, but it notably fails if:
- the target path has access rights equal to 0000 (openat() returns EPERM),
=> once you've done chmod(0000) on a file, you can never chmod() again
- the target path is UNIX domain socket (openat() returns ENXIO)
=> bind() of UNIX domain sockets fails if the file is on 9pfs
The solution is to use O_PATH: openat() now succeeds in both cases, and we
can ensure the path isn't a symlink with fstat(). The associated entry in
"/proc/self/fd" can hence be safely passed to the regular chmod() syscall.
The previous behavior is kept for older systems that don't have O_PATH.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Zhi Yong Wu <zhiyong.wu@ucloud.cn>
---
v5: - added missing fd == -1 check
v4: - fixed #if condition
- moved out: label above #endif
- fixed typo in changelog
- added Eric's r-b
v3: - O_PATH in a separate block of code
- added a reference to the fchmodat2() tentative in the changelog
v2: - renamed OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH to O_PATH_9P_UTIL and use it as a replacement
for O_PATH to avoid build breaks on O_PATH-less systems
- keep current behavior for O_PATH-less systems
- added comments
- TODO in 2.11: add _nofollow suffix to openat_dir() and openat_file()
---
hw/9pfs/9p-local.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
index 6e478f4765ef..cb0b5f1fc41c 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
@@ -333,17 +333,27 @@ update_map_file:
static int fchmodat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *name, mode_t mode)
{
+ struct stat stbuf;
int fd, ret;
/* FIXME: this should be handled with fchmodat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW).
- * Unfortunately, the linux kernel doesn't implement it yet. As an
- * alternative, let's open the file and use fchmod() instead. This
- * may fail depending on the permissions of the file, but it is the
- * best we can do to avoid TOCTTOU. We first try to open read-only
- * in case name points to a directory. If that fails, we try write-only
- * in case name doesn't point to a directory.
+ * Unfortunately, the linux kernel doesn't implement it yet.
*/
- fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, O_RDONLY, 0);
+
+ /* First, we clear non-racing symlinks out of the way. */
+ if (fstatat(dirfd, name, &stbuf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (S_ISLNK(stbuf.st_mode)) {
+ errno = ELOOP;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Access modes are ignored when O_PATH is supported. We try O_RDONLY and
+ * O_WRONLY for old-systems that don't support O_PATH.
+ */
+ fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, O_RDONLY | O_PATH_9P_UTIL, 0);
+#if O_PATH_9P_UTIL == 0
if (fd == -1) {
/* In case the file is writable-only and isn't a directory. */
if (errno == EACCES) {
@@ -357,6 +367,29 @@ static int fchmodat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *name, mode_t mode)
return -1;
}
ret = fchmod(fd, mode);
+#else
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we handle racing symlinks. */
+ ret = fstat(fd, &stbuf);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (S_ISLNK(stbuf.st_mode)) {
+ errno = ELOOP;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ {
+ char *proc_path = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
+ ret = chmod(proc_path, mode);
+ g_free(proc_path);
+ }
+out:
+#endif
close_preserve_errno(fd);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
index 91299a24b8af..dc0d2e29aa3b 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@
#ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
#define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
+#ifdef O_PATH
+#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
+#else
+#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL 0
+#endif
+
static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
{
int serrno = errno;
@@ -22,13 +28,8 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
{
-#ifdef O_PATH
-#define OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH O_PATH
-#else
-#define OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH 0
-#endif
return openat(dirfd, name,
- O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH);
+ O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH_9P_UTIL);
}
static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, int flags,
@@ -43,9 +44,14 @@ static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, int flags,
}
serrno = errno;
- /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. */
- ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
- assert(!ret);
+ /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
+ * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
+ * ignored it anyway.
+ */
+ if (!(flags & O_PATH_9P_UTIL)) {
+ ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
+ assert(!ret);
+ }
errno = serrno;
return fd;
}
On 08/10/2017 07:46 AM, Greg Kurz wrote:
> This function has to ensure it doesn't follow a symlink that could be used
> to escape the virtfs directory. This could be easily achieved if fchmodat()
> on linux honored the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag as described in POSIX, but
> it doesn't. There was a tentative to implement a new fchmodat2() syscall
> with the correct semantics:
>
> https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9596301/
>
> but it didn't gain much momentum. Also it was suggested to look at an O_PATH
> based solution in the first place.
>
> The current implementation covers most use-cases, but it notably fails if:
> - the target path has access rights equal to 0000 (openat() returns EPERM),
> => once you've done chmod(0000) on a file, you can never chmod() again
> - the target path is UNIX domain socket (openat() returns ENXIO)
> => bind() of UNIX domain sockets fails if the file is on 9pfs
>
> The solution is to use O_PATH: openat() now succeeds in both cases, and we
> can ensure the path isn't a symlink with fstat(). The associated entry in
> "/proc/self/fd" can hence be safely passed to the regular chmod() syscall.
>
> The previous behavior is kept for older systems that don't have O_PATH.
>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
> Tested-by: Zhi Yong Wu <zhiyong.wu@ucloud.cn>
> ---
> v5: - added missing fd == -1 check
>
> v4: - fixed #if condition
> - moved out: label above #endif
> - fixed typo in changelog
> - added Eric's r-b
>
> v3: - O_PATH in a separate block of code
> - added a reference to the fchmodat2() tentative in the changelog
>
> v2: - renamed OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH to O_PATH_9P_UTIL and use it as a replacement
> for O_PATH to avoid build breaks on O_PATH-less systems
> - keep current behavior for O_PATH-less systems
> - added comments
> - TODO in 2.11: add _nofollow suffix to openat_dir() and openat_file()
> ---
> hw/9pfs/9p-local.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
> 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
> index 6e478f4765ef..cb0b5f1fc41c 100644
> --- a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
> +++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
> @@ -333,17 +333,27 @@ update_map_file:
>
> static int fchmodat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *name, mode_t mode)
> {
> + struct stat stbuf;
> int fd, ret;
>
> /* FIXME: this should be handled with fchmodat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW).
> - * Unfortunately, the linux kernel doesn't implement it yet. As an
> - * alternative, let's open the file and use fchmod() instead. This
> - * may fail depending on the permissions of the file, but it is the
> - * best we can do to avoid TOCTTOU. We first try to open read-only
> - * in case name points to a directory. If that fails, we try write-only
> - * in case name doesn't point to a directory.
> + * Unfortunately, the linux kernel doesn't implement it yet.
> */
> - fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, O_RDONLY, 0);
> +
> + /* First, we clear non-racing symlinks out of the way. */
> + if (fstatat(dirfd, name, &stbuf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)) {
> + return -1;
> + }
> + if (S_ISLNK(stbuf.st_mode)) {
> + errno = ELOOP;
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + /* Access modes are ignored when O_PATH is supported. We try O_RDONLY and
> + * O_WRONLY for old-systems that don't support O_PATH.
> + */
> + fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, O_RDONLY | O_PATH_9P_UTIL, 0);
> +#if O_PATH_9P_UTIL == 0
> if (fd == -1) {
> /* In case the file is writable-only and isn't a directory. */
> if (errno == EACCES) {
> @@ -357,6 +367,29 @@ static int fchmodat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *name, mode_t mode)
> return -1;
> }
> ret = fchmod(fd, mode);
> +#else
> + if (fd == -1) {
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + /* Now we handle racing symlinks. */
> + ret = fstat(fd, &stbuf);
the following ...
> + if (ret) {
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (S_ISLNK(stbuf.st_mode)) {
> + errno = ELOOP;
> + ret = -1;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + {
> + char *proc_path = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
> + ret = chmod(proc_path, mode);
> + g_free(proc_path);
> + }
> +out:
can be refactored as:
if (!ret) {
if (S_ISLNK(stbuf.st_mode)) {
errno = ELOOP;
ret = -1;
} else {
char *proc_path = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
ret = chmod(proc_path, mode);
g_free(proc_path);
}
}
which look (at least to me) easier to follow, and remove the 'out' label
this way:
Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
> +#endif
> close_preserve_errno(fd);
> return ret;
> }
> diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
> index 91299a24b8af..dc0d2e29aa3b 100644
> --- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
> +++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
> @@ -13,6 +13,12 @@
> #ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
> #define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
>
> +#ifdef O_PATH
> +#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
> +#else
> +#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL 0
> +#endif
> +
> static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
> {
> int serrno = errno;
> @@ -22,13 +28,8 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
>
> static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
> {
> -#ifdef O_PATH
> -#define OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH O_PATH
> -#else
> -#define OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH 0
> -#endif
> return openat(dirfd, name,
> - O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH);
> + O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH_9P_UTIL);
> }
>
> static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, int flags,
> @@ -43,9 +44,14 @@ static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, int flags,
> }
>
> serrno = errno;
> - /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. */
> - ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
> - assert(!ret);
> + /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
> + * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
> + * ignored it anyway.
> + */
> + if (!(flags & O_PATH_9P_UTIL)) {
> + ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
> + assert(!ret);
> + }
> errno = serrno;
> return fd;
> }
>
>
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