ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c | 3 + ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.h | 1 + ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuMmuCommon.c | 4 + ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 6 + MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h | 24 ++ MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf | 1 + MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c | 7 + MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Pool.c | 65 +++- MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c | 371 +++++++++++++++++++- MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Image/Image.c | 23 +- MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 32 ++ MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/AArch64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.c | 23 ++ MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.h | 14 + MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ia32/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ipf/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/X64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- 17 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
Hello all,
First of all, thanks for the reviews and regression testing. However, I did
not add the tested-by tags nor some of the R-b's, given the changes in this v4.
This series implements a memory protection policy that removes all executable
permissions from writable memory regions, which greatly enhances security.
It is based on Jiewen's recent work, which is a step in the right direction,
but still leaves most of memory exploitable due to the default R+W+X
permissions.
The idea is that the implementation of the CPU arch protocol goes over the
memory map and removes exec permissions from all regions that are not already
marked as 'code. This requires some preparatory work to ensure that the DxeCore
itself is covered by a BootServicesCode region, not a BootServicesData region.
Exec permissions are re-granted selectively, when the PE/COFF loader allocates
the space for it. Combined with Jiewen's code/data split, this removes all
RWX mapped regions.
Changes since v3:
- mandate that the same policy applies to EfiConventionalMemory regions and
EfiBootServicesData regions: they are unlikely to differ in practice, and
dealing with that corner case greatly complicates the implementation, given
the way DxeCore allocates memory for itself in the implementation of the page
and pool allocation routines.
- apply the EfiConventionalMemory policy to untested RAM regions in the GCD
memory space map: without this, we may still have a large region of RAM that
is exploitable, and it also removes the need to apply memory protections in
PromoteMemoryResource (), which is very difficult to achieve without a major
restructuring of the code due to the way locking is implemented here.
- add missing ApplyMemoryProtectionPolicy() call to CoreAddMemoryDescriptor()
- use CoreAcquireLockOrFail() on gMemoryLock for CoreAllocatePoolPages (#4)
- incorporate feedback from Liming (#2, #6)
- add patch to enable the NX memory protection policy for ArmVirtPkg (#7)
Changes since v2:
- added patch to make EBC use EfiBootServicesCode pool allocations for thunks
- redefine PCD according to Jiewen's feedback, including default value
- use sorted memory map and merge adjacent entries with the same policy, to
prevent unnecessary page table splitting
- ignore policy when executing in SMM
- refactor the logic for managing permission attributes of pool allocations
- added some R-b's
Changes since v1:
- allocate code pages for PE/COFF images in PeiCore, so that DxeCore pages have
the expected memory type (as suggested by Jiewen)
- add patch to inhibit page table updates while syncing the GCD memory space
map with the page tables
- add PCD to set memory protection policy, which allows the policy for reserved
and ACPI/NVS memory to be configured separately
- move attribute manipulation into DxeCore page allocation code: this way, we
should be able to solve the EBC case by allocating BootServicesCode pool
memory explicitly.
Series can be found here:
https://git.linaro.org/people/ard.biesheuvel/uefi-next.git/log/?h=memprot-take2-v4
Ard Biesheuvel (7):
ArmPkg/CpuDxe: ignore attribute changes during SyncCacheConfig()
MdeModulePkg/PeiCore: allocate BootServicesCode memory for PE/COFF
images
MdeModulePkg/EbcDxe: use EfiBootServicesCode memory for thunks
MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: use separate lock for pool allocations
MdeModulePkg: define PCD for DXE memory protection policy
MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: implement memory protection policy
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc: enable NX memory protection for all
platforms
ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c | 3 +
ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.h | 1 +
ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuMmuCommon.c | 4 +
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 6 +
MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h | 24 ++
MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf | 1 +
MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c | 7 +
MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Pool.c | 65 +++-
MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c | 371 +++++++++++++++++++-
MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Image/Image.c | 23 +-
MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 32 ++
MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/AArch64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +-
MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.c | 23 ++
MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.h | 14 +
MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ia32/EbcSupport.c | 2 +-
MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ipf/EbcSupport.c | 2 +-
MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/X64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +-
17 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--
2.7.4
_______________________________________________
edk2-devel mailing list
edk2-devel@lists.01.org
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
All series reviewed-by: jiewen.yao@intel.com X86 platform regression tested-by: Jiewen.yao@intel.com Thank you Yao Jiewen > -----Original Message----- > From: Ard Biesheuvel [mailto:ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org] > Sent: Monday, February 27, 2017 10:38 PM > To: edk2-devel@lists.01.org; afish@apple.com; leif.lindholm@linaro.org; Kinney, > Michael D <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>; Gao, Liming <liming.gao@intel.com>; > Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> > Cc: lersek@redhat.com; Tian, Feng <feng.tian@intel.com>; Zeng, Star > <star.zeng@intel.com>; Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> > Subject: [PATCH v4 0/7] MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: increased memory protection > > Hello all, > > First of all, thanks for the reviews and regression testing. However, I did > not add the tested-by tags nor some of the R-b's, given the changes in this v4. > > This series implements a memory protection policy that removes all executable > permissions from writable memory regions, which greatly enhances security. > It is based on Jiewen's recent work, which is a step in the right direction, > but still leaves most of memory exploitable due to the default R+W+X > permissions. > > The idea is that the implementation of the CPU arch protocol goes over the > memory map and removes exec permissions from all regions that are not already > marked as 'code. This requires some preparatory work to ensure that the > DxeCore > itself is covered by a BootServicesCode region, not a BootServicesData region. > Exec permissions are re-granted selectively, when the PE/COFF loader allocates > the space for it. Combined with Jiewen's code/data split, this removes all > RWX mapped regions. > > Changes since v3: > - mandate that the same policy applies to EfiConventionalMemory regions and > EfiBootServicesData regions: they are unlikely to differ in practice, and > dealing with that corner case greatly complicates the implementation, given > the way DxeCore allocates memory for itself in the implementation of the > page > and pool allocation routines. > - apply the EfiConventionalMemory policy to untested RAM regions in the GCD > memory space map: without this, we may still have a large region of RAM that > is exploitable, and it also removes the need to apply memory protections in > PromoteMemoryResource (), which is very difficult to achieve without a major > restructuring of the code due to the way locking is implemented here. > - add missing ApplyMemoryProtectionPolicy() call to > CoreAddMemoryDescriptor() > - use CoreAcquireLockOrFail() on gMemoryLock for CoreAllocatePoolPages (#4) > - incorporate feedback from Liming (#2, #6) > - add patch to enable the NX memory protection policy for ArmVirtPkg (#7) > > Changes since v2: > - added patch to make EBC use EfiBootServicesCode pool allocations for thunks > - redefine PCD according to Jiewen's feedback, including default value > - use sorted memory map and merge adjacent entries with the same policy, to > prevent unnecessary page table splitting > - ignore policy when executing in SMM > - refactor the logic for managing permission attributes of pool allocations > - added some R-b's > > Changes since v1: > - allocate code pages for PE/COFF images in PeiCore, so that DxeCore pages have > the expected memory type (as suggested by Jiewen) > - add patch to inhibit page table updates while syncing the GCD memory space > map with the page tables > - add PCD to set memory protection policy, which allows the policy for reserved > and ACPI/NVS memory to be configured separately > - move attribute manipulation into DxeCore page allocation code: this way, we > should be able to solve the EBC case by allocating BootServicesCode pool > memory explicitly. > > Series can be found here: > https://git.linaro.org/people/ard.biesheuvel/uefi-next.git/log/?h=memprot-tak > e2-v4 > > Ard Biesheuvel (7): > ArmPkg/CpuDxe: ignore attribute changes during SyncCacheConfig() > MdeModulePkg/PeiCore: allocate BootServicesCode memory for PE/COFF > images > MdeModulePkg/EbcDxe: use EfiBootServicesCode memory for thunks > MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: use separate lock for pool allocations > MdeModulePkg: define PCD for DXE memory protection policy > MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: implement memory protection policy > ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc: enable NX memory protection for all > platforms > > ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c | 3 + > ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.h | 1 + > ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuMmuCommon.c | 4 + > ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 6 + > MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h | 24 ++ > MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf | 1 + > MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c | 7 + > MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Pool.c | 65 +++- > MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c | 371 > +++++++++++++++++++- > MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Image/Image.c | 23 +- > MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 32 ++ > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/AArch64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.c | 23 ++ > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.h | 14 + > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ia32/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ipf/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/X64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- > 17 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) > > -- > 2.7.4 _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
On 28 February 2017 at 05:48, Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> wrote: > All series reviewed-by: jiewen.yao@intel.com > X86 platform regression tested-by: Jiewen.yao@intel.com > Thanks all for the reviews and testing. I am going to proceed and merge this series, except for the last patch enabling it for ArmVirtQemu. That allows us to test it more widely on out of tree platforms. In the mean time, the recommendation is to disable NX protection for EfiLoaderData regions, on AArch64 as well as on X86. In the future, we may want to promote the PCD to one that can be configured as dynamic, and let the user decide which policy to use. I will follow up with a separate patch if we intend to go down that road. Regards, Ard. >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Ard Biesheuvel [mailto:ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org] >> Sent: Monday, February 27, 2017 10:38 PM >> To: edk2-devel@lists.01.org; afish@apple.com; leif.lindholm@linaro.org; Kinney, >> Michael D <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>; Gao, Liming <liming.gao@intel.com>; >> Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> >> Cc: lersek@redhat.com; Tian, Feng <feng.tian@intel.com>; Zeng, Star >> <star.zeng@intel.com>; Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> >> Subject: [PATCH v4 0/7] MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: increased memory protection >> >> Hello all, >> >> First of all, thanks for the reviews and regression testing. However, I did >> not add the tested-by tags nor some of the R-b's, given the changes in this v4. >> >> This series implements a memory protection policy that removes all executable >> permissions from writable memory regions, which greatly enhances security. >> It is based on Jiewen's recent work, which is a step in the right direction, >> but still leaves most of memory exploitable due to the default R+W+X >> permissions. >> >> The idea is that the implementation of the CPU arch protocol goes over the >> memory map and removes exec permissions from all regions that are not already >> marked as 'code. This requires some preparatory work to ensure that the >> DxeCore >> itself is covered by a BootServicesCode region, not a BootServicesData region. >> Exec permissions are re-granted selectively, when the PE/COFF loader allocates >> the space for it. Combined with Jiewen's code/data split, this removes all >> RWX mapped regions. >> >> Changes since v3: >> - mandate that the same policy applies to EfiConventionalMemory regions and >> EfiBootServicesData regions: they are unlikely to differ in practice, and >> dealing with that corner case greatly complicates the implementation, given >> the way DxeCore allocates memory for itself in the implementation of the >> page >> and pool allocation routines. >> - apply the EfiConventionalMemory policy to untested RAM regions in the GCD >> memory space map: without this, we may still have a large region of RAM that >> is exploitable, and it also removes the need to apply memory protections in >> PromoteMemoryResource (), which is very difficult to achieve without a major >> restructuring of the code due to the way locking is implemented here. >> - add missing ApplyMemoryProtectionPolicy() call to >> CoreAddMemoryDescriptor() >> - use CoreAcquireLockOrFail() on gMemoryLock for CoreAllocatePoolPages (#4) >> - incorporate feedback from Liming (#2, #6) >> - add patch to enable the NX memory protection policy for ArmVirtPkg (#7) >> >> Changes since v2: >> - added patch to make EBC use EfiBootServicesCode pool allocations for thunks >> - redefine PCD according to Jiewen's feedback, including default value >> - use sorted memory map and merge adjacent entries with the same policy, to >> prevent unnecessary page table splitting >> - ignore policy when executing in SMM >> - refactor the logic for managing permission attributes of pool allocations >> - added some R-b's >> >> Changes since v1: >> - allocate code pages for PE/COFF images in PeiCore, so that DxeCore pages have >> the expected memory type (as suggested by Jiewen) >> - add patch to inhibit page table updates while syncing the GCD memory space >> map with the page tables >> - add PCD to set memory protection policy, which allows the policy for reserved >> and ACPI/NVS memory to be configured separately >> - move attribute manipulation into DxeCore page allocation code: this way, we >> should be able to solve the EBC case by allocating BootServicesCode pool >> memory explicitly. >> >> Series can be found here: >> https://git.linaro.org/people/ard.biesheuvel/uefi-next.git/log/?h=memprot-tak >> e2-v4 >> >> Ard Biesheuvel (7): >> ArmPkg/CpuDxe: ignore attribute changes during SyncCacheConfig() >> MdeModulePkg/PeiCore: allocate BootServicesCode memory for PE/COFF >> images >> MdeModulePkg/EbcDxe: use EfiBootServicesCode memory for thunks >> MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: use separate lock for pool allocations >> MdeModulePkg: define PCD for DXE memory protection policy >> MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: implement memory protection policy >> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc: enable NX memory protection for all >> platforms >> >> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c | 3 + >> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.h | 1 + >> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuMmuCommon.c | 4 + >> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 6 + >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h | 24 ++ >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf | 1 + >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c | 7 + >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Pool.c | 65 +++- >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c | 371 >> +++++++++++++++++++- >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Image/Image.c | 23 +- >> MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 32 ++ >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/AArch64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.c | 23 ++ >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.h | 14 + >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ia32/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ipf/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/X64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >> 17 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) >> >> -- >> 2.7.4 > _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
On 02/27/17 15:38, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > Hello all, > > First of all, thanks for the reviews and regression testing. However, I did > not add the tested-by tags nor some of the R-b's, given the changes in this v4. > > This series implements a memory protection policy that removes all executable > permissions from writable memory regions, which greatly enhances security. > It is based on Jiewen's recent work, which is a step in the right direction, > but still leaves most of memory exploitable due to the default R+W+X > permissions. > > The idea is that the implementation of the CPU arch protocol goes over the > memory map and removes exec permissions from all regions that are not already > marked as 'code. This requires some preparatory work to ensure that the DxeCore > itself is covered by a BootServicesCode region, not a BootServicesData region. > Exec permissions are re-granted selectively, when the PE/COFF loader allocates > the space for it. Combined with Jiewen's code/data split, this removes all > RWX mapped regions. > > Changes since v3: > - mandate that the same policy applies to EfiConventionalMemory regions and > EfiBootServicesData regions: they are unlikely to differ in practice, and > dealing with that corner case greatly complicates the implementation, given > the way DxeCore allocates memory for itself in the implementation of the page > and pool allocation routines. > - apply the EfiConventionalMemory policy to untested RAM regions in the GCD > memory space map: without this, we may still have a large region of RAM that > is exploitable, and it also removes the need to apply memory protections in > PromoteMemoryResource (), which is very difficult to achieve without a major > restructuring of the code due to the way locking is implemented here. > - add missing ApplyMemoryProtectionPolicy() call to CoreAddMemoryDescriptor() > - use CoreAcquireLockOrFail() on gMemoryLock for CoreAllocatePoolPages (#4) > - incorporate feedback from Liming (#2, #6) > - add patch to enable the NX memory protection policy for ArmVirtPkg (#7) > > Changes since v2: > - added patch to make EBC use EfiBootServicesCode pool allocations for thunks > - redefine PCD according to Jiewen's feedback, including default value > - use sorted memory map and merge adjacent entries with the same policy, to > prevent unnecessary page table splitting > - ignore policy when executing in SMM > - refactor the logic for managing permission attributes of pool allocations > - added some R-b's > > Changes since v1: > - allocate code pages for PE/COFF images in PeiCore, so that DxeCore pages have > the expected memory type (as suggested by Jiewen) > - add patch to inhibit page table updates while syncing the GCD memory space > map with the page tables > - add PCD to set memory protection policy, which allows the policy for reserved > and ACPI/NVS memory to be configured separately > - move attribute manipulation into DxeCore page allocation code: this way, we > should be able to solve the EBC case by allocating BootServicesCode pool > memory explicitly. > > Series can be found here: > https://git.linaro.org/people/ard.biesheuvel/uefi-next.git/log/?h=memprot-take2-v4 > > Ard Biesheuvel (7): > ArmPkg/CpuDxe: ignore attribute changes during SyncCacheConfig() > MdeModulePkg/PeiCore: allocate BootServicesCode memory for PE/COFF > images > MdeModulePkg/EbcDxe: use EfiBootServicesCode memory for thunks > MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: use separate lock for pool allocations > MdeModulePkg: define PCD for DXE memory protection policy > MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: implement memory protection policy > ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc: enable NX memory protection for all > platforms > > ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c | 3 + > ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.h | 1 + > ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuMmuCommon.c | 4 + > ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 6 + > MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h | 24 ++ > MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf | 1 + > MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c | 7 + > MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Pool.c | 65 +++- > MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c | 371 +++++++++++++++++++- > MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Image/Image.c | 23 +- > MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 32 ++ > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/AArch64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.c | 23 ++ > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.h | 14 + > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ia32/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ipf/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- > MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/X64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- > 17 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) > I regression-tested this series for x86 / OVMF as under v3, with the zero PCD default, and experienced no issues. However, v4 breaks booting Fedora 24 on my Mustang (aarch64/KVM): ----------------- [Bds]Booting Fedora FSOpen: Open '\EFI\fedora\shim.efi' Success [Bds] DevicePath expand: HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi -> PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi [Security] 3rd party image[0] can be loaded after EndOfDxe: PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi. InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageProtocol] 13A6D2AC0 Loading driver at 0x001382F4000 EntryPoint=0x001382F4148 Loading driver at 0x001382F4000 EntryPoint=0x001382F4148 InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageDevicePathProtocol] 138CDBD98 ProtectUefiImageCommon - 0x3A6D2AC0 - 0x00000001382F4000 - 0x00000000000CBAE0 !!!!!!!! ProtectUefiImageCommon - Section Alignment(0x20) is incorrect !!!!!!!! FSOpen: Open '\EFI\fedora\grubaa64.efi' Success Synchronous Exception at 0x00000001380F7400 X0 0x000000013A6EEA98 X1 0x000000013BFF0018 X2 0x00000001380F7400 X3 0x00000000000FD000 X4 0x0000000000000000 X5 0x0000000000000000 X6 0x0000000138362AF4 X7 0x0000000000000000 X8 0x000000013C01F548 X9 0x0000000200000000 X10 0x00000001380F6000 X11 0x00000001382F3FFF X12 0x0000000000000000 X13 0x0000000000000008 X14 0x0000000000000000 X15 0x0000000000000000 X16 0x000000013EC6ABD0 X17 0x0000000000000000 X18 0x0000000000000000 X19 0x0000000138CDB698 X20 0x000000013A746E18 X21 0x0000000000000000 X22 0x0000000000000000 X23 0x0000000000000000 X24 0x0000000000000000 X25 0x0000000000000000 X26 0x0000000000000000 X27 0x0000000000000000 X28 0x0000000000000000 FP 0x000000013EC6AA50 LR 0x00000001382F80F8 V0 0xAFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF AFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF V1 0x6963702F66666666 6666666666666666 V2 0x697363732F312C31 406567646972622D V3 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V4 0x0000000000000400 0000000000000000 V5 0x4010040140100401 4010040140100401 V6 0x0004000000000000 0004000000000000 V7 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V8 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V9 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V10 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V11 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V12 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V13 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V14 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V15 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V16 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V17 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V18 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V19 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V20 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V21 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V22 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V23 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V24 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V25 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V26 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V27 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V28 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V29 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V30 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V31 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 SP 0x000000013EC6AA50 ELR 0x00000001380F7400 SPSR 0x60000205 FPSR 0x00000000 ESR 0x8600000E FAR 0x00000001380F7400 ESR : EC 0x21 IL 0x1 ISS 0x0000000E Instruction abort: Permission fault, second level Stack dump: 000013EC6A950: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6A970: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6A990: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6A9B0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6A9D0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6A9F0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6AA10: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001380F7400 0000000060000205 000013EC6AA30: 0000000000000000 000000008600000E 00000001380F7400 0000000400000800 > 000013EC6AA50: 000000013EC6AB50 00000001382F8198 0000000138367370 000000013A6EEA98 000013EC6AA70: 0000000138CDB698 000FD00000000000 00000001381F5018 0000000000000000 000013EC6AA90: 0000000000000000 00000001382F3D18 0000000000001000 0000000000000000 000013EC6AAB0: 000000013BFF0018 000000013A4BA518 000000013A6D2F98 0000000000000000 000013EC6AAD0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001382F4000 00000000000CBAE0 000013EC6AAF0: 0000000200000001 0000000000000000 000000013A6D2AC0 11D295625B1B31A1 000013EC6AB10: 3B7269C9A0003F8E 0000000000000000 00000001382F3F98 000000003EC6AB58 000013EC6AB30: 000000013EC6AB60 800000000000000E 000000013EC6AB80 0000000000000000 ASSERT [ArmCpuDxe] .../ArmPkg/Library/DefaultExceptionHandlerLib/AArch64/DefaultExceptionHandler.c(265): ((BOOLEAN)(0==1)) ----------------- The "shim.efi" binary is not built with the required section alignment, but that's not a problem, it only elicits a warning, and that's it. "shim.efi" still proceeds to load "grubaa64.efi". However, "grubaa64.efi" blows up. I experience the same with my "RHEL for ARM 7.3" guest. In my "openSUSE Tumbleweed" guest, "shim.efi" isn't actually used; there the "opensuse" UEFI boot option refers to grub directly. There I even catch the message "Welcome to GRUB!", but then it crashes too: --------------- [Bds]Booting opensuse FSOpen: Open '\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi' Success [Bds] DevicePath expand: HD(1,GPT,3E62269B-A0A1-4F3C-B404-081796D9CDB4,0x800,0x4E000)/\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi -> PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,GPT,3E62269B-A0A1-4F3C-B404-081796D9CDB4,0x800,0x4E000)/\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi [Security] 3rd party image[0] can be loaded after EndOfDxe: PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,GPT,3E62269B-A0A1-4F3C-B404-081796D9CDB4,0x800,0x4E000)/\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi. InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageProtocol] 13A69FD40 Loading driver at 0x00138391000 EntryPoint=0x00138391400 Loading driver at 0x00138391000 EntryPoint=0x00138391400 InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageDevicePathProtocol] 138CD4E98 ProtectUefiImageCommon - 0x3A69FD40 - 0x0000000138391000 - 0x000000000002E600 !!!!!!!! ProtectUefiImageCommon - Section Alignment(0x200) is incorrect !!!!!!!! Welcome to GRUB! ^M Synchronous Exception at 0x00000000FFFF1F3C X0 0x00000000FFFF3720 X1 0x00000000FFFF1F3C X2 0x000000000000000D X3 0x000000013839FA30 X4 0x00000000FFFF1F3C X5 0x00000000FFFF0800 X6 0x00000000FFFF1000 X7 0x0000000000000000 X8 0x00000000FFFF2120 X9 0x000000000000001F X10 0x0000000000000000 X11 0x000000013EC6A880 X12 0x0098989800989898 X13 0x0098989800989898 X14 0x0000000000000001 X15 0x0000000000000003 X16 0x000000013EC6ABD0 X17 0x0000000000000000 X18 0x0000000000000000 X19 0x00000000FFFF3720 X20 0x0000000138399000 X21 0x0000000138399000 X22 0x0000000000000000 X23 0x0000000000000000 X24 0x0000000000000000 X25 0x0000000000000000 X26 0x0000000000000000 X27 0x0000000000000000 X28 0x0000000000000000 FP 0x000000013EC6AB60 LR 0x00000001383980CC V0 0xAFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF AFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF V1 0x6963702F66666666 6666666666666666 V2 0x697363732F312C31 406567646972622D V3 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V4 0x0000000000000400 0000000000000000 V5 0x4010040140100401 4010040140100401 V6 0x0004000000000000 0004000000000000 V7 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V8 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V9 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V10 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V11 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V12 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V13 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V14 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V15 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V16 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V17 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V18 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V19 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V20 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V21 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V22 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V23 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V24 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V25 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V26 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V27 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V28 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V29 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V30 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V31 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 SP 0x000000013EC6AB60 ELR 0x00000000FFFF1F3C SPSR 0x60000205 FPSR 0x00000000 ESR 0x8600000D FAR 0x00000000FFFF1F3C ESR : EC 0x21 IL 0x1 ISS 0x0000000D Instruction abort: Permission fault, first level Stack dump: 000013EC6AA60: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6AA80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6AAA0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6AAC0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6AAE0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6AB00: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6AB20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000FFFF1F3C 0000000060000205 000013EC6AB40: 0000000000000000 000000008600000D 00000000FFFF1F3C 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AB60: 000000013EC6AB80 0000000138399650 00000001383AAA18 0000000000000000 000013EC6AB80: 000000013EC6ABD0 000000013EC71E50 000000013A732218 000000013A747718 000013EC6ABA0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6ABC0: 0000000000000000 000000013A747718 000000013EC6AC50 000000013BA5C62C 000013EC6ABE0: 000000013EC6AC00 0000000138CD4060 0000000138CD4068 000000013A6EE018 000013EC6AC00: 000000013EC6AC30 000000013BA577B4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000013EC6AC20: 000000013ECA83D8 0000000000000126 000000013EC6AC50 000000013A69FD18 000013EC6AC40: 000000013A6EE018 0000000000000000 000000013EC6ACF0 000000013BA4AF88 ASSERT [ArmCpuDxe] .../ArmPkg/Library/DefaultExceptionHandlerLib/AArch64/DefaultExceptionHandler.c(265): ((BOOLEAN)(0==1)) --------------- If I revert the last patch in the series (leaving ArmVirtQemu's PCD at the default 0), then all three guests boot fine. This reminds me of the case when Star introduced the non-executable stack for DXE, we turned it on in OVMF, and that killed the grub version shipped with an older Debian release: https://www.mail-archive.com/edk2-devel@lists.01.org/msg02022.html So ultimately we had to make the PCD dynamic, and make it default to "off" (see commit ab081a50e565, "OvmfPkg: PlatformPei: take no-exec DXE settings from the QEMU command line", 2015-09-15). Thanks Laszlo _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
On 28 February 2017 at 10:46, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> wrote: > On 02/27/17 15:38, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> Hello all, >> >> First of all, thanks for the reviews and regression testing. However, I did >> not add the tested-by tags nor some of the R-b's, given the changes in this v4. >> >> This series implements a memory protection policy that removes all executable >> permissions from writable memory regions, which greatly enhances security. >> It is based on Jiewen's recent work, which is a step in the right direction, >> but still leaves most of memory exploitable due to the default R+W+X >> permissions. >> >> The idea is that the implementation of the CPU arch protocol goes over the >> memory map and removes exec permissions from all regions that are not already >> marked as 'code. This requires some preparatory work to ensure that the DxeCore >> itself is covered by a BootServicesCode region, not a BootServicesData region. >> Exec permissions are re-granted selectively, when the PE/COFF loader allocates >> the space for it. Combined with Jiewen's code/data split, this removes all >> RWX mapped regions. >> >> Changes since v3: >> - mandate that the same policy applies to EfiConventionalMemory regions and >> EfiBootServicesData regions: they are unlikely to differ in practice, and >> dealing with that corner case greatly complicates the implementation, given >> the way DxeCore allocates memory for itself in the implementation of the page >> and pool allocation routines. >> - apply the EfiConventionalMemory policy to untested RAM regions in the GCD >> memory space map: without this, we may still have a large region of RAM that >> is exploitable, and it also removes the need to apply memory protections in >> PromoteMemoryResource (), which is very difficult to achieve without a major >> restructuring of the code due to the way locking is implemented here. >> - add missing ApplyMemoryProtectionPolicy() call to CoreAddMemoryDescriptor() >> - use CoreAcquireLockOrFail() on gMemoryLock for CoreAllocatePoolPages (#4) >> - incorporate feedback from Liming (#2, #6) >> - add patch to enable the NX memory protection policy for ArmVirtPkg (#7) >> >> Changes since v2: >> - added patch to make EBC use EfiBootServicesCode pool allocations for thunks >> - redefine PCD according to Jiewen's feedback, including default value >> - use sorted memory map and merge adjacent entries with the same policy, to >> prevent unnecessary page table splitting >> - ignore policy when executing in SMM >> - refactor the logic for managing permission attributes of pool allocations >> - added some R-b's >> >> Changes since v1: >> - allocate code pages for PE/COFF images in PeiCore, so that DxeCore pages have >> the expected memory type (as suggested by Jiewen) >> - add patch to inhibit page table updates while syncing the GCD memory space >> map with the page tables >> - add PCD to set memory protection policy, which allows the policy for reserved >> and ACPI/NVS memory to be configured separately >> - move attribute manipulation into DxeCore page allocation code: this way, we >> should be able to solve the EBC case by allocating BootServicesCode pool >> memory explicitly. >> >> Series can be found here: >> https://git.linaro.org/people/ard.biesheuvel/uefi-next.git/log/?h=memprot-take2-v4 >> >> Ard Biesheuvel (7): >> ArmPkg/CpuDxe: ignore attribute changes during SyncCacheConfig() >> MdeModulePkg/PeiCore: allocate BootServicesCode memory for PE/COFF >> images >> MdeModulePkg/EbcDxe: use EfiBootServicesCode memory for thunks >> MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: use separate lock for pool allocations >> MdeModulePkg: define PCD for DXE memory protection policy >> MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: implement memory protection policy >> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc: enable NX memory protection for all >> platforms >> >> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c | 3 + >> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.h | 1 + >> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuMmuCommon.c | 4 + >> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 6 + >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h | 24 ++ >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf | 1 + >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c | 7 + >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Pool.c | 65 +++- >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c | 371 +++++++++++++++++++- >> MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Image/Image.c | 23 +- >> MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 32 ++ >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/AArch64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.c | 23 ++ >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.h | 14 + >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ia32/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ipf/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/X64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >> 17 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) >> > > I regression-tested this series for x86 / OVMF as under v3, with the zero PCD default, and experienced no issues. > > However, v4 breaks booting Fedora 24 on my Mustang (aarch64/KVM): > > ----------------- > [Bds]Booting Fedora > FSOpen: Open '\EFI\fedora\shim.efi' Success > [Bds] DevicePath expand: HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi -> PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi > [Security] 3rd party image[0] can be loaded after EndOfDxe: PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi. > InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageProtocol] 13A6D2AC0 > Loading driver at 0x001382F4000 EntryPoint=0x001382F4148 > Loading driver at 0x001382F4000 EntryPoint=0x001382F4148 > InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageDevicePathProtocol] 138CDBD98 > ProtectUefiImageCommon - 0x3A6D2AC0 > - 0x00000001382F4000 - 0x00000000000CBAE0 > !!!!!!!! ProtectUefiImageCommon - Section Alignment(0x20) is incorrect !!!!!!!! > FSOpen: Open '\EFI\fedora\grubaa64.efi' Success > > > Synchronous Exception at 0x00000001380F7400 > > X0 0x000000013A6EEA98 X1 0x000000013BFF0018 X2 0x00000001380F7400 X3 0x00000000000FD000 > X4 0x0000000000000000 X5 0x0000000000000000 X6 0x0000000138362AF4 X7 0x0000000000000000 > X8 0x000000013C01F548 X9 0x0000000200000000 X10 0x00000001380F6000 X11 0x00000001382F3FFF > X12 0x0000000000000000 X13 0x0000000000000008 X14 0x0000000000000000 X15 0x0000000000000000 > X16 0x000000013EC6ABD0 X17 0x0000000000000000 X18 0x0000000000000000 X19 0x0000000138CDB698 > X20 0x000000013A746E18 X21 0x0000000000000000 X22 0x0000000000000000 X23 0x0000000000000000 > X24 0x0000000000000000 X25 0x0000000000000000 X26 0x0000000000000000 X27 0x0000000000000000 > X28 0x0000000000000000 FP 0x000000013EC6AA50 LR 0x00000001382F80F8 > > V0 0xAFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF AFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF V1 0x6963702F66666666 6666666666666666 > V2 0x697363732F312C31 406567646972622D V3 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V4 0x0000000000000400 0000000000000000 V5 0x4010040140100401 4010040140100401 > V6 0x0004000000000000 0004000000000000 V7 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V8 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V9 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V10 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V11 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V12 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V13 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V14 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V15 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V16 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V17 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V18 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V19 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V20 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V21 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V22 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V23 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V24 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V25 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V26 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V27 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V28 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V29 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V30 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V31 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > > SP 0x000000013EC6AA50 ELR 0x00000001380F7400 SPSR 0x60000205 FPSR 0x00000000 > ESR 0x8600000E FAR 0x00000001380F7400 > > ESR : EC 0x21 IL 0x1 ISS 0x0000000E > > Instruction abort: Permission fault, second level > Hmm, that is disappointing. This is probably due to GRUB's modular nature, which means it allocates memory and loads executable code into it, under the assumption that memory is always executable in UEFI. The short term fix is to remove the NX bit from LoaderData regions, but in the mean time, I will work with Leif to get this fixed properly (assuming there is a proper way to fix this) Thanks a lot for taking the time to test this, Ard. > Stack dump: > 000013EC6A950: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6A970: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6A990: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6A9B0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6A9D0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6A9F0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AA10: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001380F7400 0000000060000205 > 000013EC6AA30: 0000000000000000 000000008600000E 00000001380F7400 0000000400000800 >> 000013EC6AA50: 000000013EC6AB50 00000001382F8198 0000000138367370 000000013A6EEA98 > 000013EC6AA70: 0000000138CDB698 000FD00000000000 00000001381F5018 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AA90: 0000000000000000 00000001382F3D18 0000000000001000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AAB0: 000000013BFF0018 000000013A4BA518 000000013A6D2F98 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AAD0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001382F4000 00000000000CBAE0 > 000013EC6AAF0: 0000000200000001 0000000000000000 000000013A6D2AC0 11D295625B1B31A1 > 000013EC6AB10: 3B7269C9A0003F8E 0000000000000000 00000001382F3F98 000000003EC6AB58 > 000013EC6AB30: 000000013EC6AB60 800000000000000E 000000013EC6AB80 0000000000000000 > ASSERT [ArmCpuDxe] .../ArmPkg/Library/DefaultExceptionHandlerLib/AArch64/DefaultExceptionHandler.c(265): ((BOOLEAN)(0==1)) > ----------------- > > The "shim.efi" binary is not built with the required section alignment, but that's not a problem, it only elicits a warning, and that's it. "shim.efi" still proceeds to load "grubaa64.efi". > > However, "grubaa64.efi" blows up. > > I experience the same with my "RHEL for ARM 7.3" guest. > > In my "openSUSE Tumbleweed" guest, "shim.efi" isn't actually used; there the "opensuse" UEFI boot option refers to grub directly. There I even catch the message "Welcome to GRUB!", but then it crashes too: > > --------------- > [Bds]Booting opensuse > FSOpen: Open '\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi' Success > [Bds] DevicePath expand: HD(1,GPT,3E62269B-A0A1-4F3C-B404-081796D9CDB4,0x800,0x4E000)/\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi -> PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,GPT,3E62269B-A0A1-4F3C-B404-081796D9CDB4,0x800,0x4E000)/\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi > [Security] 3rd party image[0] can be loaded after EndOfDxe: PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,GPT,3E62269B-A0A1-4F3C-B404-081796D9CDB4,0x800,0x4E000)/\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi. > InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageProtocol] 13A69FD40 > Loading driver at 0x00138391000 EntryPoint=0x00138391400 > Loading driver at 0x00138391000 EntryPoint=0x00138391400 > InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageDevicePathProtocol] 138CD4E98 > ProtectUefiImageCommon - 0x3A69FD40 > - 0x0000000138391000 - 0x000000000002E600 > !!!!!!!! ProtectUefiImageCommon - Section Alignment(0x200) is incorrect !!!!!!!! > Welcome to GRUB! > > ^M > > Synchronous Exception at 0x00000000FFFF1F3C > > X0 0x00000000FFFF3720 X1 0x00000000FFFF1F3C X2 0x000000000000000D X3 0x000000013839FA30 > X4 0x00000000FFFF1F3C X5 0x00000000FFFF0800 X6 0x00000000FFFF1000 X7 0x0000000000000000 > X8 0x00000000FFFF2120 X9 0x000000000000001F X10 0x0000000000000000 X11 0x000000013EC6A880 > X12 0x0098989800989898 X13 0x0098989800989898 X14 0x0000000000000001 X15 0x0000000000000003 > X16 0x000000013EC6ABD0 X17 0x0000000000000000 X18 0x0000000000000000 X19 0x00000000FFFF3720 > X20 0x0000000138399000 X21 0x0000000138399000 X22 0x0000000000000000 X23 0x0000000000000000 > X24 0x0000000000000000 X25 0x0000000000000000 X26 0x0000000000000000 X27 0x0000000000000000 > X28 0x0000000000000000 FP 0x000000013EC6AB60 LR 0x00000001383980CC > > V0 0xAFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF AFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF V1 0x6963702F66666666 6666666666666666 > V2 0x697363732F312C31 406567646972622D V3 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V4 0x0000000000000400 0000000000000000 V5 0x4010040140100401 4010040140100401 > V6 0x0004000000000000 0004000000000000 V7 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V8 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V9 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V10 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V11 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V12 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V13 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V14 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V15 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V16 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V17 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V18 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V19 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V20 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V21 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V22 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V23 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V24 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V25 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V26 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V27 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V28 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V29 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > V30 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V31 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > > SP 0x000000013EC6AB60 ELR 0x00000000FFFF1F3C SPSR 0x60000205 FPSR 0x00000000 > ESR 0x8600000D FAR 0x00000000FFFF1F3C > > ESR : EC 0x21 IL 0x1 ISS 0x0000000D > > Instruction abort: Permission fault, first level > > Stack dump: > 000013EC6AA60: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AA80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AAA0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AAC0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AAE0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AB00: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AB20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000FFFF1F3C 0000000060000205 > 000013EC6AB40: 0000000000000000 000000008600000D 00000000FFFF1F3C 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AB60: 000000013EC6AB80 0000000138399650 00000001383AAA18 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AB80: 000000013EC6ABD0 000000013EC71E50 000000013A732218 000000013A747718 > 000013EC6ABA0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6ABC0: 0000000000000000 000000013A747718 000000013EC6AC50 000000013BA5C62C > 000013EC6ABE0: 000000013EC6AC00 0000000138CD4060 0000000138CD4068 000000013A6EE018 > 000013EC6AC00: 000000013EC6AC30 000000013BA577B4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > 000013EC6AC20: 000000013ECA83D8 0000000000000126 000000013EC6AC50 000000013A69FD18 > 000013EC6AC40: 000000013A6EE018 0000000000000000 000000013EC6ACF0 000000013BA4AF88 > ASSERT [ArmCpuDxe] .../ArmPkg/Library/DefaultExceptionHandlerLib/AArch64/DefaultExceptionHandler.c(265): ((BOOLEAN)(0==1)) > --------------- > > If I revert the last patch in the series (leaving ArmVirtQemu's PCD at the default 0), then all three guests boot fine. > > This reminds me of the case when Star introduced the non-executable stack for DXE, we turned it on in OVMF, and that killed the grub version shipped with an older Debian release: > > https://www.mail-archive.com/edk2-devel@lists.01.org/msg02022.html > > So ultimately we had to make the PCD dynamic, and make it default to "off" (see commit ab081a50e565, "OvmfPkg: PlatformPei: take no-exec DXE settings from the QEMU command line", 2015-09-15). > > Thanks > Laszlo _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
On 28 February 2017 at 10:52, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: > On 28 February 2017 at 10:46, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> wrote: >> On 02/27/17 15:38, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >>> Hello all, >>> >>> First of all, thanks for the reviews and regression testing. However, I did >>> not add the tested-by tags nor some of the R-b's, given the changes in this v4. >>> >>> This series implements a memory protection policy that removes all executable >>> permissions from writable memory regions, which greatly enhances security. >>> It is based on Jiewen's recent work, which is a step in the right direction, >>> but still leaves most of memory exploitable due to the default R+W+X >>> permissions. >>> >>> The idea is that the implementation of the CPU arch protocol goes over the >>> memory map and removes exec permissions from all regions that are not already >>> marked as 'code. This requires some preparatory work to ensure that the DxeCore >>> itself is covered by a BootServicesCode region, not a BootServicesData region. >>> Exec permissions are re-granted selectively, when the PE/COFF loader allocates >>> the space for it. Combined with Jiewen's code/data split, this removes all >>> RWX mapped regions. >>> >>> Changes since v3: >>> - mandate that the same policy applies to EfiConventionalMemory regions and >>> EfiBootServicesData regions: they are unlikely to differ in practice, and >>> dealing with that corner case greatly complicates the implementation, given >>> the way DxeCore allocates memory for itself in the implementation of the page >>> and pool allocation routines. >>> - apply the EfiConventionalMemory policy to untested RAM regions in the GCD >>> memory space map: without this, we may still have a large region of RAM that >>> is exploitable, and it also removes the need to apply memory protections in >>> PromoteMemoryResource (), which is very difficult to achieve without a major >>> restructuring of the code due to the way locking is implemented here. >>> - add missing ApplyMemoryProtectionPolicy() call to CoreAddMemoryDescriptor() >>> - use CoreAcquireLockOrFail() on gMemoryLock for CoreAllocatePoolPages (#4) >>> - incorporate feedback from Liming (#2, #6) >>> - add patch to enable the NX memory protection policy for ArmVirtPkg (#7) >>> >>> Changes since v2: >>> - added patch to make EBC use EfiBootServicesCode pool allocations for thunks >>> - redefine PCD according to Jiewen's feedback, including default value >>> - use sorted memory map and merge adjacent entries with the same policy, to >>> prevent unnecessary page table splitting >>> - ignore policy when executing in SMM >>> - refactor the logic for managing permission attributes of pool allocations >>> - added some R-b's >>> >>> Changes since v1: >>> - allocate code pages for PE/COFF images in PeiCore, so that DxeCore pages have >>> the expected memory type (as suggested by Jiewen) >>> - add patch to inhibit page table updates while syncing the GCD memory space >>> map with the page tables >>> - add PCD to set memory protection policy, which allows the policy for reserved >>> and ACPI/NVS memory to be configured separately >>> - move attribute manipulation into DxeCore page allocation code: this way, we >>> should be able to solve the EBC case by allocating BootServicesCode pool >>> memory explicitly. >>> >>> Series can be found here: >>> https://git.linaro.org/people/ard.biesheuvel/uefi-next.git/log/?h=memprot-take2-v4 >>> >>> Ard Biesheuvel (7): >>> ArmPkg/CpuDxe: ignore attribute changes during SyncCacheConfig() >>> MdeModulePkg/PeiCore: allocate BootServicesCode memory for PE/COFF >>> images >>> MdeModulePkg/EbcDxe: use EfiBootServicesCode memory for thunks >>> MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: use separate lock for pool allocations >>> MdeModulePkg: define PCD for DXE memory protection policy >>> MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: implement memory protection policy >>> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc: enable NX memory protection for all >>> platforms >>> >>> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c | 3 + >>> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.h | 1 + >>> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuMmuCommon.c | 4 + >>> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 6 + >>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h | 24 ++ >>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf | 1 + >>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c | 7 + >>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Pool.c | 65 +++- >>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c | 371 +++++++++++++++++++- >>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Image/Image.c | 23 +- >>> MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 32 ++ >>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/AArch64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.c | 23 ++ >>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.h | 14 + >>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ia32/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ipf/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/X64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >>> 17 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) >>> >> >> I regression-tested this series for x86 / OVMF as under v3, with the zero PCD default, and experienced no issues. >> >> However, v4 breaks booting Fedora 24 on my Mustang (aarch64/KVM): >> >> ----------------- >> [Bds]Booting Fedora >> FSOpen: Open '\EFI\fedora\shim.efi' Success >> [Bds] DevicePath expand: HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi -> PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi >> [Security] 3rd party image[0] can be loaded after EndOfDxe: PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi. >> InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageProtocol] 13A6D2AC0 >> Loading driver at 0x001382F4000 EntryPoint=0x001382F4148 >> Loading driver at 0x001382F4000 EntryPoint=0x001382F4148 >> InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageDevicePathProtocol] 138CDBD98 >> ProtectUefiImageCommon - 0x3A6D2AC0 >> - 0x00000001382F4000 - 0x00000000000CBAE0 >> !!!!!!!! ProtectUefiImageCommon - Section Alignment(0x20) is incorrect !!!!!!!! >> FSOpen: Open '\EFI\fedora\grubaa64.efi' Success >> >> >> Synchronous Exception at 0x00000001380F7400 >> >> X0 0x000000013A6EEA98 X1 0x000000013BFF0018 X2 0x00000001380F7400 X3 0x00000000000FD000 >> X4 0x0000000000000000 X5 0x0000000000000000 X6 0x0000000138362AF4 X7 0x0000000000000000 >> X8 0x000000013C01F548 X9 0x0000000200000000 X10 0x00000001380F6000 X11 0x00000001382F3FFF >> X12 0x0000000000000000 X13 0x0000000000000008 X14 0x0000000000000000 X15 0x0000000000000000 >> X16 0x000000013EC6ABD0 X17 0x0000000000000000 X18 0x0000000000000000 X19 0x0000000138CDB698 >> X20 0x000000013A746E18 X21 0x0000000000000000 X22 0x0000000000000000 X23 0x0000000000000000 >> X24 0x0000000000000000 X25 0x0000000000000000 X26 0x0000000000000000 X27 0x0000000000000000 >> X28 0x0000000000000000 FP 0x000000013EC6AA50 LR 0x00000001382F80F8 >> >> V0 0xAFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF AFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF V1 0x6963702F66666666 6666666666666666 >> V2 0x697363732F312C31 406567646972622D V3 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V4 0x0000000000000400 0000000000000000 V5 0x4010040140100401 4010040140100401 >> V6 0x0004000000000000 0004000000000000 V7 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V8 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V9 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V10 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V11 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V12 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V13 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V14 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V15 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V16 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V17 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V18 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V19 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V20 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V21 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V22 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V23 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V24 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V25 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V26 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V27 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V28 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V29 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V30 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V31 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> >> SP 0x000000013EC6AA50 ELR 0x00000001380F7400 SPSR 0x60000205 FPSR 0x00000000 >> ESR 0x8600000E FAR 0x00000001380F7400 >> >> ESR : EC 0x21 IL 0x1 ISS 0x0000000E >> >> Instruction abort: Permission fault, second level >> > > Hmm, that is disappointing. This is probably due to GRUB's modular > nature, which means it allocates memory and loads executable code into > it, under the assumption that memory is always executable in UEFI. > > The short term fix is to remove the NX bit from LoaderData regions, > but in the mean time, I will work with Leif to get this fixed properly > (assuming there is a proper way to fix this) > Care to have a quick go at using 0xC000000000007FD1 instead? (if you are not already doing so) Thanks, Ard. >> Stack dump: >> 000013EC6A950: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6A970: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6A990: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6A9B0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6A9D0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6A9F0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AA10: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001380F7400 0000000060000205 >> 000013EC6AA30: 0000000000000000 000000008600000E 00000001380F7400 0000000400000800 >>> 000013EC6AA50: 000000013EC6AB50 00000001382F8198 0000000138367370 000000013A6EEA98 >> 000013EC6AA70: 0000000138CDB698 000FD00000000000 00000001381F5018 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AA90: 0000000000000000 00000001382F3D18 0000000000001000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AAB0: 000000013BFF0018 000000013A4BA518 000000013A6D2F98 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AAD0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001382F4000 00000000000CBAE0 >> 000013EC6AAF0: 0000000200000001 0000000000000000 000000013A6D2AC0 11D295625B1B31A1 >> 000013EC6AB10: 3B7269C9A0003F8E 0000000000000000 00000001382F3F98 000000003EC6AB58 >> 000013EC6AB30: 000000013EC6AB60 800000000000000E 000000013EC6AB80 0000000000000000 >> ASSERT [ArmCpuDxe] .../ArmPkg/Library/DefaultExceptionHandlerLib/AArch64/DefaultExceptionHandler.c(265): ((BOOLEAN)(0==1)) >> ----------------- >> >> The "shim.efi" binary is not built with the required section alignment, but that's not a problem, it only elicits a warning, and that's it. "shim.efi" still proceeds to load "grubaa64.efi". >> >> However, "grubaa64.efi" blows up. >> >> I experience the same with my "RHEL for ARM 7.3" guest. >> >> In my "openSUSE Tumbleweed" guest, "shim.efi" isn't actually used; there the "opensuse" UEFI boot option refers to grub directly. There I even catch the message "Welcome to GRUB!", but then it crashes too: >> >> --------------- >> [Bds]Booting opensuse >> FSOpen: Open '\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi' Success >> [Bds] DevicePath expand: HD(1,GPT,3E62269B-A0A1-4F3C-B404-081796D9CDB4,0x800,0x4E000)/\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi -> PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,GPT,3E62269B-A0A1-4F3C-B404-081796D9CDB4,0x800,0x4E000)/\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi >> [Security] 3rd party image[0] can be loaded after EndOfDxe: PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,GPT,3E62269B-A0A1-4F3C-B404-081796D9CDB4,0x800,0x4E000)/\EFI\opensuse\grubaa64.efi. >> InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageProtocol] 13A69FD40 >> Loading driver at 0x00138391000 EntryPoint=0x00138391400 >> Loading driver at 0x00138391000 EntryPoint=0x00138391400 >> InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageDevicePathProtocol] 138CD4E98 >> ProtectUefiImageCommon - 0x3A69FD40 >> - 0x0000000138391000 - 0x000000000002E600 >> !!!!!!!! ProtectUefiImageCommon - Section Alignment(0x200) is incorrect !!!!!!!! >> Welcome to GRUB! >> >> ^M >> >> Synchronous Exception at 0x00000000FFFF1F3C >> >> X0 0x00000000FFFF3720 X1 0x00000000FFFF1F3C X2 0x000000000000000D X3 0x000000013839FA30 >> X4 0x00000000FFFF1F3C X5 0x00000000FFFF0800 X6 0x00000000FFFF1000 X7 0x0000000000000000 >> X8 0x00000000FFFF2120 X9 0x000000000000001F X10 0x0000000000000000 X11 0x000000013EC6A880 >> X12 0x0098989800989898 X13 0x0098989800989898 X14 0x0000000000000001 X15 0x0000000000000003 >> X16 0x000000013EC6ABD0 X17 0x0000000000000000 X18 0x0000000000000000 X19 0x00000000FFFF3720 >> X20 0x0000000138399000 X21 0x0000000138399000 X22 0x0000000000000000 X23 0x0000000000000000 >> X24 0x0000000000000000 X25 0x0000000000000000 X26 0x0000000000000000 X27 0x0000000000000000 >> X28 0x0000000000000000 FP 0x000000013EC6AB60 LR 0x00000001383980CC >> >> V0 0xAFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF AFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF V1 0x6963702F66666666 6666666666666666 >> V2 0x697363732F312C31 406567646972622D V3 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V4 0x0000000000000400 0000000000000000 V5 0x4010040140100401 4010040140100401 >> V6 0x0004000000000000 0004000000000000 V7 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V8 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V9 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V10 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V11 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V12 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V13 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V14 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V15 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V16 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V17 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V18 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V19 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V20 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V21 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V22 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V23 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V24 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V25 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V26 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V27 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V28 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V29 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> V30 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V31 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> >> SP 0x000000013EC6AB60 ELR 0x00000000FFFF1F3C SPSR 0x60000205 FPSR 0x00000000 >> ESR 0x8600000D FAR 0x00000000FFFF1F3C >> >> ESR : EC 0x21 IL 0x1 ISS 0x0000000D >> >> Instruction abort: Permission fault, first level >> >> Stack dump: >> 000013EC6AA60: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AA80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AAA0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AAC0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AAE0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AB00: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AB20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000FFFF1F3C 0000000060000205 >> 000013EC6AB40: 0000000000000000 000000008600000D 00000000FFFF1F3C 0000000000000000 >>> 000013EC6AB60: 000000013EC6AB80 0000000138399650 00000001383AAA18 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AB80: 000000013EC6ABD0 000000013EC71E50 000000013A732218 000000013A747718 >> 000013EC6ABA0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6ABC0: 0000000000000000 000000013A747718 000000013EC6AC50 000000013BA5C62C >> 000013EC6ABE0: 000000013EC6AC00 0000000138CD4060 0000000138CD4068 000000013A6EE018 >> 000013EC6AC00: 000000013EC6AC30 000000013BA577B4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >> 000013EC6AC20: 000000013ECA83D8 0000000000000126 000000013EC6AC50 000000013A69FD18 >> 000013EC6AC40: 000000013A6EE018 0000000000000000 000000013EC6ACF0 000000013BA4AF88 >> ASSERT [ArmCpuDxe] .../ArmPkg/Library/DefaultExceptionHandlerLib/AArch64/DefaultExceptionHandler.c(265): ((BOOLEAN)(0==1)) >> --------------- >> >> If I revert the last patch in the series (leaving ArmVirtQemu's PCD at the default 0), then all three guests boot fine. >> >> This reminds me of the case when Star introduced the non-executable stack for DXE, we turned it on in OVMF, and that killed the grub version shipped with an older Debian release: >> >> https://www.mail-archive.com/edk2-devel@lists.01.org/msg02022.html >> >> So ultimately we had to make the PCD dynamic, and make it default to "off" (see commit ab081a50e565, "OvmfPkg: PlatformPei: take no-exec DXE settings from the QEMU command line", 2015-09-15). >> >> Thanks >> Laszlo _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
On 28 February 2017 at 10:59, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: > On 28 February 2017 at 10:52, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: >> On 28 February 2017 at 10:46, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> wrote: >>> On 02/27/17 15:38, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >>>> Hello all, >>>> >>>> First of all, thanks for the reviews and regression testing. However, I did >>>> not add the tested-by tags nor some of the R-b's, given the changes in this v4. >>>> >>>> This series implements a memory protection policy that removes all executable >>>> permissions from writable memory regions, which greatly enhances security. >>>> It is based on Jiewen's recent work, which is a step in the right direction, >>>> but still leaves most of memory exploitable due to the default R+W+X >>>> permissions. >>>> >>>> The idea is that the implementation of the CPU arch protocol goes over the >>>> memory map and removes exec permissions from all regions that are not already >>>> marked as 'code. This requires some preparatory work to ensure that the DxeCore >>>> itself is covered by a BootServicesCode region, not a BootServicesData region. >>>> Exec permissions are re-granted selectively, when the PE/COFF loader allocates >>>> the space for it. Combined with Jiewen's code/data split, this removes all >>>> RWX mapped regions. >>>> >>>> Changes since v3: >>>> - mandate that the same policy applies to EfiConventionalMemory regions and >>>> EfiBootServicesData regions: they are unlikely to differ in practice, and >>>> dealing with that corner case greatly complicates the implementation, given >>>> the way DxeCore allocates memory for itself in the implementation of the page >>>> and pool allocation routines. >>>> - apply the EfiConventionalMemory policy to untested RAM regions in the GCD >>>> memory space map: without this, we may still have a large region of RAM that >>>> is exploitable, and it also removes the need to apply memory protections in >>>> PromoteMemoryResource (), which is very difficult to achieve without a major >>>> restructuring of the code due to the way locking is implemented here. >>>> - add missing ApplyMemoryProtectionPolicy() call to CoreAddMemoryDescriptor() >>>> - use CoreAcquireLockOrFail() on gMemoryLock for CoreAllocatePoolPages (#4) >>>> - incorporate feedback from Liming (#2, #6) >>>> - add patch to enable the NX memory protection policy for ArmVirtPkg (#7) >>>> >>>> Changes since v2: >>>> - added patch to make EBC use EfiBootServicesCode pool allocations for thunks >>>> - redefine PCD according to Jiewen's feedback, including default value >>>> - use sorted memory map and merge adjacent entries with the same policy, to >>>> prevent unnecessary page table splitting >>>> - ignore policy when executing in SMM >>>> - refactor the logic for managing permission attributes of pool allocations >>>> - added some R-b's >>>> >>>> Changes since v1: >>>> - allocate code pages for PE/COFF images in PeiCore, so that DxeCore pages have >>>> the expected memory type (as suggested by Jiewen) >>>> - add patch to inhibit page table updates while syncing the GCD memory space >>>> map with the page tables >>>> - add PCD to set memory protection policy, which allows the policy for reserved >>>> and ACPI/NVS memory to be configured separately >>>> - move attribute manipulation into DxeCore page allocation code: this way, we >>>> should be able to solve the EBC case by allocating BootServicesCode pool >>>> memory explicitly. >>>> >>>> Series can be found here: >>>> https://git.linaro.org/people/ard.biesheuvel/uefi-next.git/log/?h=memprot-take2-v4 >>>> >>>> Ard Biesheuvel (7): >>>> ArmPkg/CpuDxe: ignore attribute changes during SyncCacheConfig() >>>> MdeModulePkg/PeiCore: allocate BootServicesCode memory for PE/COFF >>>> images >>>> MdeModulePkg/EbcDxe: use EfiBootServicesCode memory for thunks >>>> MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: use separate lock for pool allocations >>>> MdeModulePkg: define PCD for DXE memory protection policy >>>> MdeModulePkg/DxeCore: implement memory protection policy >>>> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc: enable NX memory protection for all >>>> platforms >>>> >>>> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.c | 3 + >>>> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.h | 1 + >>>> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/CpuMmuCommon.c | 4 + >>>> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 6 + >>>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h | 24 ++ >>>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf | 1 + >>>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c | 7 + >>>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Pool.c | 65 +++- >>>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c | 371 +++++++++++++++++++- >>>> MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Image/Image.c | 23 +- >>>> MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 32 ++ >>>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/AArch64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >>>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.c | 23 ++ >>>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcInt.h | 14 + >>>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ia32/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >>>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/Ipf/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >>>> MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/X64/EbcSupport.c | 2 +- >>>> 17 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) >>>> >>> >>> I regression-tested this series for x86 / OVMF as under v3, with the zero PCD default, and experienced no issues. >>> >>> However, v4 breaks booting Fedora 24 on my Mustang (aarch64/KVM): >>> >>> ----------------- >>> [Bds]Booting Fedora >>> FSOpen: Open '\EFI\fedora\shim.efi' Success >>> [Bds] DevicePath expand: HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi -> PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi >>> [Security] 3rd party image[0] can be loaded after EndOfDxe: PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Scsi(0x1,0x0)/HD(1,MBR,0xDB4976D3,0x800,0x64000)/\EFI\fedora\shim.efi. >>> InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageProtocol] 13A6D2AC0 >>> Loading driver at 0x001382F4000 EntryPoint=0x001382F4148 >>> Loading driver at 0x001382F4000 EntryPoint=0x001382F4148 >>> InstallProtocolInterface: [EfiLoadedImageDevicePathProtocol] 138CDBD98 >>> ProtectUefiImageCommon - 0x3A6D2AC0 >>> - 0x00000001382F4000 - 0x00000000000CBAE0 >>> !!!!!!!! ProtectUefiImageCommon - Section Alignment(0x20) is incorrect !!!!!!!! >>> FSOpen: Open '\EFI\fedora\grubaa64.efi' Success >>> >>> >>> Synchronous Exception at 0x00000001380F7400 >>> >>> X0 0x000000013A6EEA98 X1 0x000000013BFF0018 X2 0x00000001380F7400 X3 0x00000000000FD000 >>> X4 0x0000000000000000 X5 0x0000000000000000 X6 0x0000000138362AF4 X7 0x0000000000000000 >>> X8 0x000000013C01F548 X9 0x0000000200000000 X10 0x00000001380F6000 X11 0x00000001382F3FFF >>> X12 0x0000000000000000 X13 0x0000000000000008 X14 0x0000000000000000 X15 0x0000000000000000 >>> X16 0x000000013EC6ABD0 X17 0x0000000000000000 X18 0x0000000000000000 X19 0x0000000138CDB698 >>> X20 0x000000013A746E18 X21 0x0000000000000000 X22 0x0000000000000000 X23 0x0000000000000000 >>> X24 0x0000000000000000 X25 0x0000000000000000 X26 0x0000000000000000 X27 0x0000000000000000 >>> X28 0x0000000000000000 FP 0x000000013EC6AA50 LR 0x00000001382F80F8 >>> >>> V0 0xAFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF AFAFAFAFAFAFAFAF V1 0x6963702F66666666 6666666666666666 >>> V2 0x697363732F312C31 406567646972622D V3 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V4 0x0000000000000400 0000000000000000 V5 0x4010040140100401 4010040140100401 >>> V6 0x0004000000000000 0004000000000000 V7 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V8 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V9 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V10 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V11 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V12 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V13 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V14 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V15 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V16 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V17 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V18 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V19 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V20 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V21 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V22 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V23 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V24 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V25 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V26 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V27 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V28 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V29 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> V30 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 V31 0x0000000000000000 0000000000000000 >>> >>> SP 0x000000013EC6AA50 ELR 0x00000001380F7400 SPSR 0x60000205 FPSR 0x00000000 >>> ESR 0x8600000E FAR 0x00000001380F7400 >>> >>> ESR : EC 0x21 IL 0x1 ISS 0x0000000E >>> >>> Instruction abort: Permission fault, second level >>> >> >> Hmm, that is disappointing. This is probably due to GRUB's modular >> nature, which means it allocates memory and loads executable code into >> it, under the assumption that memory is always executable in UEFI. >> >> The short term fix is to remove the NX bit from LoaderData regions, >> but in the mean time, I will work with Leif to get this fixed properly >> (assuming there is a proper way to fix this) >> > > Care to have a quick go at using 0xC000000000007FD1 instead? (if you > are not already doing so) > Adding my own data point: running CelloBoard with gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy set to 0xC000000000007FD5 happily boots straight into the kernel, but crashes when booting via GRUB. Changing the value to 0xC000000000007FD1 gets things working again. _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
On 02/28/17 11:59, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On 28 February 2017 at 10:52, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: >> On 28 February 2017 at 10:46, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> wrote: >>> I regression-tested this series for x86 / OVMF as under v3, with the zero PCD default, and experienced no issues. >>> >>> However, v4 breaks booting Fedora 24 on my Mustang (aarch64/KVM): >> Hmm, that is disappointing. This is probably due to GRUB's modular >> nature, which means it allocates memory and loads executable code into >> it, under the assumption that memory is always executable in UEFI. >> >> The short term fix is to remove the NX bit from LoaderData regions, >> but in the mean time, I will work with Leif to get this fixed properly >> (assuming there is a proper way to fix this) >> > > Care to have a quick go at using 0xC000000000007FD1 instead? (if you > are not already doing so) With the following patch on top: > commit ef6be33275e45045a15201a15a2be26e6fbabcaa > Author: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> > Date: Wed Mar 1 00:06:37 2017 +0100 > > ArmVirtPkg: remove the NX bit from LoaderData regions > > msgid <CAKv+Gu8V4o0-s9jhQSM5hFaaC6yppdC001MiuBX830WrXi_VKQ@mail.gmail.com> > > Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> > Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 > Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> > > diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc > index 23b601a199ed..4d3ae5d0bc80 100644 > --- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc > +++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc > @@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild.AARCH64] > # Enable NX memory protection for all non-code regions, including OEM and OS > # reserved ones. > # > - gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy|0xC000000000007FD5 > + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy|0xC000000000007FD1 > > [Components.common] > # all three guests mentioned previously boot okay. (I also made sure that the "applying strict permissions..." messages showed up in the firmware log for each.) Thanks Laszlo _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
I fail to get this working on my target. I've enabled the following Pcd's like in ArmVirt: gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdImageProtectionPolicy|0x3 gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy|0xC000000000007FD1 gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSetNxForStack|TRUE but apparently, DxeCore removes the executable permission from it's own code. after the BL instruction of the call to gCpu->SetMemoryAttributes I get an instruction permission fault: InitializeDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy: applying strict permissions to active memory regions SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x0000000080200000 - 0x0000000008C00000 (0x0000000000004000) SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x0000000089000000 - 0x0000000004A00000 (0x0000000000004000) SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x000000008EC00000 - 0x0000000000400000 (0x0000000000004000) SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x000000008F700000 - 0x0000000000700000 (0x0000000000004000) SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x000000008FF00000 - 0x000000006E095000 (0x0000000000004000) SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x00000000FDFB9000 - 0x0000000000047000 (0x0000000000004000) SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x00000000FE400000 - 0x0000000001C00000 (0x0000000000004000) Prefetch Abort Exception PC at 0xFEEA630E CPSR 0x20000033 nzCveaifT_svc Build/LittleKernelPkg/DEBUG_GCC5/ARM/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain/DEBUG/DxeCore.dll loaded at 0xFEEA4000 (PE/COFF offset) 0x230E (ELF or Mach-O offset) 0x130E 0xBF00 IT EQ R0 0x00000000 R1 0x01C00000 R2 0x00000000 R3 0x00000000 R4 0x00000000 R5 0x00026000 R6 0x00000000 R7 0xFE000214 R8 0x80000000 R9 0xFE400000 R10 0xFFFEF000 R11 0x00000004 R12 0x00000002 SP 0xFFFFEBA0 LR 0xFDF98B4D PC 0xFEEA630E DFSR 0x00000000 DFAR 0x00000000 IFSR 0x0000000D IFAR 0xFEEA630E Instruction Permission fault on Section at 0xFEEA630E ASSERT [ArmCpuDxe] ArmPkg/Library/DefaultExceptionHandlerLib/Arm/DefaultExceptionHandler.c(268): ((BOOLEAN)(0==1)) ---- so did I miss anything? Thanks Michael On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 12:46 AM, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> wrote: > On 02/28/17 11:59, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> On 28 February 2017 at 10:52, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: >>> On 28 February 2017 at 10:46, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> wrote: > >>>> I regression-tested this series for x86 / OVMF as under v3, with the zero PCD default, and experienced no issues. >>>> >>>> However, v4 breaks booting Fedora 24 on my Mustang (aarch64/KVM): > >>> Hmm, that is disappointing. This is probably due to GRUB's modular >>> nature, which means it allocates memory and loads executable code into >>> it, under the assumption that memory is always executable in UEFI. >>> >>> The short term fix is to remove the NX bit from LoaderData regions, >>> but in the mean time, I will work with Leif to get this fixed properly >>> (assuming there is a proper way to fix this) >>> >> >> Care to have a quick go at using 0xC000000000007FD1 instead? (if you >> are not already doing so) > > > With the following patch on top: > >> commit ef6be33275e45045a15201a15a2be26e6fbabcaa >> Author: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> >> Date: Wed Mar 1 00:06:37 2017 +0100 >> >> ArmVirtPkg: remove the NX bit from LoaderData regions >> >> msgid <CAKv+Gu8V4o0-s9jhQSM5hFaaC6yppdC001MiuBX830WrXi_VKQ@mail.gmail.com> >> >> Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> >> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 >> Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> >> >> diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc >> index 23b601a199ed..4d3ae5d0bc80 100644 >> --- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc >> +++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc >> @@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild.AARCH64] >> # Enable NX memory protection for all non-code regions, including OEM and OS >> # reserved ones. >> # >> - gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy|0xC000000000007FD5 >> + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy|0xC000000000007FD1 >> >> [Components.common] >> # > > all three guests mentioned previously boot okay. > > (I also made sure that the "applying strict permissions..." messages showed up in the firmware log for each.) > > Thanks > Laszlo > _______________________________________________ > edk2-devel mailing list > edk2-devel@lists.01.org > https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
On 13 March 2017 at 09:43, Michael Zimmermann <sigmaepsilon92@gmail.com> wrote: > I fail to get this working on my target. I've enabled the following > Pcd's like in ArmVirt: > gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdImageProtectionPolicy|0x3 > gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy|0xC000000000007FD1 > gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSetNxForStack|TRUE > > but apparently, DxeCore removes the executable permission from it's own code. > after the BL instruction of the call to gCpu->SetMemoryAttributes I > get an instruction permission fault: > > InitializeDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy: applying strict permissions to > active memory regions > SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x0000000080200000 - 0x0000000008C00000 > (0x0000000000004000) > SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x0000000089000000 - 0x0000000004A00000 > (0x0000000000004000) > SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x000000008EC00000 - 0x0000000000400000 > (0x0000000000004000) > SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x000000008F700000 - 0x0000000000700000 > (0x0000000000004000) > SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x000000008FF00000 - 0x000000006E095000 > (0x0000000000004000) > SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x00000000FDFB9000 - 0x0000000000047000 > (0x0000000000004000) > SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x00000000FE400000 - 0x0000000001C00000 > (0x0000000000004000) > > Prefetch Abort Exception PC at 0xFEEA630E CPSR 0x20000033 nzCveaifT_svc > Build/LittleKernelPkg/DEBUG_GCC5/ARM/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain/DEBUG/DxeCore.dll > loaded at 0xFEEA4000 (PE/COFF offset) 0x230E (ELF or Mach-O offset) 0x130E > 0xBF00 IT EQ > R0 0x00000000 R1 0x01C00000 R2 0x00000000 R3 0x00000000 > R4 0x00000000 R5 0x00026000 R6 0x00000000 R7 0xFE000214 > R8 0x80000000 R9 0xFE400000 R10 0xFFFEF000 R11 0x00000004 > R12 0x00000002 SP 0xFFFFEBA0 LR 0xFDF98B4D PC 0xFEEA630E > DFSR 0x00000000 DFAR 0x00000000 IFSR 0x0000000D IFAR 0xFEEA630E > Instruction Permission fault on Section at 0xFEEA630E > > ASSERT [ArmCpuDxe] > ArmPkg/Library/DefaultExceptionHandlerLib/Arm/DefaultExceptionHandler.c(268): > ((BOOLEAN)(0==1)) > > ---- > > so did I miss anything? > You are using PrePi, right? _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
> You are using PrePi, right? yes. Isn't that supported yet? afaik ArmVirtXen uses PrePi too. On Mon, Mar 13, 2017 at 9:50 AM, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: > On 13 March 2017 at 09:43, Michael Zimmermann <sigmaepsilon92@gmail.com> wrote: >> I fail to get this working on my target. I've enabled the following >> Pcd's like in ArmVirt: >> gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdImageProtectionPolicy|0x3 >> gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy|0xC000000000007FD1 >> gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSetNxForStack|TRUE >> >> but apparently, DxeCore removes the executable permission from it's own code. >> after the BL instruction of the call to gCpu->SetMemoryAttributes I >> get an instruction permission fault: >> >> InitializeDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy: applying strict permissions to >> active memory regions >> SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x0000000080200000 - 0x0000000008C00000 >> (0x0000000000004000) >> SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x0000000089000000 - 0x0000000004A00000 >> (0x0000000000004000) >> SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x000000008EC00000 - 0x0000000000400000 >> (0x0000000000004000) >> SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x000000008F700000 - 0x0000000000700000 >> (0x0000000000004000) >> SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x000000008FF00000 - 0x000000006E095000 >> (0x0000000000004000) >> SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x00000000FDFB9000 - 0x0000000000047000 >> (0x0000000000004000) >> SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes - 0x00000000FE400000 - 0x0000000001C00000 >> (0x0000000000004000) >> >> Prefetch Abort Exception PC at 0xFEEA630E CPSR 0x20000033 nzCveaifT_svc >> Build/LittleKernelPkg/DEBUG_GCC5/ARM/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain/DEBUG/DxeCore.dll >> loaded at 0xFEEA4000 (PE/COFF offset) 0x230E (ELF or Mach-O offset) 0x130E >> 0xBF00 IT EQ >> R0 0x00000000 R1 0x01C00000 R2 0x00000000 R3 0x00000000 >> R4 0x00000000 R5 0x00026000 R6 0x00000000 R7 0xFE000214 >> R8 0x80000000 R9 0xFE400000 R10 0xFFFEF000 R11 0x00000004 >> R12 0x00000002 SP 0xFFFFEBA0 LR 0xFDF98B4D PC 0xFEEA630E >> DFSR 0x00000000 DFAR 0x00000000 IFSR 0x0000000D IFAR 0xFEEA630E >> Instruction Permission fault on Section at 0xFEEA630E >> >> ASSERT [ArmCpuDxe] >> ArmPkg/Library/DefaultExceptionHandlerLib/Arm/DefaultExceptionHandler.c(268): >> ((BOOLEAN)(0==1)) >> >> ---- >> >> so did I miss anything? >> > > You are using PrePi, right? _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
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